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READING ROOM 





LIBRARY 


OF THE 


UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA. 


Class Univ. of Californie 
Withdrawn 














ss 





AN AMBASSADOR OF 
THE VANQUISHED 


AN AMBASSADOR OF 
THE VANQUISHED 


VISCOUNT ELIE DE GONTAUT-BIRON’S 
MISSION TO BERLIN, 1871—1877 


FROM HIS DIARIES AND MEMORANDA 


By 


THE DUKE DE BROGLIE 


TRANSLATED, WITH NOTES, BY 
ALBERT D. VANDAM 


AUTHOR OF ‘‘AN ENGLISHMAN IN PARIS” 


se ~<A > 
OF THE 
UNIVERSITY 


WLALIFORNIA 





New Mork 
MACMILLAN AND CO. 
1896 





CONTENTS © + 


PART: 3 
PAGE 


THE LIBERATION OF THE TERRITORY ek ae ae I 


PART II 
THE MINISTRY OF MAY 24, 1873... rey ae Nr AS, 


PART III 
THE EPISCOPAL CHARGES AND THE CRISIS OF 1875 ... I4I 


PART IV 


THE EASTERN QUESTION AND THE BERLIN MEMORAN- 
DUM—THE ELECTIONS OF 1877—THE RESIGNATION 24I 


RO2?O 372 





= 





I 


THE LIBERATION OF THE 
TERRITORY 










OF THE 
UNIVERSITY 


\ CALIFORWE 


THE LIBERATION OF THE TERRITORY 


I 


Viscount Eure (Elias) de Gontaut-Biron 
represented France at Berlin in the capacity of 
ambassador from December 4, 1871, till’ the last 
days of 1877. At the time that mission was 
confided to him, part of the Treaty of Peace 
concluded with Germany in consequence of our 
disasters was already being carried out. Two 
out of the five milliards of the war indemnity 
stipulated for by Clause 2 of that Treaty were on 
the eve of being paid, by means of a loan subscribed 
with marvellous rapidity by the resources of the 
country in the way of savings and national energy. 
But three more remained to be paid, and six 
French departments were to be held in pledge by 
the troops of the victor until the whole should 
have been settled. Moreover, the new limits of 
our territory, so sadly mutilated, were not exactly 
defined. In other words, nothing was finally con- 
cluded, and the possibility of new conflicts, or rather 
of fresh misfortunes, had by no means vanished 
from the horizon. The slightest disagreement 


S carte 


4 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


with regard to the manner and time of payment, 
or in connection with the mapping out of the 
contested districts, a scuffle between the victorious 
soldiers and the vanquished populations on this 
or that occupied spot, any or all of those contin- 
gencies might place us once more, just as during 
the negotiations for peace itself, in the alternative 
of having to make painful concessions, or of 
resuming a hopeless resistance ; we were, in fact, 
under the heel of the victor, who was still the 
master, to interpret according to his own will the 
conditions he himself had dictated. 

It was that victor whom the representative of 
France had to go and confront at Berlin, ze. at 
the seat of his power, in order to discuss with 
him questions still pregnant with so much stress 
and storm. No one was more surprised than M. 
de Gontaut himself at being called upon, or rather 
condemned to assume that perilous honour. He 
himself takes care to remind us in Recollections, 
which his kindly confidence has enabled us to 
read,’ that nothing, absolutely nothing, had 
prepared him for that task. Until he was well 
advanced in life, he had stood aloof from all 
public office. Sprung from one of the oldest and 
most illustrious families of France, his fealty to 
hereditary traditions and convictions had kept him 
from all participation in politics during the whole 


? The memoirs in question have, it appears, not been published 
as yet. 
2 M. de Gontaut-Biron was born in 1817,—TRANSLATOR. 


THE LIBERATION OF THE TERRITORY = 5 


of the Second Empire. It was only after our 
defeats that the suffrages of the electors of the 
Lower Pyrenees had gone in search of him in that 
retreat to send him to the National Assembly. 
The sympathy he had never felt towards the 
dynasty that came to an end on September 4 was 
equally conspicuous by its absence with regard to 
the Republic which was improvised that day, and 
under ordinary circumstances he would have had 
no desire to take service under it. 

But the word “ordinary” had lost its signifi- 
cance at that critical hour. The possibility of 
rendering the slightest service to the land of 
one’s birth, fallen into such a depth of misfortune, 
imposed on men of all parties the duty of forget- 
ting, at any rate for the time being, their dearest 
attachments. Hence, it had been agreed from 
the very first days of the opening of the Assembly, 
that, in order to facilitate the patriotic concord, 
the Republican form, adopted in the hour of intense 
excitement by the population of Paris, should be 
considered merely as a temporary label, and that 
all questions bearing on the definite’ constitution 
of the Government should be postponed to the 
day when France should be free from the foreign 
yoke under which she was smarting. In the par- 
lance of those days, which is gradually being 
forgotten as they recede, this was called “the 
Bordeaux pact.” It was M. Thiers himself who 
had solemnly proclaimed the conditions of that 


6 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


truce of parties. It was on the occasion of his 
investiture with the supreme power by the unani- 
mous suffrages of the National Assembly, and 
the words he used left apparently no room for 
ambiguous interpretation. He promised oz his 
honour, and on the penalty of being considered as 
guilty of treason, to attempt nothing himself 
against that truce, nor to allow others to attempt 
anything against it. Did he deceive himself with 
regard to the sense of his words and the extent 
of his engagements? It is a delicate point, on 
which I should be reluctant to insist, and only 
then if the exposition of facts made it absolutely 
necessary. 

In this instance it is sufficient to remind the 
reader that, whether it was justified or not, M. de 
Gontaut’s confidence was as complete as that of 
others placed in a similar position, and to whom 
M. Thiers made analogous offers, or rather on 
whom he imposed the same duties. Not one of 
these would have lent himself to them if for a 
single moment they could have supposed that the 
smallest renunciation of their monarchical con- 
victions was required of them in consequence. 
Those who, like M. de Gontaut, had been en- 
trusted with a seat in the new Parliament would 
have been particularly scrupulous not to desert it 
if they had thought that their absence was calcu- 
lated to compromise the cause which in their 
opinion constituted the hope of the country. 


THE LIBERATION OF THE TERRITORY 7 


It was in that frame of mind, and not without 
a good deal of hesitation and repugnance, that 
M. de Gontaut, an ambassador greatly surprised 
at being one, took the road to Berlin. The very 
mixed feelings that animated him on the day he 
was to take his first official step in handing the 
new Emperor his credentials, cannot be better 
described than he himself has described them in 
terms rendered eloquent by their sincerity. ‘ Be- 
hold me then,” he says, “compelled to don a 
uniform for the first time in my life. I may own 
that I felt more or less uncomfortable at. my own 
appearance in a coat with gold lace on every seam, 
a sword getting between my legs, and a cocked 
hat with white feathers on my head. Mingling 
with the serious and sad reflections of the moment 
there come some less grave and more humorous 
impressions at the sight of my costume, or at the 
sound of ‘Your Excellency’ from the grand 
seigneurs, as well as from the subalterns. I 
rubbed my eyes in order to ascertain whether I 
had been taken with a sudden access of giddiness, 
or whether my eyesight was perfectly clear. I 
asked myself whether it was I, a descendant of 
those who warred in the Crusades, who, in the 
name of the President of the French Republic, was 
about to present myself as the ambassador of my 
sadly disturbed country to the new Emperor of 
Germany in all the glitter of his success, sur- 
rounded by triumphant generals like himself; 


8 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


whether it was I who was going afterwards to 
pay court to the Empress amidst her ladies of 
honour attired in all their splendour as on gala 
days? I asked myself all this as I stood alone 
amidst a crowd of unknown faces, and listening 
to a language I did not understand. Was it a 
dream? Was it a nightmare? It was both the 
one and the other; it was a multitude of diverse 
sensations such as one might experience during 
a troubled sleep, in which brilliant scenes become 
complicated by impossible, unlikely, and ridiculous 
situations, from which one is relieved only by 
becoming awake.” 

The procession and escort that came to take 
the ambassador made their way along the Unter 
den Linden, lined by a sight-loving population, 
whose demeanour was, however, becoming 
throughout, and the military of all grades in 
particular stood at the salute, and deferentially 
put their hands to their helmets. ‘I thought in 
a melancholy way,” said M. de Gontaut never- 
theless, ‘‘that I resembled those kings of antiquity 
vanquished and despoiled by the Romans, and who 
came to swell the triumphs of the victors.” 

I am pleased to be able to say in common 
fairness that there was nothing calculated to increase 
the bitterness of those thoughts in the subsequent 
interviews with the Emperor and the various 
members of the Imperial family. On the contrary, 
every one of them visibly tried to spare the dignity 


THE LIBERATION OF THE TERRITORY 9 


of the vanquished one and to make his position 
bearable. ‘When the doors of the reception- 
room were thrown open I entered alone, and 
beheld in the centre of the apartment a tall, 
martial, and kindly-looking man, standing upright, 
bareheaded, and wearing the ribbon of the Legion 
of Honour. I advanced towards him bowing 
deeply. He on his side advanced to meet me.” 
This was the opportunity to deliver a little speech 
drawn up under the supervision of M. Thiers, 
and of which the following was the principal 
sentence: ‘Invested by the eminent man who 
actually presides over the destinies of France 
with a mission than which none could be more 
honourable, that of renewing regular and pacific 
relations between two great nations, I make bold 
to trust to your Majesty’s goodwill to help me to 
discharge my task with all the loyalty I am 
anxious to bring to bear upon it. Peace with 
honour is an essential thing to nations.” 

At the sound of the words “loyalty” and 
“honour,” particularly emphasized by the speaker, 
the Emperor slightly inclined his head in token 
of assent. ‘I share every one of those senti- 
ments,” he said afterwards. ‘I will endeavour 
to make your stay in Berlin as agreeable as 
possible.” 

From the Emperor M. de Gontaut had to pass 
to the Empress. All those who knew that 
Princess are aware of the particular liking she 


1o AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


displayed from her youth for French literature 
and society, and the graceful ease with which she 
spoke our language. It is not surprising, then, 
that it should have pleased her to prolong with 
marked goodwill the official interview, and to 
become so forgetful of the etiquette of a first 
audience as to make the ambassador sit down. 
She recalled little details from M. de Gontaut’s 
family history which she had heard from her Paris 
friends and acquaintances, and dwelt especially 
on particulars connected with his respected mother 
whom he had recently lost. ‘‘ You have no doubt 
made a great sacrifice in accepting the embassy 
to Berlin, but you have done the right thing, and 
you may depend on me to prevent your repenting 
of the step.” 

One did not expect similar assurances of good- 
will from the heir to the throne, afterwards 
Emperor Frederick, one of the combatants in 
the struggle that had just come to an end, and 
for that very reason those assurances assumed 
a greater significance. Nevertheless, the words 
he uttered, full of generous and lofty thoughts, 
will astonish no one who has since then watched 
with deep concern the last phase of that noble 
prince’s life. He also spoke of France and of 
the recollections he had left behind him there, 
without avoiding speaking of the very latest. 

“TI know lots of people in France; I have 
even seen some during the late events.” ‘‘ Yes,” 


THE LIBERATION OF THE TERRITORY 11 


replied M. de Gontaut, “you have seen the 
Bishop of Orleans, who has a very vivid recol- 
lection of the sentiments expressed by your 


Imperial Highness.” ‘‘ Yes, that’s just it, Mon- 
seigneur Dupanloup,” remarked the Prince with 
great animation; “unfortunately he was just 


going away to Bordeaux, and I was only able 
to talk to him for ten minutes. Our two countries 
have had a terrible bleeding,” he went on; “like 
yourselves, we have had some considerable and 
very bad losses. Now we must stick to peace.” 
“That is the feeling with which I have come 
to Berlin,” said M. de Gontaut. ‘ There is some 
merit on our side in wishing for peace, for we 
are paying a heavy price for it, but peace is 
useful to Germany as it is to France.” “Yes, 
you are right, peace is good for everybody.” 
And the Princess, whom at present we call 
Empress Victoria (Empress Frederick), repeated 
the words “with a kind of gentle energy.” 
The consideration one shows to the weak, 
and which sadly marks their position, may touch 
but do not console them. To be the object of 
such consideration amidst the discreet surround- 
ings of private interviews was sufficiently painful 
to M. de Gontaut; still more painful was it to 
find himself their object amidst the brilliant 
receptions and entertainments which succeeded 
one another during that year at the Court of 
Prussia, the splendour of those entertainments 


12 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


being enhanced by the feeling of triumph of the 
entertainers. The first of those entertainments 
was a magnificent concert. 

‘‘When the Emperor and Empress made their 
appearance,” says M. de Gontaut, ‘“‘there was a 
deep silence, and the first strains of the music 
rose on the air. Up till then I was mainly 
swayed by curiosity, but at that moment my 
heart sank, and I began to analyze my own 
sensations. I began to account to myself for the 
scene at which I was looking; they were our 
conquerors I had before me, they who had 
beaten, humiliated, and pitilessly treated us. I 
was seated at the foot of their throne; I repre- 
sented vanquished, diminished, lowered France. 
I may own that my heart’s anguish was such as 
to find almost vent in tears, and that for the first 
time in my life the sounds of a magnificent 
orchestra, as they fell upon my ears, were odious 
tome. To revive my courage, I ceased looking 
at the scene before me, and turned my thoughts 
to those higher regions where serenity and peace 
hold undivided sway—towards that heavenly 
court, very different in its brilliancy from the 
brilliancy of earthly courts ; towards that heavenly 
court which knows neither the insolent triumphs 
of mere strength, nor sorrows that cannot be 
healed ; towards that heavenly court, where the 
vanquished, the disinherited, and all those who 
have fought the good fight of life are at rest. 


THE LIBERATION OF THE TERRITORY 13 


That moment of introspection comforted me. 
About a quarter past eleven the concert was 
over, the princes retired, the company slowly left 
the White Room, and at midnight I was at home, 
chewing the cud of my own thoughts with regard 
to that brilliant entertainment, amidst a silence 
unbroken by any sound without, and in a room 
flooded with moonlight. My mind dwelt un- 
consciously on all those harmonious chords, on 
all those princes, on the interchange of compli- 
ments; in one word, on everything that had 
caused so much noise and commotion but one 
short hour ago, and which, at the time I write, is 
gone for ever, like everything that is merely of 
this world—gone, vanished, lost into eternity.” 
In diplomacy, the period for the interchange 
of mere compliments, while it should not be 
treated with indifference, passes quickly by to 
make room for that of transacting business, 
consequently for entering into discussions. The 
first discussion M. de Gontaut had to sustain with 
Herr von Bismarck, or rather the first meeting 
he had to face (discussion was out of the question), 
was on a subject that could not be broached with- 
out emotion on the ambassador’s part. All the 
French prisoners had by no means been given 
up at the conclusion of peace. Prussia still kept 
within her fortresses not only some of the 
regulars accused of having committed, during 
their captivity, acts of insubordination or other 


14 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


offences, but also those who, forming no part of 
the regular army, had been taken “arms in 
hand”; for, by a more than doubtful interpret- 
ation of international law, the Prussian generals 
never consented to look upon the freely-organized 
contingents (des corps francs) as entitled to the 
consideration which, according to the usages of 
all civilized nations, is due to belligerents. They, 
the Prussian generals, would not concede those 
rights even to the corps organized under official 
approval. As a consequence, they had often 
punished with death acts of legitimate defence, 
and flattered themselves that they were showing 
great clemency when inflicting an indefinite term 
of captivity on those whom they considered guilty 
of such defence. Among those prisoners were 
some of the flower of our country. 

M. de Gontaut, acting on instructions from 
M. Thiers, resolutely set to work to plead their 
cause. The greatest difficulty, however, lay in 
doing this with Herr von Bismarck himself, who, 
after having welcomed the ambassador at a first 
interview with a brusqueness to which he wished 
to impart the semblance of cordiality, made him- 
self generally invisible, referring the more delicate 
questions at issue to his Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, Herr von Thile, who in his turn had 
never sufficient latitude given to him to settle 
them; hence M. de Gontaut never did more 
than draw a few individual concessions from him, 


THE LIBERATION OF THE TERRITORY 15 


which, moreover, were limited to the lot of the 
purely military captures. M. de St. Vallier, who 
was at Nancy at that time, charged by M. Thiers 
with the communications between himself and 
General von Manteuffel, commanding the army 
of occupation, and who pursued assiduously ‘a 
similar course, was not more lucky than M. de 
Gontaut in that respect." Months went by, and 
there seemed to be no end to the hardships borne 
by the ill-fated captives. At last, one day at a 
dinner-party, M. de Gontaut happened to be 
seated by the side of the terrible Chancellor. It 
is a well-known fact that his somewhat forbidding 
aspect and his colossal height (M. de Gontaut 
says, ‘“‘He gives one the impression of a Goth 
or a Visigoth,”), whence he, as it were, dominates 
his interlocutor, make it rather difficult to open 
a conversation with him. Nevertheless, this was 
an opportunity it would have been unwise not to 
embrace, and M. de Gontaut made up his mind 
to seize it, and to get the load from off his heart. 
It was a by no means easy task, for his powerful 
neighbour, who saw no doubt what he was aiming 
at, deliberately interrupted him by a long mono- 
logue on the best way to obtain good vintages, 
and treated the conveniently-handy subject with 

1M. de St. Vallier was Minister Plenipotentiary at Stuttgart 
at the outbreak of the war, and succeeded M. de Gontaut-Biron 
as Ambassador to Berlin. It was during his mission that the 


French Embassy on the Pariser Platz was rebuilt, at a cost of 
£24,000.—TRANS. 


16 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


an inexhaustible flow of language, testifying to a 
deep study of the question. It was only just 
before the party broke up that M. de Gontaut 
was enabled to slip in a word, which was imme- 
diately taken up most animatedly. Herr von 
Bismarck insisted energetically on the necessity 
of curbing French ardour, and to guard by 
examples of just severity his troops which were 
still in France from the dangers to which they 
were exposed every day in their contact with the 
inhabitants of the “occupied” provinces. Had 
he not just heard that some peasants tried for 
having killed two German soldiers in a quarrel 
had been acquitted by juries of two departments 
(Aisne and Seine et Oise)? It was therefore 
useless to depend on French justice; he was 
compelled to provide his own police. 

“« After all,” remarked Herr von Bismarck, ‘“‘what 
you are complaining is the consequence of war.” 
‘‘All the more reason,” replied M. de Gontaut, 
“not to prolong the thing beyond the war 
itself.” 

The conversation ended, though, with a word 
of hope, which M. de Gontaut construed into a 
kind of promise. He was wrong, for, the fulfil- 
ment of the supposed promise being delayed, he 
thought he might venture to refresh the Chan- 
cellor’s memory by a letter addressed to him 
directly. ‘I was but a novice in diplomacy,” he 
said ingenuously. And, in fact, though he had 


THE LIBERATION OF THE TERRITORY 17 


carefully avoided every expression that might read 
like a reproach, Herr von Bismarck pretended to 
be offended at being accused of breaking his word, 
and made the pretext the opportunity for defer- 
ring the hoped-for amnesty until the conclusion 
of a more important negotiation, which was not 
terminated until several months later. 

That negotiation aimed at nothing less than at 
the alleviation, in advance of the date fixed before- 
hand, of the enormous burden that weighed upon 
us, and to accelerate the moment of our complete 
deliverance. The painful treaty signed at Frank- 
fort the year before had fixed May 12, 1874, as 
the latest date for the payment of the three 
milliards still due, and for the cessation at the 
same time of the occupation of the territory which 
was held as a guarantee for that payment. Truly, 
a special clause gave France the option to dis- 
charge her debt before that day by a series of 
advance payments on account, but no provision 
had been made as to the consideration that should 
accrue to us in return for those advanced pay- 
ments, if made, whether in the extent of the 
territory occupied or the number of troops, whose 
maintenance devolved on the French Treasury. 
M. Thiers intended to claim a proportional and 
gradual decrease of those two burdens. 

There was nothing excessive in that claim, for 
in every kind of transaction natural equity pre- 
scribes that the value of the pledge shall be kept 

c 


18 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


proportionate to the amount of the debt. But it 
would have been neither prudent nor feasible to 
ask for more. Truly, in an analogous situation 
the Duc de Richelieu, speaking in the name of 
Louis XVIII. at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, 
had, by sheer weight of character and by the 
benevolent support of Russia, obtained an imme- 
diate and unconditional termination of a similar 
period of trial which was not to expire for a long 
while, but the condition of things and the states 
of mind were far different. Herr von Bismarck 
had none of the generous feelings of Alexander L; 
we had no aid to expect from any of the European 
Powers. Thenew Emperor of Germany could not 
be asked to show the consideration for the uncer- 
tain and provisional state of Republican France, 
which the allied Powers of 1815 had shown to 
the monarchical principle represented by the 
envoy of royalty restored. This time we could 
look for no other attenuation of our lot than that 
of our own forestalling of the sacrifices exacted 
from us. 

But in that particular direction one might 
advance boldly and make the largest offers with- 
out the least fear of being embarrassed in their 
performance. The ease with which the first loan 
had been subscribed attested a strength of the 
national thrift that promised as easy a response 
to a second, no matter how short the interval 
between the two, and even if the second should 


THE LIBERATION OF THE TERRITORY 19 


considerably exceed the first. M. Thiers felt per- 
fectly safe in announcing that the first of the 
three still outstanding milliards would be at the 
disposal of Germany in the first half of 1872, and 
the last two in the course of the following year. 
The next thing to do was to obtain a proportional 
reduction in the extent of the occupation after 
each payment. Those were the terms in which 
the negotiations were to be opened by M. de 
Gontaut at Berlin, and in Paris by M. Thiers with 
the ambassador of Prussia, Count von Arnim. 
But at the first word uttered, it - became 
patent that this unexpected proof of the financial 
resources of France—which astonished Europe, 
and inspired us with a justified revival of hope— 
was received by our victors with very different 
feelings. The surprise showed them the mistake 
they had made, and they were scarcely able to 
hide their annoyance. In fixing the amount of the 
indemnity at a figure hitherto unprecedented, one 
which appalled the imagination, the idea had been 
to deal at the wealth and credit of the nation, 
already so cruelly tried, a blow from which she 
would not recover for a long while, if ever. This 
turned out to be a mistake, seeing that the burden 
was so lightly borne, but the error they secretly 
regretted was that of not having asked for more. 
Then when they saw the wounded one, whom 
they believed to be utterly prostrate, get up and 
recover his strength in a marvellously short time, 


zo AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


there was the annoyance of having to give him 
his liberty to make use of that strength. More- 
over, was not this very hurry to pay at once and 
at any price somewhat suspicious? Did not the 
hurry to be rid of the German troops hide the 
design to embark in military preparations away 
from their surveillance, with the view of having 
recourse as soon as possible, and in the hope of 
a prompt revenge, to the chances of another war ? 
That fear, on the face of it, seemed confirmed by 
the activity with which, at the same moment, the 
National Assembly assiduously devoted itself to 
the task of reconstructing our shattered army, with 
an ardour such that M. Thiers himself appeared 
unable to restrain it, inasmuch as he dissented on 
several points with the parliamentary commissions, 
notably on the points of compulsory service, and 
the inordinate increase of the effective number of 
troops which would be its result. The conclusion 
was that, in the interests of peace, Germany should 
be in no hurry to relinquish the means to check 
the intention to provoke her, the signs of which 
she fancied she could detect. 

Sincere though this feeling of uneasiness was 
with some, it was, if not altogether assumed, at 
any rate considerably exaggerated by others, who 
were not unwilling to take advantage of it; for 
this near renewal of hostilities on France's part 
which they professed to dread was almost openly 
and eagerly desired by a powerful party, especially 


THE LIBERATION OF THE TERRITORY 21 


among the military extourage of the Emperor. 
Convinced, as they said they were, that the 
feeling of irritation prevailing in France would 
inevitably lead to a renewed struggle, whether 
sooner or later, was it not wiser to face it at once, 
when their heel was still on the throat of the 
enemy, and all the roads to the capital practically 
open? Moreover, seeing that the operation which 
was meant to weaken her for ever had failed in 
its aim, this would be the moment to make it 
complete. Truly, some of them remarked, that 
even with the prospect of a more or less imminent 
renewal of the war,.it would be to Germany’s 
interest to begin proceedings by getting hold of 
the three milliards, which would serve to cover 
the cost of that war, instead of leaving the money 
to the French Treasury. But the majority were 
in favour of keeping the territory due to their 
victory, and in military circles it was over and 
over again repeated, that if France had paid 
4,999,999,999 francs of her debt, not a single 
German ought to leave the ground occupied until 
the last franc was in Germany’s pockets. The 
reports of this provoking language were so wide- 
spread, that one day an English paper, as a rule 
well-informed, gave the news that if France refused 
to’ give her promise to suspend her armaments, 
the German ambassador would be recalled, and 
the army of occupation would take the field once 
more. 


22 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


The extreme coolness with which M. de Gon- 
taut’s first references to the subject which he was 
instructed to make, in the form of discreet hints, 
were received is explained by the somewhat 
complex views which have just been alluded to, 
and it became the ambassador’s business to dis- 
entangle them and to make them understood. 
This, as it were, constituted the moral part of the 
negotiation, which only he was in a position to 
pursue, amidst the surroundings in which he was 
placed. With regard to the material difficulties 
of all kinds hampering a hitherto unparalleled and 
gigantic financial operation, M. Thiers brought 
to bear upon this solution all the inexhaustible 
resources of a mind and a promptness and at 
the same time suppleness of decision which as- 
tounded even the experienced financiers whom he 
made his instruments. Unfortunately, the only 
one to confront him was the German ambassador 
in Paris, Count von Arnim, a peevish and unbusi- 
ness-like interlocutor, who, as was suspected then 
already and proved afterwards, only reflected very 
impartially the mental disposition and intentions 
of his masters. In Berlin only was it possible to 
read their real feelings clearly and to probe their 
inmost hearts. ‘Truly, to do this it required the 
subtlety of observation with which M. de Gon- 
taut found himself all at once endowed, and which 
at the first trial must have left him thoroughly 
convinced, in spite of what he said himself, that 


THE LIBERATION OF THE TERRITORY 23 


his diplomatic apprenticeship would not be a long 
one. In a profession in which a knowledge of 
men is of infinitely greater value than mere book- 
learning, there has been no more convincing 
proof than his, that the thing one is likely to know 
is that which one would have never known if an 
apprenticeship to it had been necessary. In judg- 
ing M. de Gontaut to be fully fitted for the 
delicate task that had been confided to him, with- 
out the need of adding anything to his natural 
gifts, developed by the practice of polite society, 
M. Thiers had judged correctly, and beén served 
by his luck. 

The capacity to listen and to understand, 
however, was one thing, to get hold of an inter- 
locutor was another, and the more difficult of the 
two. ‘Prussian interiors are very much walled- 
in,’ wrote M. de Gontaut on January 29, 1872, 
‘‘and this holds good of the higher as of the less 
elevated sections of society. The great distrust 
of foreigners has been a tradition here since 
the time of Frederick the Great. The princes 
never talk politics, and one never sets eyes on 
them except at official receptions. Herr. von 
Bismarck is practically invisible. The represent- 
atives of the German courts quiver in their shoes 
before the Chancellor, and those of other courts 
are scarcely more free of speech. Those are the 
elements by the aid of which one is compelled to 
look and to judge, and you will admit that there 


24 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


is a great risk of venturing too far, especially to 
one who is so little seasoned as I am as yet.” 

If, as M. de Gontaut subsequently says, the 
ice was broken very soon, his rapid advance into 
a midst which lent itself so little to it, was due to 
a union of good qualities which are sure to be 
appreciated quickly, not only in social intercourse, 
but on the scene of the most important transac- 
tions ; namely, a prepossessing manner, which did 
not detract from the dignity, the charm, and the 
firmness of his intercourse; secondly, a great 
delicacy of feeling, and even the advantage of 
being a delightful talker. Besides, M. de Gon- 
taut was not the only one that was thus endowed, 
and who utilized those gifts. He was seconded 
by his numerous and lovable family, the members 
of which, owing to grand alliances contracted 
previously to the war, met at once with an affec- 
tionate and almost familiar welcome in the higher 
spheres of Prussian society, and who in that 
way were enabled to approach several royal 
personages ‘on a footing of respectful intimacy. 
Thanks to those facilities, and to the art of keep- 
ing an open door to all sorts of communications, 
M. de Gontaut managed to gather in a short time, 
and from the best sources, many bits of information 
exceedingly useful to his purpose, of giving those 
in Paris an exact idea of what was being said and 
thought and occurred in Berlin. 

First of all came the great banker, the financial 


THE LIBERATION OF THE TERRITORY = 25 


auxiliary of Herr Von Bismarck. “I am bound 
to tell you” (says Herr Bleichroeder in a con- 
fidential interview) “that Herr von Bismarck is 
very pleased to see you here, but he is not pleased 
with M. Thiers.” ‘But why?” I asked. ‘“Be- 
cause M. Thiers is increasing the French army to 
an inordinate extent. Prince Bismarck is anxiously 
watching the reorganization of your army. He 
finds that the war budget is eighty millions of 
francs in excess of the preceding budgets. He 
assures us that the new ‘effectivé’ exceeds that 
of the Empire, which would be contrary to the 
promises given to him: personally at Versailles by 
M. Thiers. That is the dark point at the horizon ; 
the only one, perhaps, that worries Prince Bis- 
marck with regard to the maintenance of peace.” 

A few days afterwards came the turn of one 
of M. de Gontaut’s colleagues, the Minister of a 
great foreign court. He went still further in 
his revelations. ‘The military party,” said that 
envoy, “will always reproach Bismarck with 
having given up Belfort to France, and they have 
not altogether abandoned the idea of prolonging 
the military occupation, perhaps to make it per- 
manent. They are well aware that this would be 
altogether at variance with the treaties, but they 
are counting on some imprudent act on your part, 
on some delay in the fulfilment of your engage- 
ments; also probably on troubles among your- 
selves, which they would convert into a pretext 


-26 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


for their designs. At all events that party is 
strongly inclined to occupy your departments as 
long as possible, and, after what I have just told 
you, you will not fail to understand the reason 
of it.” 

‘A little while after that,” adds M. de Gontaut, 
‘‘a member of the Bundesrath (the Federal Council 
of the Empire) said to me, ‘ There is a strong 
wish here to keep Belfort. The war, according 
to calculations, has cost Germany about four 
milliards ; they would be very willing to cry quits 
with you for the fifth milliard if you would let 
them keep Belfort.’” 

To cap the whole, there was an interview of 
the same kind with a personage more important 
than all the rest, with him who, perhaps, to a 
greater degree than Lazare Carnot, had deserved 
the title of the organizer of victory, in effect, with 
Marshal von Moltke. The interview was of M. 
de Gontaut’s own seeking. Aware of the exag- 
gerated terms in which the efforts of the National 
Assembly to replace the scattered army were 
being discussed by the Prussian Staffs, the am- 
bassador broached the subject point-blank to 
Moltke, by asking him if he had any knowledge 
of the report on the new military law presented 
by M. de Chasseloup-Laubat. 

“T have read it,” replied the Marshal; “he 
reports in favour of compulsory service. Do you 
think he will get it?” As will be seen directly, 


THE LIBERATION OF THE TERRITORY 27 


that question bore directly on the chief preoccu- 
pation of the Prussian Government. “I am 
unable to say,” I remarked to the Marshal; ‘I 
am unable to say; opinions are very much 
divided. M. Thiers is scarcely inclined to com- 
pulsory service; but you have got it here, and 
the majority of the European states are adopting 
it one after the other.. Hence there is a general 
tendency in France to apply it.” ‘I cannot deny 
it,” said the Marshal; “still as yet I fail to see 
in what direction the Assembly will decide... . 
Meanwhile,” he went on, rather more vivaciously 
than was his wont, and with a slightly bitter 
smile, ‘‘meanwhile, M. Thiers seems pretty busy 
in reconstructing that army. Next spring it will 
be in a position to commence war.” 

Then, as if afraid that he had gone too far, he 
warmly disclaimed all desire for a renewal of 
hostilities, and even emphatically mentioned his 
own wish that the occupation should come to an 
end as soon as possible, in the interest of the 
German troops themselves. He in that way 
confirmed, as it were, seriously what he had said 
a few days previously in a jocular manner, namely, 
that material existence in France was so easy and 
sweet that it had the effect of spoiling his soldiers 
for their profession. 

Contrary to the habits of, most diplomatic 
agents, M. de Gontaut says very little of himself 
in his dispatches. From an innate feeling of 


28 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


modesty (sufficiently rare among our countrymen), 
he seems to be convinced that, with reference to 
the advice he was called upon to give, that which 
was said to him was of greater interest than his 
own replies or remarks. In spite of that reserve, 
one cannot help being struck by the justness of 
perception and promptness of reply which enabled 
him to show more than once (and that notwith- 
standing his slight practical knowledge of military 
matters) that the measures at which Germany 
professed to take umbrage were, after all, only the 
indispensable minimum of endeavour on the part 
of France to reconstruct her shattered ‘“ cadres,” 
and precaution to repair her broken lines of 
defence. Gontaut’s loyalty, which was admitted 
on all sides after a little while, and the character 
of good faith that stamped all his words, gave 
great weight to his statements. They were, 
moreover, confirmed by M. Thiers in a very 
sustained correspondence, in which, warned of 
the nature of the difficulties that were obstructing 
his hopes, he brought to bear upon the removal 
of those prejudices and obstacles that mixture of 
clearness and dash that invested truth from his 
lips with an almost irresistible strength. 

But whatever the effect of those protestations, 
the choicest passages of which M. de Gontaut 
carefully communicated with a view to their 
reaching the Emperor himself, every eye re- 
mained, nevertheless, fixed on our Assembly, and 


THE LIBERATION OF THE TERRITORY 29 


every ear strained to catch the sound of the 
debates on the law of recruitment, which were 
at that moment just beginning to occupy the 
attention of the Chamber. It was patent that 
the decision for which we were being kept waiting 
would depend on the turn of those debates; and 
I have already indicated the capital point which 
aroused the most anxious curiosity to the whole 
of military society, but to the Emperor himself 
more than to any one, namely, the introduction 
so ardently desired by a section of the Assembly 
of compulsory and personal military service. Not 
that the generals, who had practical proof of what 
in reality constituted the strength of the French 
soldier, were seriously alarmed at the enormous 
cipher which in consequence of that general 
call might somewhat indefinitely multiply their 
quantity. In reality the number caused them 
no anxiety, for they felt certain that Germany 
would always be able to place more men in line 
than we; and besides, more than one of those 
generals had his doubts with regard to the system 
of compulsory service in itself. But the ardour 
displayed by the French in their rush to meet a 
sacrifice, the burden of which would be especially 
felt by the better provided classes, the enthusiastic 
shouts that had greeted the fiery words of the 
Duc d’Audiffret-Pasquier, enjoining on every 
citizen the duty to learn the practice of arms; 
all these, according to them, were the signs 


30 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


revealing, still according to them, not an impulse 
of lofty patriotism, but an impatient thirsting 
for reparation and revenge. It was like the 
bugle sounding a general uprising. They were 
awaiting the final resolution of the Assembly as 
the touchstone which would enable them to judge 
of the degree of confidence they were to place 
in our pacific intentions. 

At the same time, this was the very subject 
on which M. Thiers felt the most easy, not only 
with regard to offering the most formal assurances, 
but, as it were, to lavish them, for there was no 
subject on which he had a more decided opinion 
and a more deep-seated conviction. It is well 
known that he clung to both these in his retire- 
ment, and till the last day of his life, and that on 
the eve of his death he gathered his friends 
around him to beseech them not to lend them- 
selves to a mode of recruitment the unavoidable 
consequence of which was the shortening of the 
term of service, which shortening would, according 
to him, spoil the mechanism of no matter what 
army by swamping it in a confused and _indis- 
ciplined mass. Therefore it would be absolutely 
beside the truth to say that he authorized M. 
de Gontaut to promise in his (Thiers’) name that 
he would not allow the system of compulsory 
service to be legally adopted. If there were 
such a pledge at all, he had taken it beforehand, 
not with regard to Germany, but with regard to 


THE LIBERATION OF THE TERRITORY | 31 


France and to himself, in the patriotic interest of 
a national defence. But he made no secret of 
his resolve, and assured the Prussian Government 
that he felt sufficiently strong to overcome all 
resistance. Hence on April 26, 1872, the report 
spread that he was about to give way to the 
repeated instances of the Parliamentary Commis- 
sion. ‘I am told,” he writes, “that M. de 
Bismarck is displeased at two things.” (The 
first being only an insignificant detail as to the 
mode of payment of the various sums to be paid, 
I think it unnecessary to reproduce it.) ‘“ But the 
second,” he goes on to say, ‘is an agreement 
between me and the Commission, entitled the 
Army Commission on the principle of compulsory 
service. Those two things are absolutely untrue 
(sont fausses). 1 am in favour of an army which 
knows its business, and am against a revolutionary 
army, as unfit to wage war within as without. I 
shall, perhaps, be obliged to make concessions in 
the way of words, but I will make no concessions 
whatsoever with regard to things. Whosoever 
has had business dealings with men knows that 
one is, as a rule, compelled to the former, even 
under circumstances of the sincerest and staunchest 
convictions.” 

Truth to tell, his able and clever minister for 
Foreign Affairs, M. de Rémusat, did not altogether 
share his confidence. ‘I doubt,” he wrote on 
May 12, “if the King of Prussia would have 


32 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


felt particularly assured if he could have heard 
the speech of M. le Duc d’Audiffret-Pasquier,' 
who, as far as talent went, unquestionably deserved 
his immense success, but who at the same time, 
I fear, is not quite as prudent as he is eloquent. 
He drew thunders of applause in favour of com- 
pulsory service, and I have no need to tell you 
with what suspicion Germany views the system 
which, nevertheless, would probably give us an 
army more anarchical than warlike. You may 
boldly give it forth that M. Thiers has come to 
an understanding with the Assembly, and is under 
the impression that he will really obtain what he 
desires by means of a concession of words and 
an amendment which will be accorded to him. 
He is very sincere in that assurance, but I may 
tell you in all confidence, that this question of the 
reorganization of the army has always impressed 
me as being the most critical of all, and if there 
be a rock on which we are likely to split, I am 
sadly afraid it will be that one.” 

M. de Rémusat’s mistrust was not devoid of 
foundation. Every one, in fact, has heard of the 
strength of will and energy it wanted on M. 
Thiers’ part to restrain the generous impetuosity 


1M. d’Audiffret-Pasquier made two speeches during that 
memorable month of May 1872. The first, that of May 4, 1872, 
which is evidently that alluded to by M. de Rémusat, caused intense 
excitement, and raised him in public opinion to the front rank of 
parliamentary orators. It drew a violent reply from M. Rouher, 
whom he answered in a second speech (May 22), which was con- 
sidered even more powerful than the first.—TRANS. 


THE LIBERATION OF THE TERRITORY 33 


of the Assembly. The compromise arrived at 
between him and the Parliamentary Commission 
consisted in the acceptance, fundamentally, of 
compulsory service combined with the mainten- 
ance of active service for five years, which 
combination obliged the authorities to take only 
half the contingent each year, lest the effective 
number of troops should exceed the proportions 
which the budget could possibly bear. But from the 
moment that mutual understanding was established, 
M. Thiers refused to overstep his concession by 
so much as a hair’s-breadth. He even opposed 
with all his strength a modest amendment to 
reduce the active service from five years to four, 
and went as far as to declare in the Tribune itself, 
that if the law were modified in that direction he 
would decline the responsibility of applying it. 
It was in the fear of a crisis which no one cared 
to provoke that the amendment, already with- 
drawn by its author and re-introduced by a rather 
obscure member, only secured an insignificant 
number of votes. 

A comparison between two dates is in itself 
sufficient to show the effect of that sitting, the 
recollection of which is still vivid in the minds of 
all who were members of the Assembly. The 
final vote was given in the evening of June Io, 
and a fortnight afterwards—namely, on the 29th 
—a negotiation, the delays and indecision of 
which had been prolonged for months, could be 

D 


34 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


promptly terminated at Versailles by the signing 
of a Convention, the clauses of which partly 
responded to M. Thiers’ hopes and wishes.’ 

I say “partly,” for there were still several 
points wanting to complete the satisfaction of M. 
Thiers. The Convention stipulated clearly enough 
that two departments should be evacuated im- 
mediately after the payment of the first half- 
milliard (of the remaining three), and two other 
departments after the integral discharge of the 
second, which was fixed for March 1, 1874. But 
although there was a clause which implied clearly 
enough the successive reduction of the number of 
troops in consequence, nothing precise had been 
stipulated in that respect, and the relief of this or 
that department might entail a heavier burden on 
another. The evacuated departments, moreover, 
were to remain (according to the Treaty) neutral 
ground in the military sense until the final 
execution of the operation, that is, there could be 


1 There is evidently a slight mistake on the author’s part, which 
I do not feel justified in altering in the text. He distinctly says a 
fortnight (guznze jours), but, according to his dates, nineteen days 
went by between the passing of the law and the signing of the 
Convention by M. de Rémusat and Count von Arnim. He is 
distinctly correct in his dates ; the law passed on the 1oth, and was 
promulgated on June 27. The Convention was also signed on the 
date he assigns. Inasmuch as he lays great stress on the shortness 
of the interval, the error may be a slip of the pen, or a printer’s 
error, or he has merely used the words guznze jours in a more or 
less accurate sense. I am translating from the first, and what 
appear to me 7o¢ finally corrected proofs, for the sake of dispatch.— 
TRANS. 


SAE > 
OF THE 
UNIVERSITY 





OF THE TERRITORY 35 


no agglomeration of troops nor erection of new 
fortresses. Finally, a delay for the discharge of 
the third milliard had been granted until May 1, 
1875, although such delay had not been asked 
for. Truly, there was also the option on France’s 
part to substitute before that period financial 
guarantees of recognized weight for the territorial 
guarantees. Those various conditions attested a 
persistent and by no means gracious mistrust, and 
betrayed the secret hope, maybe, to take advan- 
tage of possible complications. Hence, when the 
text of the Convention became known, there was 
a rather visible disappointment on the part of the 
nation which had hoped for better things. 

Charged by the Commission of the Assembly, 
to which the Treaty had to be submitted, with the 
report thereon, I did my utmost to hide that 
feeling, but the assent, which could not be with- 
held, was given in a sad and silent manner, 
although unanimously. Truly, a popular ratifica- 
tion of a different character, and of much greater 
importance, followed close ; namely, the issue of a 
loan of three milliards, covered in a few days by 
subscriptions which attained nearly forty times 
the amount asked for. The ill-humour of the 
creditor mattered little after that to the debtor, 
who, holding his ransom in the palm of his hand, 
might safely believe himself to be nigh his hour 
of deliverance. 

For the nonce, in fact, the proof admitted of no 


36 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


reply. Verily, France was resuscitated, and she 
would have to be reckoned with once more, a 
nation which, scarcely recovered from so terrible 
a fall, showed herself capable and disposed to use 
the sinews of war in such a large-handed manner. 
The success was beyond all expectation. The 
very lively impression it produced in Europe 
came in the nick of time, perhaps, to modify the 
character of a solemn meeting which was to be 
held at Berlin, and in which M. de Gontaut would 
be called upon to take a greater part than had 
apparently been reserved to him. 

In the course of the previous year the Emperor 
of Austria had received at Gastein a visit from 
the new Emperor of Germany—a doleful act of 
politeness, only tending to establish beyond a 
doubt the triumph of an erstwhile rival who had 
become all-powerful, but which, nevertheless, was 
all the more significant, and at the same time 
equally necessary to return. 

The arrival, then, in Berlin, of the Sovereign 
and Prime Minister of Austria, timed to take 
place about the very beginning of the autumn, 
seemed perfectly natural ; but what caused greater 
surprise was the news that Czar Alexander II., 
either as a self-invited or bidden guest, intended 
to make a third at the interview. Was it to bea 
real congress, that meeting? And if so, what 
would be its meaning and aim. The English 
and German papers immediately swarmed with 


THE LIBERATION OF THE TERRITORY 37 


comments of all kinds on the subject. Given the 
place of meeting, it could not be admitted for a 
moment that the host called upon to preside at 
that meeting would permit in his very presence a 
discussion of the extraordinarily important facts 
that had been accomplished but a short time 
since to his glory and profit. There remained, 
then, only one supposition, namely, that he 
intended, on the contrary, to ask for, nay to 
demand, perhaps, their consecration by means of 
the sanction of his fellow-monarchs, in order to 
make those facts the starting-point and basis of a 
new European code of the law of nations. 

The conjecture was all the more natural, inas- 
much as that mode of conferring legitimacy of a 
certain sort, by a general assent after the fact, on 
possessions more or less regularly acquired, tallied 
sufficiently well with past traditions, and in par- 
ticular with those of the grand Congress of 
Vienna, which were still vividly imprinted on 
everybody’s memory as the heroic days of diplom- 
acy. In fact, was it not in a similar manner 
that the powers which foregathered on that 
memorable occasion, after dividing among them- 
selves the spoil of the vanquished one of 
Waterloo, and allotting crowns and territories at 
their own sweet will, had affixed their collective 
guarantee to their work, and by so doing recip- 
rocally pledged themselves to allow no attempt 
against it except by their unanimous agreement 


- 
- 


38 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


and consent. In reality, that was the rule which 
had prevailed for nearly forty years; the treatiés 
of 1815 figuring meanwhile as the charter of an 
international pact, which had not been deviated 
from save on very rare occasions, and after 
protracted negotiations and a series of conferences 
and protocols. Was that the 7é/e reserved now 
for the Treaty of Frankfort? Was it to be 
converted into the principal clause of a new policy 
of mutual insurance between the three great 
Powers of the North? Those proposed articles 
of European partnership might appear somewhat 
belated on the part of Herr von Bismarck, for no 
one more than he had openly made it a point not 
to be trammelled by any consideration for con- 
ventions, or of interests other than those of his 
master. No one had been more assiduous in 
dissuading Wilhelm to admit of intervention or 
even of comment that might hamper him in the 
most rigorous and extended application of his 
rights as a victor. In that way he had twice 
re-arranged the map of Central Europe without 
permitting witnesses, even those most interested 
in that new distribution, to as much as lift their 
voices. It did indeed seem strange that, after 
having kept his neighbours at arm’s-length during 
the action, he now wished to induce them to 
guarantee the identical points with regard to 
which he had conspicuously abstained from con- 
sulting them. Was this a reason, though, why 


THE LIBERATION OF THE TERRITORY 39 


the new German Empire, after having allotted to 
itself everything it deemed fit to take, should not 
seek to secure for itself, in order to keep what it 
had taken, the eventual co-operation of those 
whose counsels were neither asked nor probably 
would have been listened to if offered? Not at 
all. In thus changing his tone and carriage in 
accordance with altered circumstances, the Prussian 
Minister was only imitating once more the grand 
model whose example. it has always been his 
boast to reproduce. In order to understand 
Bismarck thoroughly, one must before everything 
else study Frederick the Great. The invader of 
Silesia, after having laid violent hands on his 
prey without taking advice or listening to re- 
monstrance, was nevertheless most anxious after- 
wards to obtain the recognition and guarantee of 
his possession by all the united Powers, which 
assembled a few years later at the Congress of 
Aix-la-Chapelle. 

What we really had to fear, then, was a 
confirmation and even an aggravation of the 
painful position in which we were placed, for it 
was not a matter of indifference to us to see the 
chain of our conquered provinces riveted still 
more tightly by two additional links, and a restric- 
tion of the chances which the unexpected whims 
of Fortune keep in reserve for the just causes 
she has allowed to be defeated: M. de Gontaut, 
who had come to spend a few days in France 


- 


40 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


after the signing of the Convention, received 
orders to return immediately to his post with 
instructions to watch everything in order to 
ascertain whether the conversation between the 
royal (? imperial) personages would result in 
something more than an interchange of friendly 
assurances, and, above all, whether it would lead 
to anything like a verbal convention or a written 
instrument. 

It did not take M. de Gontaut long to become 
practically sure that, if an idea of that kind had 
been entertained at Berlin, the reception of the 
first overtures in that direction had not been 
of a nature to encourage it. The first dazzling 
effects caused by the brilliant Prussian victories 
were beginning to wear off, and the spectators, 
struck fora moment with stupor, were gradually 
coming to their senses, and felt more or less ill- 
at-ease. All those who sooner or later would be 
bound to have dealings with the favourite of 
fortune looked with apprehension at the pre- 
ponderant power looming in front of them, and 
with which no one would be sufficiently strong 
to cope. On every frontier of the German Empire 
there became evident the kind of uneasiness caused 
by the lateral pressure of a volume of water, even 
when undisturbed, which is too vast for its banks, 
and ever ready to overflow them. Seeing that 
France, which people imagined to be utterly 
crushed, seemed to be reviving, the idea presented 


THE LIBERATION OF THE TERRITORY 41 


itself to many that one day she might be called 
upon to assume a part that would serve as a basis 
of resistance against the colossus whose growth 
has been so complacently watched; and that 
presentiment was not without its influence on 
the friendly welcome M. de Gontaut received 
from the two imperial visitors to Berlin and their 
ministers, a welcome the very reverse of that 
of Herr von Bismarck, who. was : disagreeably 
surprised at M. de. Gontaut’s hurried return. 
On the part of the Austrians, however, the 
expression of that feeling was, though sufficiently 
patent, more or less reserved and not unmixed. 
This was but natural; Austria was strongly 
suspected, and not without reason, of having 
expressed sincere wishes for our success during 
the whole duration of the war. Recent: revela- 
tions have even shown that she had- promised 
us her aid on certain conditions, the fulfilment 
of which the ministers of Napoleon III. had the 
incredible imprudence not to await. Any mark 
of sympathy would have given umbrage, which 
in her actual isolated and unsupported position 
it was highly important to avoid; hence M. de 
Gontaut’s conversations with the Emperor always 
took place in the presence of a numerous gather- 
ing, and although they were sufficiently prolonged 
to arouse the attention and displeasure of certain 
witnesses of them, nothing was ever said beyond 
vague general statements and remarks. Different 


- 


42 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


was the attitude of Russia, simply because her 
situation was equally different. She had rendered 
good service to the victor during the war, inas- 
much as the constant dread of her ever-threatening 
intervention had deprived us of all support from 
the outside ; she had reaped the fruit of her good 
offices by freeing herself, in virtue of the Con- 
vention recently signed in London, from all the 
consequences of her Crimean defeats, and by 
recovering for her navy the free run and the 
empire of the Black Sea. At the end of the 
game the parties to it were quits, and at liberty 
to regulate their future relations with one another 
as best they liked. The perfect frankness of the 
Czar’s language during the interview he granted 
M. de Gontaut attested that independence. 

After having, according to diplomatic custom, 
inquired about the health of the Chief of the 
State, the Czar went on, saying—‘“I hold M. 
Thiers in the most profound esteem. Be kind 
enough to convey to him my assurance that he 
has nothing to fear from what is going on here. 
France might have been certain beforehand that 
I would bear no share in anything that might be 
attempted against her.” 

In his turn, Chancellor Gortschakoff considered 
it his duty to add his comments to those profes- 
sions already so reassuring. ‘His Majesty’s 
language conveys very accurately the sentiments 
of the Russian Government,” he said. ‘‘ We are 


THE LIBERATION OF THE TERRITORY 43 


interested in and sympathetic to France. France 
must be both strong and wise: she must be wise 
in order to play the part assigned to her in the 
world; she must be wise just because she must 
be able to play her part with authority, and in 
order to make her action yield beneficent results. 
Take heart for yourself, and also reassure M. 
Thiers. If you fulfil the engagements under- 
taken by you nothing else will be required of you. 
People are talking of your army and its reorgan- 
ization, it is but natural that these matters should 
not be looked at with indifference here; but on 
that point Germany has not the faintest right to 
address the slightest objection to you. You do 
what you please, and you are right... .” Then 
he went on—‘ With regard to what has passed 
between us here, there may have been an inter- 
change of views and ideas, but there has been 
no protocol. We are parting without the smallest 
scrap of writing between us. Do not fail to 
inform your Government to that effect.” 

It was the same idea that was expressed a few 
days later, and in a somewhat more epigram- 
matic manner, by a Russian agent who occupied 
a most important position. All those who have 
had occasion to meet with him will recognize 
him by the somewhat thoughtless animation 
of his utterances.! ‘‘ Russia and Austria,” he 


1 T have an idea that the Russian agent referred to was M. 
Hamburger, who was sometime, and may be still, as far as I know, 


44 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


said, ‘have no wish to intervene in the question 
of the annexations that have been accomplished. 
Prussia began the war without consulting the 
other European Powers; she has had the luck 
of being victorious; she has made use of her 
victory according to her own will, without inviting 
the assent of Russia and Austria. She has 
acted on her own absolute responsibility. (Ade 
a agt &@ ses risques et périls.) What has been 
won by war may be lost in war. She has 
conquered; if she should be conquered when 
her turn comes is none of our business.” 

At the still troubled period, when those assur- 
ances of a sympathetic support on the part of 
Russia were given to us, there might have been 
a doubt as to their sincerity and durableness. 
Subsequent facts have proved that France was 
right in trusting to them. We know how bril- 
liantly and firmly the successor of Alexander II. 
persisted in his line of conduct, which was as 
loyal as it was sensible. An attempt to show 
what were its origin and starting-point may not 
be without interest, if for no other purpose than 
to divide equably between the father and the son 
the honour and gratitude due to them. 

And now let us glance for a moment at the 





the Russian minister in Switzerland. But it is nothing more than 
an idea, for the author’s description, except in one point, is too 
vague to go by. M. Hamburger was somewhat famed for his clever 
but nearly always ill-considered speeches. He was, nevertheless, 
greatly liked by the ev¢éourage of Alexander II.—TRANS. 


THE LIBERATION OF THE TERRITORY 45 


finesse, utterly devoid of presumption, with which 
M. de Gontaut, at the termination of the imperial 
visits, summed up his judgment on the dispositions 
he had been able to fathom. 

‘I am disinclined to believe that Germany has 
obtained what she desired. Without aiming ex- 
actly at anything hostile against France, she tried 
to extract from a very cordial and confidential 
meeting of the three most powerful sovereigns of 
continental Europe, a manifestation which would 
have somewhat turned to the confusion of France. 
Whatever she may still say to the contrary, it 
would have flattered her pride in a certain sense 
if those sovereigns, by an explicit act, had recog- 
nized the territorial modifications that have taken 
place in consequence of the last war. Has she 
been successful on those two points? I do not 
think so. Russia and Austria consider France to 
be necessary to Europe. It is their opinion that 
France has suffered enough, and they are evi- 
dently bent on encouraging her in her happy 
efforts to reinstate herself in her old position. 
In proof whereof are the praises bestowed by 
Alexander and Francis-Joseph, and by the Chan- 
cellor of the Russian Empire, on the reorganiza- 
tion of our army. Hence we may take it that 
Russia and Austria desire to see a France that 
shall be strong, and that Germany would like to 
keep France feeble. This constitutes a capital 
difference between the policies of the three 


46 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


Powers, a difference of which Germany, do what- 
ever she will, will be compelled to take notice.” 

‘‘Since her victories,” he adds, ‘‘the Press of 
this country treats with disdain the idea of a 
European equilibrium. It will have no more of 
it, because it aims at its own preponderance. 
Nobody, therefore, dared to pronounce the word 
since the misfortunes of France, and, behold, the 
word has reappeared in the language of politics. 
There is, as yet, no occasion to say that it means 
a victory for our country; but, at any rate, a 
proof that justice is beginning to be dealt out to 
her.” —Souvenzrs, pp. 85, 86. 

Assuredly nothing was better calculated to 
make us look impatiently forward to our com- 
plete deliverance than this clear patch on the 
European horizon; hence M. de Gontaut, acting 
upon orders from M. Thiers, was just preparing 
to open negotiations for the elimination from the 
last Convention of the clause dealing with the 
delay in the occupation, which was no longer 
justified by our financial condition, and conse- 
quently with the clauses of guarantee that had 
been added to it. Everything led him to believe 
that he would have no difficulty in making him- 
self listened to, when a grave accident in our 
home politics brought unexpected trouble around 
him, and even prevented for some time the mere 
mention of the matter in conversation. 


THE LIBERATION OF THE TERRITORY 47 


Il. 


The 13th November, the day on which the 
National Assembly resumed its work, after a 
short recess, M. Thiers, taking possession of the 
rostrum himself, read a presidential message, in 
which, after having summarized with his wonted 
precision and clearness the whole of the financial 
and political transactions over which he had so 
ably presided, he proposed without the least cir- 
cumlocution to proceed at once to the final estab- 
lishment of the Republican Government. ‘“ The 
Republic,” he said, ‘exists. The attempt to 
establish something else would mean another 
revolution, and the one most to be feared... . 
The Republic,” he. went on to say, ‘‘is bound to 
be the government of the nation, which, having 
for a long while and in good faith left the divided 
direction of her destinies to a hereditary power, 
but which, not having succeeded, through mis- 
takes which it would be impossible to judge to- 
day, decides at last to govern herself, and by 
herself, through the men she has elected.” Truly, 
he immediately added that the Republic, such as 
he conceived it, must be and remain essentially 
Conservative, and he claimed the proper institu- 


48 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


tions which, according to him, would enable it to 
keep up that character, ze. the extension of the 
prerogatives of the executive power, the constitu- 
tion of a Second Chamber, an electoral law 
regulating the exercise of universal suffrage ; but, 
disguise it as he would, the blow had been aimed. 
It was the rupture of the truce of parties known, 
as I have said, by the name of the Bordeaux 
pact; it was the open declaration of war to the 
Monarchical party of the Assembly. The prompt 
reply of M. Audrec de Kerdrel to the challenge 
is already a matter of history. Striding to the 
rostrum there and then, he moved and carried 
instanter the appointment of a commission to 
draw up an answer to the message of the Presi- 
dent. Those who were present on that memor- 
able day are not likely to forget the state of 
indescribable excitement that prevailed after 
that unexpected passage of arms, and until the 
adjournment of the Assembly. 

It would be an exaggeration, perhaps, to say 
that the news of this stirring incident was received 
with a like emotion. Our affairs did not com- 
mand as much attention as that, but, to say the 
least, people were equally surprised. No one 
expected this unforeseen outbreak of a parlia- 
mentary civil war. M. Thiers’ provocation caused 
as much surprise as the reply that had followed 
it, if not more. People were aware that differ- 
ences, which sometimes assumed a grave char- 


THE LIBERATION OF THE TERRITORY 49 


acter, had before now broken out between the 
Assembly and the illustrious man invested by it 
with the supreme power. The threats of resigna- 
tion on M. Thiers’ part, when the intentions of 
the Assembly seemed to be at variance with his, 
had preoccupied the public mind more than once ; 
but people reflected that, after all, those threats 
had never been carried out, the differences having 
always been adjusted by an arrangement, in 
which the Assembly generally: got the worst. 
That was what had occurred particularly in con- 
nection with the military laws. Compulsory per- 
sonal service having been, as I remarked before, 
the only one of the more or less marked prefer- 
ences of the Assembly that might have hampered 
M. Thiers in the course of his patriotic negotia- 
tions, the Assembly made up its mind, regretfully 
it is true, to sacrifice it to him. On all the other 
‘points that might contribute to the grand task 
of the national deliverance, the agreement had 
been as cordial as it was complete, in spite of the 
statements to the contrary propagated subse- 
quently by the unskilful panegyrists of M. Thiers. 
Whatever he had asked, or merely expressed a 
wish for, in connection with that sacred cause, 
had been accepted without either debate or dis- 
cussion by all parties. In one word, France, 
whatever may have been the already too per- 
ceptible effect of her interior divisions, had always 


shown herself resolved to remain united while 
zi E 


50 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


the alien had possession of her soil, in order to 
look him boldly in the face. Surely, he who 
spoke in her name had the greatest interest 
in seeing France prolong that attitude full of 
dignity as long as possible, for in that way he 
could truly claim to be the representative of the 
whole nation, and could make himself the surety 
for the fulfilment of all the engagements he might 
enter into for her, no matter what those engage- 
ments would be, and without reference to the 
chief France might place at her head later on, or 
the institutions that should govern her. Why 
then this haste to trouble a condition of unanimity 
of which, even if it were but an apparent one, 
he more than anybody reaped the credit and the 
honour? Why that unjustified haste, which ex- 
posed him to the risk by placing his power at 
the mercy of a stormy debate, impairing not only 
the authority of his charge, but even the value 
of his signature? Why had he not waited a few 
months longer, to put the seal on the final act 
of what was to constitute his future title to glory ? 

That was the question which everybody asked 
himself, and for the reply to which people looked 
above all to M. de Gontaut. ‘The message of 
M. Thiers is altogether republican then?” said 
Herr von Schlemitz, the President of the Council 
of Ministers, with evident trouble. ‘ But it implies 
the violation of the Bordeaux pact. What does 
it mean, and whither will it lead?” Taken by 


i a hes — 


THE LIBERATION OF THE TERRITORY 51 


surprise, like every one else, the ambassador was 
least of all able to answer, for during his recent 
short stay in Paris, M. Thiers, aware of his senti- 
ments, had (probably in order not to hurt those 
sentiments) not given him the least hint with 
regard to his personal intentions. Far from it. 
Though he talked to him in an apparently con- 
fidential manner about the message he was pre- 
paring, his language had remained sufficiently 
vague to convey the impression, that though he 
might ask for some legislative measures they 
would be solely in the direction of guaranteeing 
the conservative spirit from the invasion of revo- 
lutionary ideas and passions. M. de Gontaut’s 
illusion on the subject had been such as to con- 
vince to the same effect Chancellor Gortschakoff, 
with whom he had had another interview previous 
to the latter’s departure from Berlin. Unfortun- 
ately, the telegram recounting the sitting of 
the Assembly happened to reach Berlin on the 
evening of and but a few hours after the inter- 
view; and the Chancellor meeting the ambassador 
next morning, “could not help showing me his 
surprise, which I could not help noticing, and 
which, in reality, I shared to the full, A/us a feeling 
of sorrow.” These are M. de Gontaut’s own 
words. Then he goes on—‘‘He had just left 
Emperor Wilhelm, and I have reason to believe 
that their feelings on the subject are the same. 
I had only had a summary of the presidential 


52 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


message; I endeavoured to justify its tone by 
replying to Prince Gortschakoff that I was enabled 
to gather two things from it: the virtual acknow- 
ledgment of the existence of the Republic de facto, 
which it was impossible to deny ; and the absolute 
necessity to hedge it round with conservative 
guarantees. The last declaration constituting the 
capital point of the message, every one both in 
France and Europe ought to be pleased at it.” 

For a man who practically did not know what 
to think, much less what to say, M. de Gontaut 
got out of the difficulty pretty well. Meanwhile, 
it was necessary to convey to Paris an account of 
the uneasy feeling prevalent at Berlin, and M. de 
Gontaut would have been wanting both in dignity 
and frankness if he failed to show clearly his own 
awkward position at being suspected of wishing to 
deceive or of having been deceived himself, and of 
having been compelled to account for his error by 
explanations which would satisfy no one, seeing 
that they failed to satisfy himself. I may admit 
that to this day, reason as I will on those facts 
with the calmness and impartiality of history, to 
which indeed they belong, I understand no more 
than I did at the first hour (perhaps less than I 
did at the first hour) what induced M. Thiers to 
select that critical moment to anticipate, as it were, 
an explanation with the monarchical party—an 
explanation which sooner or later would have 
been unavoidable, but which was most inopportune 


THE LIBERATION OF THE TERRITORY § 53 


just then. Did he really imagine that a number of 
colleagues, several of whom were his friends, and 
with nearly all of whom he had lived for two years 
on a footing of intimacy, did he really imagine 
that all these would allow him to disregard in the 
most cavalier fashion all the promises he had 
made them without the least protest on their 
part? To think this would be to suppose him as 
utterly bereft of that knowledge of men which 
constitutes an essential part of the art to govern 
them. Truly, he may: have been encouraged in 
that illusion by the resignation with which that 
royalist majority had allowed him, from the very 
morrow of the engagements taken by him at 
Bordeaux, to interpret those engagements in a 
sense absolutely contrary to the ordinary sense of 
his words, and such as we understand them. It 
was, in fact, patent, and we were all aware of it, 
that far from maintaining with regard to constitu- 
tional questions the scrupulous neutrality which (if 
he did not misunderstand him) he had sworn to 
maintain oz his honour, he had considered him- 
self as entitled to lean overtly to a republican 
solution, and never neglected a means to ensure 
its success. 

It was in order to secure to the Republic the 
legal title as distinct from the de facto one which 
she already possessed, that he had used all the 
influence due either to the fafne of his happy 
genius or to popular favour; in furtherance of 


54 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


that view, he had put in operation all the 
mechanism of that administrative power which 
is always so great in France, and all the fascin- 
ation of his brilliant conversation. If it be true, 
that his relations with each of us had remained 
most kindly, his confidence, his heart, his inner- 
most feelings belonged, nevertheless, to the Re- 
publican Left. Not one of us fostered any longer 
the faintest illusion in that respect. Assuredly, it 
was painful to watch day by day the progress and 
accomplishment of a hostile and, according to 
us, destructive work. But the urgency of the 
national crisis, and the importance of not com- 
plicating it by an inward crisis, had compelled us 
to let things take their course, and to shut our 
eyes even to proofs. But the great and decisive 
question was not to be solved without us, that 
much had, at any rate, been promised, and un- 
ambiguously promised, to us. We were not so 
far wrong, then, in exercising patience pending 
the day of reckoning. And behold, before that 
day had come we were being told, not only that 
the question would not be put, but that we were 
haughtily refused the right to discuss it. There 
was something particularly offensive in that un- 
ceremonious treatment, the effect of which, it is 
difficult to believe, M. Thiers had not felt before- 
hand. He could all the less easily be mistaken in 
that respect, seeing that he was perfectly aware of 
the nature of the feelings that animated us all, and 


THE LIBERATION OF THE TERRITORY 55 


the sincerity of which not only deserved his 
consideration but his esteem. Among the most 
devoted partisans of royalty, some, in order to 
remain faithful to the principles dear to them, had 
foregone from their youth the advantages of a 
high position, and spent the best years of their 
lives in retirement, whence they had only emerged 
at the appeal of their country in distress, and with 
that modest devotion of which M. de Gontaut had 
set the example; others were the pupils of M. 
Thiers himself, inasmuch as they had been taught 
to consider the perils to which a great nation 
is exposed by the system of removing, at will of 
the chief power, the very school of parliament- 
ary chiefs of which M. Thiers was the most 
illustrious survivor. 

And it was on the whole of those convictions 
and affections of diverse origin and character, it is 
true, but all equally entitled to respect, it was on 
those glorious recollections of the past, it was on 
all those lessons experience had. taught us, on all 
the apprehensions of the future, that we were 
asked to proceed “to the order of the day’*” with 


1 “ The order of the day” of an Assembly is the order it has 
established for the regulation and transaction of its business. 
When the Assembly fixes a day for the discussion of a question (or 
bill), it is called “ inscribing the question on the order of the day.” 
“To pass to (to proceed with) the order of the day” means to 
resume the course of business inscribed on that order, which has 
been interrupted by an interpellation or an unforeseen incident. 
In a wider sense a motion voted by the Assembly is also called 
“the order of the day.” “The order of the day pure and simple” is 





OF THE 
UNIVERSITY 
OF 


os Yee 


56 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


a disdainful oblivion of antecedent events, and 
by a kind of motion to resume the “ previous 
questions.” * 

Our irritation was but natural. We were, per- 
haps, wrong to yield to it too much by interpret- 
ing the conduct at which we were offended, and 
justly offended, in a more offensive manner than 
we interpreted the fact itself. On _ several 
occasions we had seen M. Thiers bend the 
Assembly to his will by the mere threat of a 
resignation which would have interrupted and 
compromised the course of the vital negotiation 
with which he was entrusted. We were under 
the impression that he intended to have recourse 
once more to that means of influence, or rather of 
intimidation, to carry by sheer compulsion our 





the decision arrived at by the Assembly to “ close the incident,” and 
to proceed purely and simply “ with the course of its business.” ‘‘ The 
motived order of the day” indicates, on the contrary, the motives 
for which the Assembly proceeds with “the order of the day”; 
that kind of “ order of the day” frequently marks the conclusion of 
an interpellation, and may mean the wish of the Assembly, its 
approval or its censure of the Government. 

* «The previous question” (guestion préalable) takes also and 
always precedence over the principal motion. ‘To move the 
previous question” is, as a rule, a means to shelve from the very 
outset and before everything a proposition considered dangerous, 
offensive (injurious), unconstitutional, or unworthy of being ex- 
amined. A member may always move “the previous question ” 
Save in the matter of a rule affecting “the order of the day.” 
When “the previous question” has been voted with regard to a 
proposition, that proposition is considered as non-existent ; it is 
only inserted in the report of the proceedings if it has been 
read; it is neither printed nor distributed among the members. 
—Alphonse Bertrand, L’Organisation Francaise. (TRANS.) 


THE LIBERATION OF THE TERRITORY 57 


adhesion to the Republic, and we were led to sup- 
pose that in order to deprive us of the liberty of 
refusal he did not want to await the departure 
of the last German soldier ; when, his task having 
been accomplished, his continuance in power 
might have seemed less necessary to us, and we 
should therefore resign ourselves more easily to 
his withdrawal from it. That would in reality 
have been an indirect way to make us Republicans 
in spite of ourselves, and from sheer dread of a 
new complication with the alien. To attempt to 
resolve a question which to us was a matter of con- 
science in such a manner, was after all but the 
exercise of a moral pressure distinctly calculated 
to inspire people who professed to have a heart 
with a feeling of revolt. A calmer judgment 
makes me reluctant to-day to attribute to M. 
Thiers a design that would not have been worthy 
of him. In any case, if a like calculation entered 
his mind for a moment, he never cherished a more 
completely erroneous one; for by provoking a 
debate, the gravity of which he must have fore- 
seen, he did not acclerate the advent of the 
Republic ; but by an absolutely contrary effect he 
delayed and even compromised for a moment the 
solution that was to liberate us, and the accom- 
plishment of which was as near to his heart as it 
was to ours. 

What could not fail to happen was this. The 
struggle that had begun between the Assembly 


58 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


and the President threw all those who from 
across the frontiers, and especially from Berlin, 
endeavoured to comprehend the nature and to 
follow the course of it into a state of mental con- 
fusion, of which M. de Gontaut in his Souvenzrs 
gives an exact and living picture. Betwixt the 
two parties at strife people no longer knew on 
which side was right, reason, the chances of suc- 
cess, in whom to take an interest, in whom to 
place confidence. In principle, nearly all the 
hopes gathered round a Monarchy. The establish- 
ment of a great Republic in the centre of Europe 
found no favour in political circles. With the 
exception of Herr von Bismarck, who wished to 
keep France republican owing to reasons which 
he did not attempt to disguise, but which were 
neither flattering to the Republic nor to France, 
there was no one who did not think that the 
restoration of royalty was the reasonable and 
desirable issue to our long revolutionary crises. 
But people fancied they knew (and unfortunately 
it was not a mere fancy on their part), that 
between the Royalists of the Assembly and the 
only possible representatives of the hereditary 
principle the understanding was by no means 
perfect ; the fusion of the. two branches of the 
royal house of France, which had been attempted 
several times, had not been accomplished ; the 
hopes of the Monarchists were considered doubt- 
ful, and held in suspense in that way owing to a 


THE LIBERATION OF THE TERRITORY 59 


reason which it was difficult to understand, but 
which from that fact gave rise to much anxiety 
and still greater astonishment. Moreover, the 
men who spoke in the name of the Monarchical 
party were little known ; their protracted opposition 
to the imperial ~éezme had prevented them from 
acquiring either the notoriety or the experience 
gained by the exercise of power. M. Thiers had 
the advantage over them of a reputation acquired 
long ago, and which had increased in a favourable 
sense from the line of conduct, both loyal and 
sensible, he had of late adopted in the most 
thorny of negotiations. There were but two 
reproaches against him, for one of which, in 
fact, he was in no wise responsible, namely, his 
advanced age, which precluded a long lease with 
him ; the other was that to which his inopportune 
message lent consistency, viz. his predilection— 
the motive of which it was so difficult to under- 
stand—for the Republican idea, and the encourage- 
ment given by him to the party which from its 
doctrines and its past was looked upon as hostile 
to conservative interests. There existed in par- 
ticular one name, the legend of which has, as yet, 
not been destroyed by the opportunism of its 
bearer, and which was regarded as a bugbear_ by 
every friend of peace—it was that of M. Gambetta. 
It was with a certain dread that his presence was 
noted among the allies of M. Thiers in the latter’s 
struggle against the Monarchists. z 


60 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


In that condition of uncertainty which scarcely 
requires explaining, those who still held us at 
their mercy adopted a mode of dealing with us 
which was, after all, not surprising ; it was that of 
not discussing anything with us, to allow no step 
towards our deliverance while the quarrel between 
the two Powers lasted. The reason, which is not 
difficult to guess, was that before treating with 
France it was necessary to know who was entitled 
to sign in her name, and who would be there to 
execute the articles of a new Convention on the 
morrow of their having been granted. ‘Try to 
come to an understanding between yourselves if 
you wish us to listen to you ;” such was the advice, 
unquestionably prudent and wise, that was given 
to us, and there is reason to believe that the 
advice was mainly due to the practical sense and 
kindly feeling of the old Emperor. Herr von 
Bismarck would have, perhaps, preferred to have 
the discord prolonged, and may have proposed to 
himself to embitter it in order to take advantage 
of it. Be that as it may, it was M. de Gontaut 
who returned to the charge, by informing the 
chiefs from whom he still derived his authority, as 
well as the friends whom he had left in the 
Assembly, that a superior interest commanded 
them to put an end to their differences, or at any 
rate to moderate their tone in discussing them. 

It was M. Thiers who, receiving the first hint, 
was also the first to perceive his error, and with 


THE LIBERATION OF THE TERRITORY 61 


the natural pliancy of his mind soon found a 
means to repair that error. The opportunity 
that presented itself, and which he did not fail to 
seize, was provided to him by a motion of M. 
Gambetta aiming at the immediate dissolution of 
the Assembly. That hazardous expedient, which 
smacked of suicide, being to the taste of no one, 
whether of the President or the Assembly itself, 
became a neutral and, as it were, unpremeditated 
ground for the better understanding of the two 
parties. The Keeper. of the Seals, M. Dufaure, 
who by his personal predilections and well-known 
disinclination for the relations M. Thiers had 
created for himself among the members of the 
Advanced Left, inspired us with more confidence 
than the chief, was entrusted with the opposing of 
the motion, and M. Thiers, perhaps in order to 
give him a freer hand, even abstained from 
putting in an appearance at the sitting. M. 
Dufaure’s eloquence, springing from the depths 
of his inmost convictions, assumed on that day a 
character of unwonted emotion, which aroused a 
genuine enthusiasm. This was one of those 
sittings of reconciliation, ‘‘over-flowing with ten- 
derness,” of which the first National Assembly of 
France had furnished more than once the example, 
and the character of which is unfortunately more 
touching than lasting. The Assembly unani- 
mously voted the appointment of an extraordinary 
commission, which, without attempting to solve 


62 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


or even to broach the question of a definite form 
of government, would offer M. Thiers for the 
whole duration of the provisional végzme_ personi- 
fied by him, the means of governing which he 
desired. The conditions of this veritable ‘ La- 
mourette’s kiss” ’ were clearly put by M. le Duc 
d’Audiffret-Pasquier in the following terms—‘“ In- 
asmuch as we do not wish to divide the country 
against herself under the present circumstances, 
we loyally accept the discussion of certain organic 
laws tending to perfect and to consolidate the 
actual condition of affairs. But do not ask us 
either to recant our past or to subscribe to any 
confession of faith that would close the future to 
us. We are simply adjourning the realization of 
our hopes.” 

The man most satisfied with a result that enabled 
him to breathe freely was assuredly M. de Gon- 
taut, but he was not the only one in Berlin who 
experienced that feeling of relief. Every one, in 
fact, congratulated him on the subject. ‘We 
feel reassured,” said the Under-Secretary of State 
for Foreign Affairs to him; ‘as late as yesterday 
we were practically uncertain towards which side 
M. Thiers was leaning; he has the Right with 
him now; his wisest course is to march with 

1 An allusion to the all-round embraces which terminated the 
sitting of the Legislative Assembly on July 7, 1792, at the conclu- 
sion of a speech by the Abbé Lamourette, Constitutional Bishop 


of Lyons, who preached unity and fraternity at the threatened 
approach of the Prussians and Austrians.—TRANS. 


THE LIBERATION OF THE TERRITORY 63 


them.” Even Herr von Bismarck would not be 
left out of the chorus of congratulations. 

“In fact,” he said, in that semi-placid, semi- 
jeering tone which he adopted in his brighter 
moods, “‘in fact, seeing that they have as yet not 
arrived at an understanding among themselves, 
the only thing they can do is to support the 
actual condition of affairs. You will stick to 
Adolphe I.” “We are willing enough to do 
that,” I replied, “provided he leave no heir.” 

In short, the general tension became so con- 
spicuously less, that during the first days of Jan- 
uary 1873 (the vote of reconciliation had taken 
place on the preceding 15th December) M. de 
Gontaut was enabled to obtain a hearing for his 
overtures, tending to remove the last obstacles to 
the earlier withdrawal of the troops of occupation 
than was stipulated in consideration of an advanced 
payment. 

Nevertheless, the task of the famous Com- 
mission of Thirty (to give it the title by which it 
was as famous then as it has ceased to be to-day) 
was not so easy as it seemed on that day of 
oratorical excitement. Its line of conduct had 
beén traced for it by M. d’Audiffret-Pasquier with 
all possible clearness, for all that it was narrow 
and slippery. Practically, the terms in which the 
question had been presented were, if not con- 
tradictory to, at least difficult to reconcile with, 
each other. The object was the organization-of 


64 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


a provisional situation. Now, it so happens that 
the provisional, from its very nature, and born 
under the stress of circumstances that constitute 
the reason of its being and determines its con- 
ditions, does not admit of organization. Organic 
institutions assume, on their part, and naturally 
enough, a definite look; hence the result, that 
each of the two parties, the reconciliation of which 
it was the Commission’s task to promote, and 
which had in its midst representatives ever on the 
alert, endeavoured to interpret in its own sense 
the somewhat hybrid character the measures pro- 
posed. M. Thiers’ evident aim (which he did 
not disguise) was to make the Commission draft 
the principal outlines of a Republican constitution ; 
but the majority, which was very distinctly 
Monarchical, steadfastly refused to say anything, 
or to let anything pass which eventually might be 
construed as prejudicial to the solution which, 
perhaps, it would not have been in a position 
to propose immediately, but which it wished to 
be left free to propose at the end of the stipulated 
interregnum that was clearly drawing nigh. In 
this conflict of opposing designs there was there- 
fore, I will not say not an article, but not even a 
word or a syllable of all the measures under dis- 
cussion that did not give rise to a debate on the 
substance as well as on the form ; and after several 
weeks of deliberation they were as little advanced 
as ever, and more than ever confronted by the 


THE LIBERATION OF THE TERRITORY 65 


probability of not coming to an understanding 
at all, 

There is no such a thing as secrecy with regard 
to the debates in committee of a Commission, 
especially if that Commission be a numerous one 
and divided against itself. 1 remember as it were 
to-day the door of the committee room in the 
palace of Versailles where our meetings were held, 
I remember that door besieged by the reporters 
of the newspapers of various shades, who with 
their pencils in hand came to take notes of every 
incident of our sittings. All those notes were so 
much copy communicated at the same time to the 
foreign and especially to the German press, and 
all our alternatives to proposed decisions, whether 
accepted or rejected, produced their counter-effect 
on the parallel discussion, going on two hundred 
leagues away from them, between the ambassador 
of France and the Prussian ministers. The 
negotiation progressed or receded according to 
M. Thiers’ agreement with the Assembly becom- 
ing more probable or remaining problematical. 
But for the fear of employing a somewhat 
hazardous metaphor, I should say that the greater 
or lesser rapidity of the march of the German 
troops towards the frontier they were to cross 
eventually depended on the slower or quicker 
steps of the two home Powers towards one another. 

The embarrassment, and to a certain extent 
nervous agitation, of the unhappy negotiator at the 

: F 


66 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


slightest mishap to this badly-horsed chariot may 
be easily conceived. Worried beyond endurance, 
he made up his mind after a few weeks to lay the 
awkwardness of his situation before a friend, a 
member of the Commission of Thirty, in a letter, 
the terms of which would have remained graven 
on my memory even if the text of the epistle had 
been lost. ‘‘ You are gradually losing the ground 
you have gained during the last months,” he wrote, 
with a view of having his words communicated to 
us. ‘The German Government, in common with 
most of the foreign Governments, having little or 
no sympathy with the proclaiming of the Republic, 
even a Conservative Republic, all those Govern- 
ments applauded your resolution to secure a 
dominant Conservative influence in the direction 
of affairs, and the firmness you displayed in keep- 
ing the Government to that ground. Much 
apprehension was feit with regard to the intrigues 
of the Left, and the sway it might exercise on the 
President’s mind by the adroit flattery of its 
members ; hence, M. Thiers’ union with the Right 
was regarded with conspicuous favour. But M. 
Thiers’ foreign policy, his efforts to restore order 
at home, to re-establish the finances and the army, 
have inspired people with a real sympathy for 
him, and even a sincere admiration, and, in sum, 
a great confidence in him personally. There is, 
therefore, no disposition on people’s part to ap- 
prove of anything that seems intended to lessen 


THE LIBERATION OF THE TERRITORY 67 


that personality, to restrict the power of which, 
according to every one, he has made such good 
use up to the present. Still less are people 
disposed to approve of anything that might lead 
to withdrawal of his Presidency. In consequence 
of all of which, people fail or refuse to understand 
those long and subtle discussions of the Com- 
mission of Thirty, and express their surprise at 
the importance you would attach to normal and 
deeply-pondered institutions in connection with an 
abnormal and evidently transitory situation and 
circumstances. They accuse the majority of the 
Commission, 2. é. the Right, of a design to hamper 
the much-desired agreement between the Con- 
servatives and M. Thiers. One of the most 
important aims of my mission,” he added in 
conclusion, ‘‘is to reassure Germany, not only 
with regard to the payment of our debt, but also 
with regard to the appeasement of the public 
mind and its legitimate consequence, the revival 
of business, on the restoration of a feeling of tran- 
quillity in France; or if not altogether able to 
reassure Germany completely, to draw her atten- 
tion to our reasons for hoping that those benefits 
will not be withheld from us forlong. Do not make 
my task more difficult than it is, and is likely to be, 
under no matter what circumstances. Take it for 
granted that the prolonging and emphasizing of the 
disagreement during the latest sittings of the Com- 
mission are producing a most damaging effect here, 


68 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


the counter-effect of which we are certain to feel in 
our negotiations for the liberation of the territory.” 

When this letter was communicated to me by 
our common friend to whom it was addressed, 
the Commission had just appointed me its reporter. 
I do not know exactly to what I owed that 
honour, for though my monarchical convictions 
left no doubt in any one’s mind, I by no means 
figured among the most ardent to share either 
the most confident hopes in nor the lively resent- 
ment against M. Thiers. My fellow members 
were, perhaps, under the impression that, being 
more or less used to writing by profession, I 
should be more apt than any one else to mark 
the delicate shades of the situation in which we 
found ourselves. I was greatly struck by the 
justness of M. de Gontaut’s arguments so nobly 
expressed, and by the picture of his patriotic 
grief, and I made up my mind there and then to 
spare no possible concession to make the labours 
of the Commission lead to the pacific solution 
on which depended the restoration of our country 
to her complete independence. I communicated 
that intention to some of my most intimate friends, 
who associated themselves with it. 

We apprised M. Thiers through several inter- 
mediaries of our conciliatory intentions. I myself 
opened direct intercourse with several ministers 
I knew, MM. de Rémusat, de Goulard, and 


Dufaure, and was finally allowed to discuss with 


THE LIBERATION OF THE TERRITORY 69 


M. Thiers himself the various formulas that 
might be employed to respond to his require- 
ments, though I managed to husband all our 
reserves by shifting the ground of the contest 
once more to that mapped out by the Bordeaux 
pact, on which ground he, at any rate, apparently 
consented to meet me. I even seem to remember 
that on one occasion he introduced me without 
warning into the Ministerial Council assembled 
in order to afford his own friends a better under- 
standing and appreciation of my explanations. 
In spite of an ever-perceptible look of constraint, 
he made it a point to listen very patiently to my 
remarks, to place himself in my position, amidst 
the difficulties I could not help submitting to him, 
to lend himself to the expedients I proposed to 
overcome them ; and I was all the more surprised 
at this, inasmuch as I received far from the same 
amount of attention even when, as his ambassador 
in London, I had to give an account of the diffi- 
culties I might and did meet with in the course 
of the business with which I was entrusted. I 
vaguely suspected the motive of disposition, and 
did not attribute the credit of it to my good 
intentions, and least of all to my eloquence. The 
secret of it has, however, been more completely 
revealed to me ever since the dispatches of M. 
de Gontaut showed me how conscientiously that 
worthy agent of France lavished his warnings on 
him as well as on us without being discouraged 


70 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


by the surly receptions accorded to them now and 
again. M. de Gontaut played in reality the part, 
so frequently to be met with in the comedies of 
‘Moliére, of the faithful servant who, in order to 
effect a reconciliation between the lovers that 
have quarrelled, goes in turns from one side of 
the stage to the other to dispense good advice. 
In this instance, however, he had to contend with 
this difficulty: the lovers, being in no way in 
love with one another, only shook hands reluct- 
antly in the end. I am inclined to think that 
the occasion of that particular display of confidence 
to which I alluded just now must have coincided 
with the reception of a letter like the following— 


“ Berlin, February 1, 1872. 

“T ought to give you an account of a con- 
versation I have just had with a friend of the 
King. . . . This friend has already been to see 
me twice or thrice under circumstances analogous 
to the present one, and has unburthened himself 
to me with a sincerity and trust which in return 
demand on our side great circumspection. .. . 
He broached at once the question of France’s 
situation with regard to her home affairs. . . 
He then recurred to the immense perils to the 
whole of Europe with which the triumph of 
Gambetta and the Left would be fraught, and 
warmly expressed the hope that an understanding 
would be arrived at between M. Thiers and the 


THE LIBERATION OF THE TERRITORY 71 


Right. He went so far as to say, ‘It is the 
King’s ardent wish, and you may be sure that 
if such an understanding were established, there 
would be no difficulty on his part with regard 
to the withdrawal of the troops.’ I told him 
that his hopes on that point were well founded. 
‘In politics,’ I added, ‘one should avoid using 
the word “certainty” ; but the tendencies towards 
reconciliation have been too marked during the 
last few weeks, they are getting too emphasized 
every day, they are too necessary and too con- 
sistent with reason for me to deny the logic of 
things, and refuse to say, ‘The understanding 
will be brought about.”’ ‘So much the better,’ 
remarked Count ; ‘but I have not the 
slightest hesitation in telling you that everything 
depends on M. Thiers ; the understanding between 


>” 





Prussia and France is in his hands. 


To which letter M. Thiers, who had perhaps 
been talking to me in the meanwhile, sent the 
following reply :—‘‘ Make your mind easy, the 
Thirty are given to worrying, teasing, and cavil- 
ling, but they will prove themselves sensible at the 
right moment, and in a few days all will be over.” 

And when, on the 23rd, the Report of the 
Commission was submitted to the Assembly in 
the terms stipulated beforehand, he wrote at 
once, ‘‘ The agreement arrived at with the Thirty 
is producing a genuine gladness.” 


72 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


We had, in fact, succeeded in coming to an 
agreement with regard to a formula that com- 
mended itself to the majority of the Commission, 
and subsequently to the majority of the Assembly 
itself. Unfortunately that majority was not 
constituted as I could have wished. A consider- 
able part of the Right refused to belong to it, 
and had to be replaced by a nearly equal number 
of M. Thiers’ personal friends. That division 
grieved me deeply; and to this day, when re- 
reading the text it fell to my lot to defend and 
comment upon, I fail to understand how, under 
the given circumstances, one could have gone to 
work otherwise in order to arrive at the immediate 
understanding necessitated by so supreme an 
interest, and at the same time leave the doors 
ajar for the Monarchy even within the immediate 
future. The constituent power of the Assembly 
was fully recognized and placed at the head 
of the project itself, while the institutions the 
Assembly promised to establish before the ter- 
mination of its labours, the respective attributes 
of the executive and the legislative powers, the 
establishment of a second Chamber, were one 
and all perfectly compatible with the Monarchy, 
and presented nothing that implied the relinquish- 
ment or the neglect of the hereditary principle. 

Hence, I fail to account to myself for the 
scruples which not only prevented part of the 
Royalists to adhere to the project, but lent to 


THE LIBERATION OF THE TERRITORY 73 


their discussion of it a character of lively remon- 
strance and bitterness which was. sufficiently 
painful, and grieved me the more inasmuch as 
I perceived well enough that my momentary 
friendly intercourse with M. Thiers gave rise to 
unjust and rather puerile suspicions, and that | 
was debarred from pointing out, even by casting 
looks in the direction of our frontiers, still occupied 
by alien troops, the principal motive that had 
prompted me. j 

In vain had I tried to make that motive plain 
by the words of the passage that wound up the 
Report—‘‘ France centres all her hopes in the 
union of the public Powers.” I had said, “It is 
that union cemented by sacrifices and efforts 
made in common which will soon efface the last 
signs of the foreign invasion.” Dignity forbade 
me to speak more clearly from a French rostrum.’ 


1 Being essentially anxious not to refer to questions of home policy 
except in their connection with France’s diplomatic position which 
was so Critical at that period, I am bound, as it were, to keep silent 
on a whole part of the project elaborated by the Commission of 
the Thirty, which, nevertheless, gave rise to very lively debates. 
I am alluding to the rules established for the limitation of the 
direct communication of the President of the Republic with the 
Assembly to fixed cases, and under special conditions. Those 
regulations (rules) applying to an essentially transitory and ex- 
ceptional condition of affairs, aimed solely at preventing incidents 
similar to those that had occurred already at various times ; viz. 
an unforeseen altercation between the Chief of the State and the 
parliamentary majority, and his resignation in consequence of a 
hasty (¢vrréfléchz) vote, bringing in its wake at a moment’s notice two 
extremely grave political crises. Of course, at present nothing of 
the kind is necessary, inasmuch as under the actual Constitution, 
the President of the Republic does not belong to any parliamentary 
assembly, and has therefore no claim to make his appearance in 


74 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE: VANQUISHED 


Before long I was amply rewarded for those 
few hours of worry and annoyance, for as soon 
as the project’ was voted, M. Thiers brought a 
new and final Convention, which left nothing to 
desire, to the Assembly. In fact, the votes on 
the preamble and on the first clauses of the Bill, 
attesting, as it were, the establishment of the 
parliamentary agreement, had been sufficient to 
dispel at once, so to speak, the difficulties at 
Berlin which until then had been the subject of a 
sustained correspondence between M. de Gontaut 
and M. Thiers; and everything had been pre- 
pared for the signing of the whole, which (the 
signing) took place exactly forty-eight hours after 
the passing of the whole of the project of the 
Commission of the Thirty. Never was there a 
more rapid and at the same time more complete 
result. The final payments having been fixed 
for September 5, every spot was to be free on 
the previous July 5, save Verdun and a zone 
of four kilometres, which was to be held in pledge 
until the later date, the short space between the 
two being considered necessary to provide the 
last measures to efface the traces of the occupa- 
tion. The question of keeping Belfort for the 





it. Without that wise precaution, presidential crises, which would 
put the whole of the State in suspense and interrupt its progress, 
would become as frequent and as sudden as ministerial ones. It 
was that danger threatening the Assembly at every moment which 
the Commission of the Thirty was entrusted to remove. 

1 A projet de lot is a Government Bill, a proposition de lot isa 
private Bill.— TRANS. 


THE LIBERATION OF THE TERRITORY 75 


same period, and in virtue of the same title of 
guarantee, had been broached for a moment, the 
military party at Berlin being evidently reluctant 
to part with that stronghold. Some, more 
obstinate than the rest, wished to pretend that 
that precaution was absolutely necessary in order 
to prevent the revolutionary movements that 
might burst forth at the ferment caused by the 
joy of deliverance. But both M. Thiers and 
M. de Gontaut having indignantly repulsed that 
offensive supposition, Herr von Bismarck made 
up his mind to strike out a condition the suspicious 
appearance of which would have compromised 
the whole effect of that grand moral success. 
Moreover, the Chancellor, having expressed the 
wish to sign the Convention personally (perhaps 
in order not to leave the honour of it to his 
ambassador, Herr von Arnim, his. dissentiments 
with whom were becoming public), it was to M. 
de Gontaut that fell the well-deserved luck to 
affix his name to the text that was to liberate 
us, and to bequeath in that: way the most touching 
and most glorious memorial to a family which 
could already boast so many illustrious ones. 
“While sharing the general joy, I could not 
help indulging in some personal gladness for 
having contributed, in a modest and _ small 
measure, to the removal of some of the obstacles 
that might have encumbered the road to that 
most desired goal. M. Dufaure was kind enough 


76 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


to congratulate me to that effect in a letter which 
I have preserved. I was not quite so fortunate 
with M. Thiers. In common with one of the 
members of the Commission of the Thirty who 
had lent me the most constant support, I con- 
sidered it my duty to join the many who on 
that evening went to congratulate him. I verily 
believe that at the first moment he would have 
been glad to ignore our presence, and he ac- 
knowledged our congratulations in a manner 
scarcely calculated to encourage a renewal of 
them. As we descended the staircase of the Presi- 
dency, my companion and I could not help looking 
and smiling at one another. It was evident we 
were no longer wanted; I myself was more or 
less cognisant of the fact, but for decency’s sake 
they might have waited a few days before letting 
us feel it. If, as had been maliciously supposed, 
I had expected a reward of some kind in return 
for my assistance, such as, for instance, the offer 
of a fresh ambassadorial mission, or even that of 
a portfolio, I had assuredly reckoned without 
my host. 

The impression I felt at this change of tactics 
(which, I need scarcely say, left me absolutely 
callous on my own account), that impression 
I meet with once more in the reminiscences of 
M. de Gontaut, who had altogether different 
reasons for feeling the same. Treated with all 
the distinction so amply due to him, seeing that 


THE LIBERATION OF THE TERRITORY 77 


he was invested with the highest insignia of the 
national order of knighthood, in deviation of all 
the rules of that order, and in virtue of an 
exception, applauded by every one, M. de Gontaut 
came to spend a few days in Paris, where he 
met with an equally distinguished welcome from 
M. Thiers, and from the latter’s friends in the 
Assembly. 

‘“‘T soon became aware,” he says, “that though 
we had reached a halting-point in our preoccupa- 
tions with regard to our foreign policy, there was 
no similar point in our home divisions. In fact, 
the peace that had made his task possible, and 
to the restoration of which he had so actively 
contributed, was only a truce to be broken very 
shortly. This was particularly brought to him 
during a reception at the Presidency attended by 
many members of the Assembly, and belonging 
to the different parties. He was struck by their ~ 
reserved and hostile attitude. It was, I believe, 
at a dinner to which I was invited. I forget the 
reason that prevented my going, but my nephew, 
M. d’Haussonville, who had been my fellow- 
member of the Commission of the Thirty, went. 
After the dinner the conversation turned on an 
incident that had just occurred, and was making 
a good deal of noise; it was the expulsion of 
Prince Napoleon, carried out by the order of 
M. Thiers, although there was no legal provision 
in virtue of which the members of the _late 


78 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


Imperial Family could be banished from France. 
Hence there could be no question as to the 
arbitrary character of the measure. But M. 
Thiers defended it very emphatically, affirming 
that, law or no law, a Government always had 
the right to remove those whose presence con- 
stituted a threat to its existence, ‘(and that,” he 
added, ‘‘is the rule I am determined to apply to 
all pretenders, so you know what you have to 
expect, M. d’Haussonville.” 

If M. de Gontaut happened to hear those 
words, there could be no cause for surprise at his 
returning to his post his heart full of dark fore- 
boding. ‘I had several interviews with M. 
Thiers before my departure,” he wrote. ‘On 
the very day I took leave of him we had a some- 
what emphatic conversation on the subject of his 
attitude, and though I failed to find the note 
relating to that conversation, I remember very 
well having said to him as I stood on the 
threshold of the door, ‘You do not intend, then, 
to throw in your lot with the Conservatives?’ 
To which M. Thiers replied curtly, ‘No.’ ‘Well, 
you had better consider. This may prove your 
ruin,’ I retorted, but I did not think that I should 
turn out to be so good a prophet.” 





1 
THE MINISTRY OF MAY 24, 




















THE MINISTRY OF MAY 24, 1873 


Tue National Assembly, of which M. de 
Gontaut was a member, and in which I was his 
colleague, has often been reproached with having 
waited until the liberation of the territory was 
completed to engage upon the conflict with M. 
Thiers, the result of which was his withdrawal 
from the Presidency of the Republic. Those 
censors say that, with the blackest ingratitude, we 
watched for the moment of his having concluded 
the task he alone was capable of accomplishing 
for us to divest him of the chief power. Only a 
little while ago that accusation has been repeated 
in the bitterest terms by one of the most eloquent 
of M. Thiers’ friends. 

I know of no accusation less justified than that 
one. Those who prefer that charge simply forget 
that, as I have already said more than once, M. 
Thiers himself, when placed at the head of the 
State by the suffrages of the Assembly, had 
expressly requested it to raise no question calcu- 
lated to lead to serious dissensions in the home 
policy, and least of all that touching the definite 


form of government, as long as shackled France 
t 8x G 


82 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


had not thrown off the alien’s shackles. It was 
he who, in most eloquent and impassioned terms, 
had pledged all parties to that truce. If he 
imagined subsequently that that engagement, to 
which he had subscribed more explicitly than no 
matter whom of us, need not prevent him from 
favouring a republican solution openly, and even 
to propose the adoption of one before the stipu- 
lated time, that assuredly was no reason why those 
who did not interpret their promise in the same 
sense should have considered themselves justified 
in following his example. Besides, we have already 
seen that that precipitate course had by no means 
been crowned with success. The home crisis 
which his republican message of November 12, 
1872, prematurely provoked, had delayed and well 
nigh compromised a matter of paramount national 
interest. By abstaining from a similar error in 
the opposite direction, the Royalists could claim 
to have acted loyally and at the same time 
patriotically. But as soon as the condition had 
been completely fulfilled, and the stipulated delay 
had expired, they recovered, in virtue of that fact, 
the plenary right pertaining to the members of a 
constituent Assembly, and no scruple whatever 
could any longer prevent them from using that 
right. As for the reproach of having, from sheer 
ingratitude, ignored the incontestable services M. 
Thiers had rendered, I can only express my 
surprise that such a word should have been 


THE MINISTRY OF MAY 24, 1873-83 


uttered seriously in connection with constitutional 
or even legislative matters. Neither institutions 
nor laws are made in obedience to gratitude. To 
those who have served her well a nation owes 
proofs of her gratitude. She cannot heap the 
measure of honours and advantages too high ; the 
only mark of deference she has the right to with- 
hold is that which would allow them to decide at 
their will the institutions that should govern her. 
To establish a constitutional pact whence would 
depend the future of several generations, out of 
deference to the merits or services of one man, 
would be an act not less imprudent than culpable. 
Neither a people nor an individual is bound to 
sacrifice her or his reason, her or his conscience, 
to no matter whom. England has never been 
considered an ungrateful nation to those who 
served her well. But what Englishman ever 
dreamt of securing power to any man, were he 
the victor of Waterloo himself, for a day longer 
than the free movement of parties had naturally 
conferred that power on him? 

Therefore a conflict between the Monarchical 
party of the Assembly and M. Thiers must have 
sprung up sooner or later, unless the one con- 
sented to forego its old convictions, or the other 
abandoned its recent conversion, a concession 
which, considering the positions taken up or 
maintained, was not to be expected, either from 
one side or the other. The shock was unaveid- 


84 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


able, yet, as is well known, it was not the question 
of a definite form of government, it was not the 
choice between the Republic and the Monarchy 
that caused the explosion ; what gave rise to it 
was the alarm caused, not gratuitously, and not 
only among the Royalists, but among a very 
considerable part of the French nation, by the 
kind of alliances M. Thiers was compelled to 
accept, and even to seek, in the furtherance of his 
republican aims. Truly, his position, as defined 
by himself one day in the Assembly, was a 
singular one. Unable to establish the Republic 
by himself, he was perforce obliged to look for 
republican auxiliaries. As it happened, among 
those he was enabled to enlist there was not one 
from whom he was not divided by a radical 
divergence of views except on one sole point, that 
of the suppression of the hereditary Monarchy. 
While on all other matters, such as administra- 
tion, finances, public worship, and public educa- 
tion, the Republicans of old and by profession 
claimed reforms conceived from an often very 
advanced democratic point of view, he alone 
among them remained imbued with a conservative 
spirit, which he carried now and again to the 
length of routine, and which was opposed to any 
and every kind of innovation. ‘Do you know 
why the Left applauds me?” he asked the 
Assembly on November 23, during the discussion 
that followed upon his republican message. ‘It 


THE MINISTRY OF MAY 24, 1873 85 


is not because I share the opinions of the honour- 
able members occupying those benches ; it is not 
because I share the opinions, not of ¢he most 
advanced among them, but of the most moderate. 
They know that on most of the political, social, 
or economic questions I do not share their 
opinions. No, xezther on the questions of taxation, 
the army, social organization, nor the organization 
of the Republic, do I think like them.” — 

The consequence of that avowal was that he 
entered upon the campaign for the establishment 
of the Republic at the head of an army which he 
would have to disband as soon as his success was 
secured, without calling them to share any of the 
fruits of the victory. No General ever held 
similar language to his soldiers. How would he 
have contrived that operation which, at the first 
blush, seemed to partake of the nature of a 
miracle? How would he have solved the problem 
of administering either the Republic without 
Republicans, or the Conservative régzme without 
Conservatives? The question was difficult to 
answer then, it is not less difficult to-day. The 
far. from encouraging results obtained by those of 
his friends who attempted the same undertaking 
without him, the deplorable concessions they were 
compelled to make, with so little profit, do not 
tend to dissipate that want of faith on my part. 
Truly he may have considered himself more apt 
than others to get out of a difficulty. Without 


86 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


being so simple-minded as to believe in the 
absolute disinterestedness of his casual friends, he 
may nevertheless have flattered himself that he 
had sufficient influence, at any rate over some, to 
obtain great sacrifices from them, and the supple- 
ness of his talent may have made him confident 
of being able to turn round against those who 
proved refractory. But whether that confidence 
in himself was justified or not, it was excusable 
not to share it, and that was the case with a 
considerable fraction of the Assembly, which 
would have resigned itself, although without 
enthusiasm, and even without inclination, to accept 
the Republic at his hands, but who, before sub- 
scribing to this, made it a condition of their 
assent that he should not deviate from the narrow 
line of conduct he had mapped out for himself. 
Those Conservatives had neither a dislike to him 
personally, nor the design to attack his power, 
but they dreaded the influence on him of alliances, 
the hazardous and precarious character of which 
he himself had admitted ; and it was against that 
pressure, the signs of which they believed they 
recognized, they were anxious to take precautions 
and demand guarantees. 

The incident that invested those alarms with 
a character of urgency, and those demands with a 
form of pressing insistence, is well known. It 
was an unforeseen consequence of that very 
negotiation, the slow elaboration of which I have 


THE MINISTRY OF MAY 24, 1873 87 


retraced here, and in particular of the part played 
in its last phase by the agreement between the 
Chief of the State and the Commission of the 
Thirty. The satisfaction caused by the act that 
put an end to the occupation was so general 
and emphatic, that M. Thiers conceived the very 
natural idea to have the act consecrated as it 
were by a kind of plébiscite. A vacancy having 
occurred in the parliamentary representation of 
Paris, which, as our readers may remember, 
formed at that time only one constituency, M. 
Thiers made up his mind to put up his Minister 
of Foreign Affairs as a candidate for the suf- 
frages of the capital. It was but just that M. de 
Rémusat, who had lent his chief a useful aid, 
should share the honour of the result. A frac- 
tion of the Republican party, and that the most 
numerous, was of a different opinion. With their 
eyes fixed more intently on the Parliament than on 
our foreign relations, those Frenchmen of narrow 
views had become uneasy at the even momentary 
rapprochement between M. Thiers and part of 
the Assembly’s Right. The same fact occurred 
once more, a few days later, in connection with 
the passing of a law’ which assimilated the muni- 
cipal ~égzme of Lyons to that of Paris. That was 
unquestionably a tendency that might degenerate 


1 That law, if I am not mistaken, was abrogated, as far as the city 
of Lyons goes, at least thirteen years ago. I am astonished that 
the author does not mention the fact.—TRANS. , 


88 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


into habit, and which, it seemed to them, had 
better be stopped at once. M. Thiers needed 
a warning to make him desist from seeking hence- 
forth to support himself by suffrages other than 
those he might find in their ranks. Consequently, 
an obscure candidate, whose sole merit consisted in 
the extreme character of his democratic opinions,’ 
was opposed to M. de Rémusat, and defeated him 
by a crushing majority. If ever there was an 
act of ingratitude, it was surely committed on 
that day. 

I will not undertake to explain the interpret- 
ation put by M. Thiers on a check which must 
have filled him with sorrow. Was it to allay the 
umbrage of the Republican party that he con- 
sidered it expedient on that occasion to remove 
from his Cabinet the minister who seemed to 
come closer to the right-hand section of the 
Assembly than any of the others by affinities of 
origin and community of sentiments? Perhaps, 


1M. Barodet (Désiré). His biography, if written, would prove 
nearly as amusing as that of the late M. Tirard, sometime Minister 
of Finances to the Third Republic. Far better educated than the 
erstwhile dealer in mock jewellery, Barodet, like Tirard, had been 
a Jack of all Trades and seemingly a master of none, for he was 
everything in turnsand nothing very long. The author is not quite 
correct in saying that he was utterly obscure; what he ought to 
have said was that Barodet would have been practically unknown 
in Paris but for the chance the Conservatives themselves gave him 
to hoist himself into notoriety by their passing of the law providing 
for the municipal organization of Lyons. That deprived Barodet 
of his mayoralty, and, clever as he was, he utilized his pseudo- 
martyrdom to enter Parliament, and to inflict at the same time a 
lesson on Thiers.—TRANS. 


THE MINISTRY OF MAY 24, 1873 89 


but though that ministerial reconstruction may 
have reassured the Republican party, it had by 
no means the same effect on the Conservatives, 
nor could it have. In trying to soothe the former, 
he only succeeded in making the latter more 
uneasy. This was the unavoidable consequence 
of the unstable equilibrium by which he endeav- 
oured to maintain himself. The concession made 
to those very exacting allies was only looked 
upon as so much proof of the ascendency they 
were gaining over him, and the condition of 
dependence to which they might flatter them- 
selves they had reduced him. 

Great was the consternation (the word is not 
an exaggerated one) especially among the group 
of which I spoke, and which, though ready to 
follow M. Thiers, dreaded to see his headlong 
course down a revolutionary slope; and it was 
that very ardent and somewhat widespread public 
feeling that gave its character to the event of 
May 24. The parliamentary motion which M. 
Thiers chose to construe into a vote of want of 
confidence was strictly confined to a request for 
a determinedly Conservative policy. And it was 
in those terms, foreign to all allusions to dynastic 
or constitutional questions, that the discussion 
was maintained to the end, in accordance with 
the position I had been instructed to take up 
when entrusted with the opening of the debate. 
I was sufficiently familiar at that moment. with 


go AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


the feeling that prevailed in the Assembly, and 
with the uncertainty that swayed our own ranks 
until the last hour, to affirm that, if M. Thiers 
had announced his intention to take count of the 
visible emotion of the country and the Assembly, 
if he had uttered one word calculated to reassure 
his affrighted partisans, he could have easily de- 
tached from the feeble majority that appeared 
hostile to him a sufficient number of votes to 
secure a majority in the opposite sense. He 
deemed it inconsistent in him to make the 
slightest concession even in speech. On that 
very evening he tendered his resignation, and 
M. le Maréchal de MacMahon, who did not in 
the least expect to be made the recipient of that 
honour, or-—to speak by the card—to have that 
sacrifice imposed on him, was called to replace 
M. Thiers as the President of the Republic. 

I was bound to recall briefly those facts—a 
more complete recital of which would involve a 
great many details and comments that would be 
out of place here—because the conditions under 
which the new power was constituted could not 
fail to influence (as we shall see) the character 
of the relations M. de Gontaut had to keep up 
with the Prussian Government, and above all with 
Herr von Bismarck. M. de MacMahon having, 
moreover, entrusted me at that moment with the 
portfolio of Foreign Affairs, all the representatives 
of France had to enter into communication with 


THE MINISTRY OF MAY 24, 1873 91 


me. I shall therefore have occasion to appeal, 
during that short space of time, to my personal 
recollections in order to confirm, and on certain 
points to complete, those of M. de Gontaut. 

It was highly important to bring home to all 
our agents before everything the fact that the 
Marshal assumed power under the exact con- 
ditions M. Thiers had exercised it. For the 
moment there was to be no change either in the 
character or in the attributes of the elevated 
functions with which the one and the other had 
been invested; and the point on which it was 
essentially desirable to insist was, that no modifi- 
cation whatsoever had taken place in the direction 
of the foreign policy, which had in no way been 
mixed up with the crisis at its origin, and which 
was still more to be kept distinct from the result. 


The following is the text of the circular I had 
drawn up on the morrow after my admission into 
the Ministry. 

“The dissension between the majority of the 
Assembly and M. Thiers had no bearing on any 
point in connection with the foreign policy. You 
will please remember, that during the two years 
that have just passed the line of conduct adopted 
by M. Thiers, in view of the re-establishment of 
our relations ‘with the foreign Powers after the 
disasters of 1870, has never been the subject of 
any debate in the Assembly. On the contrary, 


92 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


a large number of votes have approved the 
efforts—invariably successful—of that illustrious 
man to obliterate the traces of our misfortunes, 
and to secure once more to France her thorough 
independence as a nation. Hence the instructions 
you received from the preceding Government 
remain practically unchanged, and we trust you 
will adhere faithfully to the line of conduct it has 
traced for you.” 

I need not point out that, while holding this 
language to the envoys of France to all the 
Courts, I was thinking above all of Berlin and 
M. de Gontaut. Speaking to a friend, my rela- 
tions with whom had never ceased, in spite of his 
absence, I had nothing new to tell him with 
regard to my intentions, nor the least effort to 
make to convince him of their sincerity. The 
support I had fortunately been enabled to lend 
him by removing the parliamentary obstacles to 
the conclusion of the last treaty had been too 
highly appreciated by him, he had too affection- 
ately thanked me when we met again in Paris, to 
need a fresh assurance of the good faith I should 
bring to bear on the execution of that treaty ; 
and as for himself, his signature having been 
appended in the name of France and not in 
behalf of M. Thiers personally, he was not dis- 
turbed by the dread of having its validity 
questioned. 

It is but right to say, however, that this consti- 


THE MINISTRY OF MAY 24, 1873 93 


tuted only the apparent and to some degree the 
superficial aspect of the situation. In all the 
relations of life, whether international, political, 
or private, we should often attach less importance 
to the outward regularity of acts and conduct 
than to that inmost foundation of certain feelings 
that only remain hidden and silent, to find vent 
and show themselves in a single instant, and in 
consequence of the slightest incident. It would 
have been exceedingly imprudent to forget this, 
especially in the constant and always thorny rela- 
tions which we had to go on maintaining with 
Germany. The smooth execution of the treaty 
itself still depended on the good understanding, 
one might even say on the graciousness of the 
agents commissioned to take it in hand. There 
was also this; between the respective populations, 
still filled to bursting with the recollection of a 
recent struggle, the very fact of being neighbours 
tended to keep up a spirit of reciprocal animosity 
the expression of which, ever ready to burst forth, 
might easily be envenomed. In short, it was diffi- 
cult to enumerate the many points on which the as 
yet unrelinquished interests of France were likely 
to be confronted with the ambitious activity of 
the new empire. It was, then, essentially im- 
portant to know the impression produced at Berlin 
by the parliamentary revolution that had been 
accomplished in Paris, and whether the Marshal 
might at least reckon on the comparative good- 


94 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


will which for many reasons M. Thiers had 
managed to secure for himself during the latter 
part of his Presidency. That was the point on 
which, without loss of time, I made it a point to 
interrogate M. de Gontaut in a private letter, 
dated May 27, and though I could not have 
known then what I gathered subsequently, from 
the perusal of M. de Gontaut’s dispatches, with 
regard to the complexity of sentiments of Wil- 
helm I.’s political and military extouvage concern- 
ing ourselves, from the manner in which I put 
the question I seem to have foreseen the answer. 
“How is the event of the 24th May really and 
truly (au fond et en réalité) looked at in Berlin?” 
I asked. ‘I am not talking of the more or less 
lively regrets which M. Thiers’ references: may 
have caused from a purely personal point of view. 
I feel convinced that yourself share those regrets, 
because those whose dealings with him were 
solely confined to his foreign policy, and who 
experienced the charm of his conversation, cannot 
cherish any other impression. Nor do I refer to 
certain apprehensions that may be aroused by the 
presence of a Marshal of France at the head of 
affairs. You will do me the honour -to take it 
for granted that I could not have been for a 
whole week at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
without letting every one at Berlin and in Europe 
know that all our engagements will be strictly 
kept; in one word, that the policy dictated to 


THE MINISTRY OF MAY 24, 1873 95 


us by the most elementary common-sense will 
be pursued and even publicly announced with- 
out delay. But what I am anxious to know 
is the impression produced by a Conservative 
reaction in France? Which of the two senti- 
ments predominates—that of the identity of inter- 
ests of all the Governments in view of their 
being equally threatened by the self-same revolu- 
tionary spirit, or the fear that this happy event 
which, preserving France from the possible chance 
of anarchy, provides her with a much greater one 
to recover her old position? Was not the good- 
will shown to M. Thiers mixed with a more or 
less profound calculation? Do not people think 
without saying it, nay, without admitting the 
thought to themselves, that the presence at the 
head of affairs of an old man dominated by bad 
counsellors could only afford France a material rest 
of a short time, necessary to the discharge of our 
debt, but which rest would be the lull before the 
outbreak of new crises, of which they reserved 
themselves the right to take advantage? You 
will most probably tell me that the sentiment 
varies, and is complex or simple according to the 
persons. Unfortunately, though, there is only 
one man at Berlin, and perhaps even in Europe, 
whose sentiment counts, and it is above all with 
regard to him that I am anxious. Have you any 
means of getting at his real thought, and of telling 
me what it has in store for us in the way of good- 


96 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


will or the reverse? Tell me your own opinion 
in that respect. I know it is difficult to analyze 
impressions which even in the person who experi- 
ences them may be very confused.” 

“The two sentiments to which you allude,” 
wrote M. de Gontaut in reply two days after- 
wards, ‘exist simultaneously at Berlin; that of 
the identity of interests of all the Governments in 
view of their being equally threatened by the 
self-same revolutionary spirit, and the fear of see- 
ing France recover her splendour of old. Which 
is the more powerful of the two? It is a diffi- 
cult question to answer; the sentiment varies 
according to the individual. You must not run 
away with the idea that the influence of the King 
is not considerable ; he is greatly loved, liked, and 
considered, and he is frequently at issue with the 
Chancellor, for he is naturally and on principle 
much more conservative than he. I feel confi- 
dent that the event of May 24 has been favourably 
viewed by the King; he feels particularly sym- 
pathetic towards M. de MacMahon, and every 
one in Berlin who lays claim to the title of 
Conservative is of a mind with the King. There 
is no doubt that he views the re-awakening of 
France with a certain feeling of apprehension, 
but his reluctance with regard to the Conventions 
of June 29 and March 15 sprang far more from 
his dread of the revolutionary spirit casting its 
shackles than from the fear of the projects of 


Urry eraser 
f OF 


CaLiFoRNS 


THE MINISTRY OF MAY 24, 1873 97 


revenge. In fine, the two sentiments are there 
in his case, but the first dominates the other. 
The reverse is the case with Herr von Bismarck ; 
and you are perfectly correct in saying, that no 
influence is equal to that of the Chancellor of the 
German Empire in the balance of European 
destinies. In conclusion and in reply, the check 
inflicted on Radicalism by the advent of the new 
Government has been hailed with joy here ; never- 
theless, they would like the convalescence to be 
a long one, and they are not at all anxious for 
the complete recovery of the patient. That is 
Herr von Bismarck’s sentiment, and the boldness 
of his mind as much as the ingenuity of it will 
neglect no opportunity to prevent that recovery.” 
- That prospect was not encouraging. I was not 
even allowed the time to prepare myself for it. 
When I received M. de Gontaut’s letter I was 
already in a position to verify the correctness of 
his remarks. 

I had apprised the foreign Governments of the 
advent of the new President by means of a simple 
notification to their representatives in Paris, and 
transmitted at the same time by our own diplo- 
matic agents to the various Courts. In addition 
to that formality, which I considered sufficient, I 
had, according to custom, left my card with all 
the ambassadors. The English and Turkish 
ambassadors immediately acknowledged my act 
of politeness by calling personally. But I neither 

H 


98 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


saw nor heard anything for several days from 
those of Germany, Austria, and Russia. I was 
all the more surprised at this coolness, seeing 
that Count Arnim and I had been on cordial 
terms when we met at M. de Rémusat’s recep- 
tions; that Prince Orloff and I were frequently 
thrown together at the houses of common friends ; 
that Count Apponyi and I had been on a truly 
intimate footing when we were colleagues in 
London. It was he, in fact, who sent me the 
explanation of his attitude of reserve through a 
friendly intermediary. 

He had been obliged to submit to a rather 
unexpected demand by Herr von Bismarck, who, 
it appears, was not satisfied with a simple notifi- 
cation. The Chancellor contended, that in order 
to resume diplomatic relations with the new 
Government of France, new credentials from 
Marshal MacMahon to all the diplomatic agents 
were required, those they held from M. Thiers 
having, as it seemed to him, become void. That 
claim upset all notions of international law I had 
been taught during my diplomatic apprenticeship. 
The practice of renewing credentials at the 
commencement of each new reign applies to 
Monarchies alone, because the sovereign power 
itself changes with the person of the monarch 
who is its representative; but in the case of 
Republics the sovereign is practically the nation, 
which does not undergo a corresponding change, 


THE MINISTRY OF MAY 24, 1873 99 


and of which the Chief of the State is only the 
temporary delegate. It is the nation that accredits 
the agents, and they are accredited to it. Herr 
von Bismarck, who did not dispute the principle, 
gave M. de Gontaut two reasons for not wishing 
to abide by it. Our Republic was only pro- 
visional, and to treat it like Switzerland or the 
United States would have been tantamount to an 
acknowledgment of its definite character. Besides, 
he added somewhat emphatically, he did not care 
to bind himself to recognize indiscriminately all 
the “elects” it might please us to put at our 
head ; and by an allusion to the recollections of 
the last war, he conveyed clearly that there was 
a certain personage whose position might lead to 
his assumption of power, or, to speak correctly, to 
his resumption of power, with whom he would 
object to enter into diplomatic relations. 

Of those two motives alleged in justification of 
a diplomatic novelty without precedent there was 
one with which I had no reason to be displeased. 
I had no objection whatsoever to anything that 
could bring home to people’s minds the provisional 
character of the republican form of Government, 
but I had serious objections to recognize—even 
on a hypothesis which was farthest from my wishes 
—the right of a foreign State to exercise no 
matter what control and veto over the choice of 
the chief whom it might please France to give 
herself. Divided as I was between these ‘two. 


100 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


considerations, I caused M. de Gontaut to formu- 
late express reservations with regard to the 
question of right, but after having taken those 
precautions, not to run the risk, for the sake of 
a simple formality, the interpretation of which was 
ambiguous, of prolonging a suspension—vexatious 
under all circumstances—of the diplomatic rela- 
tions which urgently required resumption. I 
reckoned on his customary skill to save with 
dignity a delicate situation; Herr von Bismarck 
did not facilitate his task. At M. de Gontaut’s 
first syllable at a second interview on the subject, 
Herr von Bismarck, instead of discussing the 
matter, cut him short with a haughty ‘“ Very well, 
so be it then; but remember, I have warned you. 
Salvavi animam meam. But Count von Arnim 
has asked me for leave of absence on account of 
his health; and inasmuch as he will have no 
credentials to present, he can come back. I'l 
authorize him to do so.” 

After which he gave M. de Gontaut to under- 
stand, that with the withdrawal of his reservations 
those of Austria and Prussia would also come to 
an end, but probably under the same conditions, 
and added that, after all, these Powers had only 
adopted his course with a repugnance which he 
professed to treat very cavalierly. 

He was not averse to showing the close and 
at the same time dependent relations of those two 
states with their formidable neighbour. It was 


THE MINISTRY OF MAY 24, 1873 101 


evident that he eagerly seized the opportunity to 
place the new Government in a kind of interdict 
with regard to the great Powers of Europe. The 
game was clear, but the trap was visible ; it would 
have been stupid indeed to fall into it. 

Hence, in order to satisfy a whim, the founda- 
tion of which consisted mainly in a display of ill- 
will, we had an exchange of credentials. Herr 
von Arnim was to hand his to the Marshal, and 
the envoy gave an account of the first interview 
in a dispatch published a few years later among 
the documents of the trial he had to undergo.* 
The terms of that account are curious, and as 
others may not have had the same reasons | had 
for noticing them, I cannot resist the temptation 
to reproduce them. 

“ Paris, Juné 2, 1873. 

‘“‘ILLUSTRISSIME (very illustrious, or most illus-_ 
trious?), most puissant Emperor and King, gra- 
cious Emperor, King, and Sovereign, 

“Yesterday I had the honour to hand to Mar- 
shal MacMahon my new credentials, also the 
reply of His Majesty to the letter of notification. 
The Marshal, who still inhabits his private 
apartment, Rue de Grenelle, at Versailles, has 
requested me to repeat to Your Majesty, that he 
considered it his duty (sa ¢éche) to maintain the 

1 Herr von Arnim was, as is well known, recalled the year after 


the events above described, and subsequently indicted for having 
illegally kept and published confidential State documents. — - 


102 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


good relations subsisting at this moment with 
Germany, and that he had a grateful recollection 
of the kindly reception he had met with at Berlin 
at his mission thither as Envoy Extraordinary, on 
the occasion of Your Majesty’s coronation. He 
also remembers the considerate manner in which 
he was treated in Germany during his captivity. 
The Marshal told me at the same time, that 
after Sedan he was left free to go whither he 
liked. He went at first to Givet, I believe. 
When the condition of his wound allowed him to 
be removed, two French battalions presented 
themselves to take him away. The temptation 
to follow them was indeed great; he had, after 
all, given no promise to constitute himself a 
prisoner, but in virtue of the consideration that 
had been shown him, he felt himself bound to 
observe great scruples, and he sent the battalions 
back. He adds that this incident was known to 
no one. The reception, which went off very 
simply, was nevertheless essentially different from 
the entirely free-and-easy manner adopted by 
M. Thiers. The Marshal, who was in uniform, 
received me standing, in the presence of his 
minister, and dismissed me (me congedié)' with 
the dignified bearing of a sovereign. I have 
seen few Frenchmen looking less like the typical 


1 The author says “dismissed,” and the expression in French is 
absolutely correct. To English ears it may sound somewhat harsh, 
but I did not care to use the alternative, “intimated that the 
interview was at an end,” in the text.— TRANS. 


THE MINISTRY OF MAY 24, 1873 103 


Frenchman than the Duc de Magenta. It may 
be, though, that the dry, simple, and the some- 
what non-loquacious manner of the Marshal is 
more apt to govern the French properly than all 
the brilliancy of his predecessor.” 


In my capacity as a witness I can guarantee the 
accuracy of this little picture, for I experienced a 
similar impression, and, to tell the truth, a similar 
surprise to those of Herr von Arnim. “My know- 
ledge of the Marshal at that period was very slight, 
and I knew that until then he had avoided enter- 
ing into the slightest relations, even those of mere 
politeness, with the representative of Germany. 
I was therefore not altogether at ease as to the 
manner in which the conversation would be 
opened. Everything went off with a noble sim- 
plicity that impressed me very much. The slight 
timidity of speech which now and then hampered” 
the Marshal in ordinary conversation seemed to 
have disappeared ; and I fancied more than once 
that it was, on the contrary, his interlocutor who 
was suffering from it. The Ambassador Ex- 
traordinary of 1867,? and the captive of Sedan, 

1“ Pyo Nihilo,’ Antécédents du proces d’Arnim, p.94. Ihave an 
idea that Pro Nihilo and Vorgeschichte des Arnimschen Processes, 
to which the author seems to refer as one, are two different publica- 
tions. I remember reading them both.—TRANS. 

2 This is evidently a slip of the pen on the part of the author, or 
a printer's error. The coronation took place in 1861, I believe, 


when Wilhelm declared himself “ King by the will of God alone.”— 
TRANS. z 


104 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


recalled his good as well as evil days with a truly 
rare mixture of dignity and kindly grace; his 
words betrayed neither the discouragement of 
misfortune nor the regret of a brilliant position, 
which had not dazzled him. The remark I made 
then; I have had occasion to review it more than 
once since. Everything in the shape of homage, 
and especially of compliment, referring exclusively 
to him and to noteworthy military performances, 
was received by the Marshal with ill-disguised 
annoyance, and a modesty which frequently bor- 
dered on the awkward. On the other hand, he 
was perfectly at his ease when it became a ques- 
tion to receive in the name of France the eminent 
foreign personages, or even princes, who came 
to pay their respects to him as Chief of the State. 
It was because on these occasions he forgot all 
about himself, and only thought about his duty. 
The loftiness of his sentiments became naturally 
at one with the loftiness of the rank which he 
had neither sought nor solicited. 

Herr von Bismarck’s rough treatment, and for 
which he had assigned so little reason, made 
M. de Gontaut and me expect similar treatment 
before long. And if it was not Herr von Bis- 
marck himself, it was his Press, known to be in 
his pay and at his call, which undertook to leave 
us no breathing time, for before the new Govern- 
ment could possibly commit any act lending itself 
to comment or criticism, the word went round, in 


THE MINISTRY OF MAY 24, 1873 105 


defiance of all etiquette, to increase in invective 
and violence against France, and all those who 
represented her, whether at home or abroad, and 
the order was obeyed by all the papers of which 
the Chancellor could dispose. M. de Gontaut, 
who subsequently was to suffer more than any one 
else, was, however, comparatively spared at that 
moment. 

It was against me, against my very inoffensive 
personality (for until then Germany had had no 
cause to complain of or concern herself with me 
more than of or with any other Frenchman), that 
a very avalanche of insults was directed. There 
was no slander running riot in the lowest section 
of our revolutionary press that was not taken up 
and granted a conspicuous place in the foremost 
papers of Berlin, Frankfort, or Cologne. Neither 
the story of my life nor, above all (though I have, 
never known why), my private means were spared 
in those attacks. I was both bankrupt in morals 
and in money, and had only accepted the Ministry 
to redeem, by means of speculation, my estates, 
which were mortgaged up to the last acre, and to 
prevent the threatened seizure of my stipend asa 
deputy. On that subject there was such perfect 
harmony between the French writers of the lowest 
category and the German ones of the highest that 
it became a question which should have the palm 
for invention. I have always professed great 
indifference for personal attacks, no matter whence 


106 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


they come and what they may be, and I am of 
opinion that he who has the misfortune to be 
sensitive in that respect should hold aloof from 
public life. But I may add that in this instance, 
and in virtue of the “certificate of origin”? of 
those renewed attacks, I went further still than 
being merely callous, I was tempted to look upon 
those attacks in the light of a flattering distinction. 

On one particular occasion I was enabled to 
determine beyond the shadow of a doubt the 
quarter whence the arrow intended for me came. 
Monseigneur le Duc d’Aumale, in pursuance of 
the preliminary investigations to that deplorable 
Bazaine trial at which he presided with such 
extreme conscientiousness and eminent superiority, 
was desirous to examine personally the spot on 
which were enacted the scenes of the drama, the 
actors of which were to appear soon before him. 
He requested me to apprise the German authori- 
ties of his intention to visit the battlefields 
around Metz. I felt practically certain that the 
notice would not be well received, hence I sent 
it directly to Herr von Bismarck, either through 
M. de Gontaut or Herr von Arnim, I do not 
remember which, asking that the thing might be 
kept secret. But before the refusal, which was a 
foregone conclusion, could reach me, all the 


1 A certificate of origin (an certificat d’origine) is a document 
accompanying imported merchandise, attesting the place of their 
manufacture, and declaring that they do not come within the cate- 
gory of prohibited goods.—TRANS. 


THE MINISTRY OF MAY 24, 1873 107 


officious papers resounded with comments on 
the arrogance of a French prince wishing to 
make a triumphal progress through the annexed 
provinces, and the unseemly conduct of the 
minister who had lent himself to the design. 
This indelicate publicity had only one advantage, 
that of providing me with a reply, which I 
imagine must have struck home (“ topical,” says 
the author), when, a few days later, Herr von 
Arnim came to complain of certain articles in the 
French papers, the responsibility for which he 
wished to fasten on me, and which had spoken 
with more or less disregard of the Chancellor. 
More singular was the fact of that unexpected 
ebullition of hostility and acrimoniousness in no 
way subsiding, when the acts as well as the attitude 
of the new Government had convinced the most 
incredulous that the sensitive and pacific policy 
of M. Thiers would in no wise be departed from, 
In vain were all the provisions of the Treaty of 
March 15 scrupulously observed; in vain did 
the evacuation of the territory proceed amid the 
profoundest calm of the populations ; in vain did 
M. de Gontaut, in accordance with his instruc- 
tions, carry the spirit of conciliation to its farther- 
most limits, amidst the sufficiently serious difficult- 
ies engendered by the execution of that Treaty, 
In short, the most praiseworthy perseverance from 
their point of view, the least praiseworthy from 
ours, looked in vain for a reproach to confrént us 


108 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


with ; the gall, nevertheless, persistently bubbled 
over. It was enough to induce the belief that the 
fall of the late President had inflicted a pain and 
almost personal wound on Herr von Bismarck to 
which he could not resign himself. But when 
the restoration of the Monarchy in France began 
to dawn on the political horizon, as the natural 
consequence of the vote of May 24, then the ill- 
humour increased to a degree as to become 
positive exasperation. 

That was a result to be expected. In truth, 
as I have already pointed out, the new presidential 
combination had ostensibly taken its stand on the 
ground of neutrality and the pact of Bordeaux, 
and Marshal MacMahon, more careful and 
anxious to maintain his position there, had inten- 
tionally chosen his ministers from among all the 
shades of the Conservative majority, not excepting 
that section which for a moment, in the track 
of M. Thiers, had inclined towards the Republic. 
Royalist opinion prevailed, nevertheless, in a 
conspicuous degree, both in the Cabinet and 
among the party that had carried the Cabinet to 
and was maintaining it in power. There was no 
doubt, then, that the Royalists, having met with 
the favourable opportunity they had been waiting 
for till they were tired of waiting, would eagerly 
turn it to account to realize at last the wish so 
dear to them. Their constitutional right to 
restore the Monarchy admitted of no discussion, 


THE MINISTRY OF MAY 24, 1873 109 


and the visit of M. le Comte de Paris to Frohsdorf 
on August 5 following, sealing as it did, and in 
so signal a manner, the reconciliation between the 
two branches of the House of France, seemed to 
justify the ardent hopes. 

There is no need to resort to conjecture to 
form an idea of the impatience—to put it mildly 
—of the nervous irritation of Herr von Bismarck 
at the prospect cf a monarchical restoration in 
France. It was the Chancellor of Germany 
himself who thought: fit to inform us, by means 
of a document, the publication of which was due 
to his good offices, of his constant desire that 
we should keep to the Republic, that form of 
government being in his opinion best calculated 
to perpetuate our isolation and weakness, That 
object having constituted the principal motive for 
the Chancellor’s goodwill to M, Thiers’ govern- 
ment—as the Chancellor himself undisguisedly 
admits—it was but natural that M. Thiers’ fall 
should have particularly affected him in a contrary 
sense. That charitable wish was printed in 
identical terms in the document of which I am 
speaking, and which caused a certain noise at 
the time of its publication. M. Thiers himself 
lived long enough to take cognizance of it, but I 
am unable to state what impression it produced. 

A few traits, which may prove not without 
interest, will suffice to let in a retrospective light 
on the delicate situation in which M. de Gontaut 


110 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


and I found ourselves while our friends were 
proceeding with a task as dear to our patriotism 
as to theirs, but which left both the one and the 
other exposed to the relentless ill-will of the 
greatest and most formidable enemy to France. 
For there was not a moment’s doubt in people’s 
minds (and they were practically right) that the 
representative of France at Berlin, and the vice- 
president of the Council of Ministers in Paris, 
were associated from the bottom of their hearts 
with the generous design that was being worked 
out around them, albeit that their official position 
prevented them from taking an active part in 
the execution of that design. 

For the strange revelation of Herr von 
Bismarck’s feelings with regard to us we must 
look once more to the documents pertaining to 
the lawsuit instituted a few years later by the 
Chancellor against Herr von Arnim, his diplo- 
matic agent with M. Thiers. The official dispatch 
containing that revelation was inserted with a 
kind of cynicism among those documents. It 
would appear that Herr von Arnim, a witness 
and perhaps a confidant of M. Thiers’ republican 
designs, had refused to associate himself with 
them, nay, had gone the length of expressing 
some fears—from the monarchical and conservative 
point of view—with regard to the possibly con- 
tagious effect of the triumph of the Republic in 
France on the rest of Europe. This drew upon 


‘THE MINISTRY OF MAY 24, 1873 III 


Count Arnim the severest reproof a diplomatist 
ever received from his chief. ‘It is assuredly 
no part of our duty to make France powerful by 
strengthening her situation at home, and by the 
establishing there of a regular Monarchy, by 
enabling that country to conclude alliances with 
the Powers with which up till now we are keeping 
up friendly relations. The enmity of France forces 
upon us the wish for her continued weakness, 
and I consider that we are already giving proofs of 
great disinterestedness in not opposing resolutely 
and by force the establishment of solid monarchical 
institutions as long as the Treaty of Peace of 
Frankfort has not been completely carried out. 
I feel convinced that no Frenchman would ever 
dream of helping us to recover the blessings of a 
Monarchy if God saw fit to inflict on us the 
miseries of Republican anarchy. To show such 
kindly concern with regard to the fate of a hostile 
neighbour is an eminently Germanic virtue. But 
his Majesty’s Government is the less justified to 
follow that unpractical inclination, seeing that every 

attentive obsérver must have noticed how numerous _ 
the political conversions have been and still are 
in Germany since the experiments zz corpore vilt 
of the Commune in the sight of the whole of 
Europe. France is a salutary hobgoblin to us. 
So long as the monarchies march shoulder 
to shoulder, the Republic cannot harm them. 
Such is my conviction, and it prevents my advising 


112 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


his Majesty to support monarchical rights in 
France.”* This is the haughty language of the 
instructions sent to Count Arnim on December 
20; 1072. 

That manner of seeing things, which I suspected 
well enough, has since then been perfectly summed 
up by a Russian diplomatist, to whose humoristic 
way of putting matters I have already alluded. 
“You may take it for granted,” said that caustic 
observer, “that Herr von Bismarck wishes you 
nothing so much as a dissolving Republic.” I 
could scarcely imagine, however, that the day 
would come when I should see the barefaced 
avowal of Herr von Bismarck’s real sentiments 
towards us. 

I still doubt whether he would have imbued 
—supposing he tried, which I equally doubt—with 
a similar sentiment either his sovereign or the 
political master-minds of Europe, who continued 
to nourish against the republican form a prejudice 
amply justified by its past adventures. In spite 
of his arrogant ascendency, he would have experi- 
enced great difficulty to induce them to follow his 
lead. Hence, the design to restore the Monarchy 
of which we were suspected was never alleged 
among the number of grievances against us. The 
subject was never alluded to in the still very 
rare interviews between M. de Gontaut and the 
Chancellor or the Prussian ministers; it was 


1 The French version of the Arnim trial, pp. 79 e¢ segq. 


THE MINISTRY OF MAY 24, 1873. 113 


not mentioned by Herr von Arnim in the daily 
complaints he brought to my door either with 
reference to the polemics of the papers, with 
which he fancied he had cause for dissatis- 
faction, or with regard to the coolness and the 
awkwardness of his intercourse with Parisian 
society. Only once, I believe, and in connection 
with some incident I do not remember, Herr. von 
Arnim asked me, casually as it were, why we were 
in such a hurry to restore the throne, and began 
dwelling with praise.on the advantages of main- 
taining the Republic in the position France had 
been placed by events. He pleaded that cause 
very badly, he spoke without conviction, like one 
who fulfils a disagreeable task, and I was not 
surprised to learn subsequently what I did not 
know then—that he was talking not only without, 
but against his personal conviction, that on that 
point he disagreed zx toto with his chief. I simply 
replied to him laughing, and without appearing to 
attach any more importance to the matter than 
he did. “But if the Republic seems such a good 
thing,” I said, “why not introduce it among 
yourselves?” He smiled, and did not refer to the 
Subject again. 

Herr von Bismarck, then, felt well enough that 
he could not prevail on monarchical Europe to 
look favourably on the Republic even in virtue of 
the harm the végzme might do to France. But 


M. de Gontaut had warned me that, for aH that, 
< I 


114 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


his ill-will would be as wary as it was active, and 
he could not have found a more fertile ground for 
the seed of distrust and hostility he was sowing 
among us. He hinted, if he did not say it, that 
we were not only Royalists, a crime all the crowned 
heads would have easily forgiven us, but we were 
also Ultramontanes and Clericals. And the Mon- 
archy which we wished to establish would be 
Ultramontane and Clerical to the same degree, and 
consequently a threat to any and every neighbour 
not animated by the same spirit, and as a second 
consequence a threat to the maintenance of 
general peace. It is but just that every inventor 
should reap the credit of his own invention. There 
was nothing original in the cry of alarm, “ Clerical- 
ism, that is the real enemy,” which M. Gambetta 
was to thunder forth from the rostrum of the 
French Chamber a few months later. It was the 
self-same cry of Herr von Bismarck from the other 
side of the Rhine, and the echoes of which he 
meant to be heard beyond the Alps. 

The diversion was all the more clever on Herr 
von Bismarck’s part, in that it seemed the natural 
explanation of the struggle upon which he had 
just entered with the Catholic Church in Germany. 
Germany was at the commencement and in the 
first ardour of what since then has been termed 
the Kulturkampf, that relentless war against 
Catholicism, the motive of which has never been 
clearly known, and the issue of which has so 


THE MINISTRY OF MAY 24, 1873 II5 


ridiculously disappointed the man who yielded to 
the brutal whim to undertake it, but which for a 
period of ten years troubled German society most 
deeply. A series of laws intending to despoil as 
well as to persecute both the secular and regular 
clergy were proposed to the Diet, and the moment 
they were adopted their rigour was aggravated 
by confiscation and arbitrary proscription. The 
spectacle was scarcely calculated to arouse much 
admiration in France; but the Conservative and 
Monarchical Press -in particular, while drawing 
pictures of those violent proceedings, could not 
refrain from expressing its indignation against the 
executors and its sympathy with the victims. 
Those very openly manifested dispositions easily 
provided Herr von Bismarck with a motive for 
pretending that, if restored royalty in France were 
animated by the same sentiment as its partisans, 
the simple fact of the advent of that royalty would 
afford the Catholic minority he was trampling upon 
as he pleased a moral support and a cause of hope 
of which he felt bound to take note. Was that 
danger real? was the fear he so noisily proclaimed 
sincere? My doubts are as strong as ever. 
Neither during nor after the war did the German 
Catholics show the least sympathy with France, 
and a patriotic scruple, which I should be the 
last to blame, has always prevented them from 
appearing to expect, still less from asking, assist- 
ance of the alien. The apprehension, neverthe- 


116 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


less, might argue its justification from, to say the 
least, specious motives, and of a character to 
impress the aged Emperor, for though less ardent 
than his minister in the pursuit of the anti- 
Catholic campaign, Wilhelm I. had practically 
allowed of its being begun, and when once the 
struggle was engaged in he supported it from a 
feeling that his prestige was involved, being 
determined that the event should not turn to the 
disadvantage of the National Church, of which he 
was the chief and the representative.! 

It was in consideration of quite a different 
nature, and of a much more urgent character, that 
weighed on the mind of another sovereign, whose 
terror of the Clericals so adroitly invoked by Herr 
von Bismarck was calculated to trouble that 
sovereign’s. I am alluding to the King of Italy. 
Established in spite of himself at the Quirinal, 
almost facing the pontifical sovereign captive at 
the Vatican, Victor Emmanuel, as is well known, 
always felt himself ill at ease there, and the dread 
of being compelled to evacuate the place in con- 
sequence of some sudden reverse of fortune never 
ceased to haunt his mind and that of his retainers.* 

1 The author is perfectly right ; here is a proof of it. “No 
measure is taken without my previous approval,” Wilhelm I. 
wrote angrily to Pius IX. on September 3, 1875. The Holy Father 
had insinuated that the persecutions against the Catholics had pro- 
bably been decided without the Emperor’s knowledge.—TRANS. 

2 What is not so well known is, that this horrible fear on the 


part of 2/7 ré galantuomo sprang from a quasi-prophecy, dating, I 
believe, from the eve of Novara, to the effect that the Quirinal 


THE MINISTRY OF MAY 24, 1873 117 


Their anxious looks were strained in the direction 
of France. 

France, in fact, had more or less cause to com- 
plain of the somewhat incorrect proceeding (to 
put it mildly) of her erstwhile allies of Solferino, 
who, instead of coming to her aid in her mis- 
fortunes, had profited by them to force an entry 
into Rome contrary to all engagements, and the 
moment the French troops had taken their depart- 
ure. Would not France, at some future time, 
endeavour to exact a reckoning for that treatment 
the reverse of friendly, and recur to a fact the 
accomplishment of which her misfortunes for the 
time being had alone compelled her to accept? 
And what if that day of reckoning were made 
to coincide with that of the restoration of the 
Monarchy through the efforts of a party which 
numbered in its ranks the most zealous and most 
faithful champions of the temporal power of the 
Papacy ? 

A like supposition was practically void of all 
foundation, for the best and at the same time 
saddest of reasons ; namely, that France, whether 
under a monarchical or republican régime, was too 
exhausted, too mutilated to attempt for a very 
long time to come any hostile movement against 





would be fatal to him. The prediction had almost been forgotten, 
but recurred to Victor Emmanuel when he took up his residence at 
the palace. For a very long while after that Victor Emmanuel left 
Rome at night by the Porta Pia for the villa of Rosina Vercellana, 
Comtessa de Mirafiori—TRANS. re 


118 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


no matter whom. She had quite enough to do to 
defend her own security ; no sane person could 
harbour the thought of her attacking any one. 
The proof whereof is, that when some zealous 
Catholics petitioned the National Assembly to 
send to the captive Pius IX. an expression of 
their sympathy, there had not been a single voice 
requesting M. Thiers to add either a promise or 
hold out the faintest hope of effectual aid. But 
it did not matter a jot; an uneasy conscience 
makes cowards of us all, even with regard to mere 
phantoms. The dread that the restoration of the 
French Monarchy might prove the signal for an 
aggressive movement against the unification of 
Italy took hold quickly throughout the peninsula 
of the alarmed imaginations. Is it not said that 
even to this day they are not completely reassured ? 
One thing is certain ; not so very long ago I had 
a letter from a big Italian Review, a letter express- 
ing in all seriousness the suspicion that Leo 
XIII.’s manifest goodwill to the Republican form 
of government (so little inclined to Clericalism 
indeed) with which we are blessed, evidently 
pointed to a secret understanding with MM. 
Ferry, Spuller, and even in case of need with 
MM. Brisson and Goblet, for the eventual re- 
storation of the temporal power. 

Be this as it may, from the moment Italy 
became seriously alarmed, and fancied that the 
restoration of a Monarchy in France meant 


THE MINISTRY OF MAY 24, 1873 119 


danger to itself, Bismarck’s purpose was virtually 
attained. 

Monarchy in prospective appeared from that 
time forth like a black spot on the horizon ; it 
was the spectre which was going to prevent 
Europe from enjoying in peace the rest to 
which she was just settling down; comment 
was rife; public opinion almost taxed us with 
preparing a vast reaction in favour of Catholic 
authority and the dogma of Legitimacy in order 
to re-establish Don Carlos at Madrid, the pro- 
scribed heir of the House of Bourbon at Naples, 
and all the dispossessed in Germany as well as 
Italy. It was to denounce and at the same 
time to avert the danger that Victor Emmanuel, 
in the beginning of September, repaired in some- 
thing like state to Berlin and then to Vienna, to 
show the peoples of Europe that the great 
Powers stood united and hand in hand, ready 
to defend them against the Clerical agitation. 
But the union of the sovereigns was as nothing 
compared to that established immediately be- 
tween the three Presses, German, Italian, and 
French. It was a concert with a triple band 
and loud ringing of bells, in which our Re- 
publican journalists took the dominant note and 
gave the key. Truly, a certain feeling of shame 
prevented them as yet to play too manifestly in 
open unison with the well-known organs of the 
Prussian Foreign Office. But there were-no such 


¥20 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


scruples with regard to those of the Quirinal ; 
there was a regular understanding between those 
two, a daily exchange of false or true communi- 
cations, a tactical system combined with method— 
in one word, a cordiality which went to the length 
of effusiveness and sentimental affection. It was 
an understood thing that a friendship, nay, the 
closest intimacy, between Italy and France was 
simply a matter of course, and could only be 
frustrated and transformed into corresponding 
feelings of distrust by the threatening “‘papalin” 
Monarchists in power. But for the designs of 
which we were suspected, the two Latin sister- 
nations, intended by nature to understand and love 
one another, would have flung themselves into 
each other’s arms, and Italy was only waiting for 
our disappearance from the political arena to show 
her grateful recollection of the services rendered 
to her unification by French arms. There is no 
need to show how subsequent events have belied 
the assumption which at that time, and even from 
sheer naiveté or calculation, commanded belief in 
every Republican mind. 

But how could people, nay, the best disposed, 
help being seriously alarmed at the rumour of 
that Clerical peril, re-echoed as it was on every 
side ; how could they help being alarmed when 
they even beheld one of the principal authors of 
the Education Bill of 1850, and the erstwhile 
accredited champion of the temporal power of the 


THE MINISTRY OF MAY 24,1873 - 121 


Papacy, namely, M. Thiers, profess to share the 
general emotion to such an extent, as to promise 
in an open letter to resume his seat in the 
Assembly, in order to defend threatened religious 
Jrecdom ; how could they help being alarmed, when 
most intelligent women belonging to the im- 
mediate circle of M. Thiers’ friends repaired to 
the public places in the South of France, in order 
to persuade the peasantry that the first act of a 
restored Monarchy would be the reviving of tithes, 
accompanied by a law of enforced monthly con- 
fession? Finally, in common candour as well as 
fairness, we are bound to admit that our own 
monarchical, but above all our religious Press 
caused us every now and again a good deal of 
embarrassment. The manner in which it took 
up the provocations coming from Italy was calcu- 
lated to invest them with a show of justice; the 
prominence it gave to most laudable religious 
manifestations was calculated to invest them with 
the appearance of a political character. It was 
not sufficiently cautious in its appeals for divine 
protection to escape the garbling of those appeals, 
and their transformation at the hands of those of 
bad faith into petitions for other than spiritual 
weapons for the defence of religion. 

Without allowing himself to be affected beyond 
measure by a situation, the painful nature of which 
was mainly manifest around him, M. de Gontaut 
kept me informed of all its evolutions with his 


122 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


usual frankness and clear-sightedness. ‘‘ There 
is a point,” he wrote to me on August 12, 
‘“‘which has always caused me anxiety, and | 
fancy I talked it over with you in Paris; I am 
alluding to the religious question in Germany. 
Herr von Bismarck, carried away by his passion, 
has made it one of the bases of his policy. The 
resistance he has met with, and which is_ be- 
coming more accentuated every day, irritates him, 
and far from proving a discouragement, it seems 
to act like a stimulant on his will. His mind is 
fertile in resources, he has few or no scruples, he 
is bold to a degree, and I feel convinced that his 
principal occupation at this moment is the devis- 
ing of new means of victory. He is, moreover, 
afraid of France; he dreads the awakening of the 
religious spirit there, and would look upon it as 
a possible encouragement to the resistance the 
Catholics oppose to him. In short, he views with 
apprehension the clearing of the horizon in favour 
of a probable return of the Monarchy in France ; 
and, thanks to the gossip of the Press, to the 
inopportune and indiscreet comments—to put it 
mildly—of the journals and of certain members 
of the extreme Right, as well as to the cries of 
alarm on the part of the Republican papers, even 
of the most moderate, he is under the impression 
that the Comte de Chambord, if he did ascend the 
throne, would before all adopt a Pope-ridden and 
religious policy of reaction, etc., etc. The triumph 


THE MINISTRY OF MAY 24, 1873 123 


of the Carlists in Spain would frighten him no less 
from that particular point of view. Impelled by 
those surmises, he cannot help being bent on 
giving us serious trouble. How will he contrive 
it? that is the question. It will probably not 
be by declaring war against us, at any rate not for 
the present. ... I repeat; there lies the dark 
and dreaded point. How is it to be cleared up? 
That again is very difficult.” 

A month later, the chances of restoring the 
Monarchy having become more probable, and 
above all more imminent, he warned me of 
possible dangers of a more serious nature, and 
calculated to give me greater concern. He had had 
the opportunity of a conversation with the Empress 
Augusta, who throughout never ceased to honour 
him with her goodwill. That noble woman was 
far from sharing all_the views, and least of all all 
the passions, of Herr von Bismarck, whether with 
regard to France, whose ruin she had never 
wished for, or with regard to the Catholic religion, 
towards which she was accused, even in Germany, 
of entertaining a secret leaning. On. that par- 
ticular day M. de Gontaut was surprised to find 
her sad, more reserved than usual, and visibly 
shaken by the noise around her. 

“Without departing from the reserve arising 
from the conventions of our reciprocal situation, I 
endeavoured to reassure her with regard to the 
tendencies that cause such a gratuitous anxiety in 


124 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


Germany. In spite of her friendly disposition, in 
spite of the natural elevation of her character, she 
is not personally free from the prejudices against 
us that are being so cleverly exploited at present. 
I was not in the least surprised at this, for that 
distrust is as it were in the air we breathe here, 
and with which apparently the most distinguished 
cannot help being impregnated. I may add, that 
this anxiety, arising from the dread of a new 
‘lifting of bucklers’ in France, and particularly 
by the excessive development of religious mani- 
festations, is not confined to Germany alone, but 
may be noticed in nearly every foreigner, if I am 
to judge by the conversations I had during my 
stay at the watering-places in Germany. This is 
a symptom to the existence of which we should 
not close our eyes, and which is calculated to 
make us think. The Empress, moreover, said 
something to me, from which I may safely 
conclude that henceforth my position will be 
fraught with greater difficulties, and be more 
delicate than hitherto it has been, ¢hat zs, while 
there were outstanding accounts between Germany 
and France. While pointing this out to me, in, I 
am bound to admit, a very kindly tone and 
manner, did she mean to allude to some plan 
Germany is hatching, to this or that trouble she 
may endeavour to fasten upon us a little later on? 
I doubt it, because she remains altogether outside 
the sphere of politics. Hence I am inclined to 


THE MINISTRY OF MAY 24, 1873 125 


believe, that in talking to me as she did she was 
simply impressed by the sad and general view 
we had both arrived at a little while before when 
discussing the whole of the situation, and the 
social dangers hanging over us in the future. 
Nevertheless, I fancy that certain words of hers 
might be construed into an allusion to the uneasy 
dispositions of Europe, face to face with the 
religious manifestations of our country, and par- 
ticularly to the dispositions of Prince Bismarck.” 

I need scarcely say that those grave warnings, 
coming whence they did, did not leave me in- 
different. The lofty position to which circum- 
stances had lifted me entailed a considerable 
share of responsibility in the future destiny of my 
country. Not to have kept my eyes open day 
and night, not to have entered heart and soul 
into the situation on the eve of the supreme. 
resolution the National Assembly was about to 
take, would, warned as I was of the consequences 
that might ensue, have been a terrible neglect of 
duty on my part. Nevertheless, amidst all those 
reflections ever present to me, I failed to detect 
the least cause why my friends should not pursue 
to the end the glorious enterprise they were 
resolved to attempt. In reality, and looking at 
them dispassionately, there was nothing substantial 
or serious in the prejudices that had been deliber- 
ately marshalled against us. No one in France, 
whether in our own ranks or in those of others 


126 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


(with the exception of some visionaries without 
the least authority), dreamt of attempting a 
religious crusade beyond our frontier, or of 
establishing at home anything resembling the 
civic domination of the clergy. At a public 
meeting in Normandy I had given my personal 
explanation of the matter, and, if the truth must 
be told, with a kind of scornful assurance, and 
not a voice had been raised, even from the most 
advanced ranks of the Right, to attenuate, still 
less to contradict, the purport of my words. 
To dissipate that mist, the Comte de Chambord, 
answering the call of the National Assembly, 
would but have had to express the same thought, 
unquestionably his, with the authority due to his 
rank, and in that dignified language and so 
distinctly French, he had at his command. All 
the preoccupations of the friends of order and of 
peace would have veered round in his favour, 
considering monarchical stability a better guarantee 
than could be offered by a Republic raised on the 
smoking ruins of the Commune. We should 
have had nothing to confront us but the disguised 
ill-will and astute threats of one man. To retreat 
before the supposed mark of his displeasure, 
before the frown of that Olympian Jupiter, would 
have been tantamount to declaring that France, 
abdicating the right to govern herself henceforth, 
was resigned to submit her national life to the 
good pleasure of a master, and not to emerge 


THE MINISTRY OF MAY 24, 1873 127 


from the shadow of his protectorate. Had we 
come to this? Had Sedan obliterated to such 
an extent the memories of Bouvines, Marignan, 
Rocroy, Denain, Fontenoy, and Austerlitz, as to 
reduce us to such an avowal of decline and to 
such a depth of humiliation? I refused to admit 
that thought. We had just paid sufficiently dear 
for our independence, we might at least claim to 
have recovered it. A few months previously, 
when Herr von Bismarck had given us to under- 
stand that, should such circumstances arise, he 
would not consent to acknowledge M. Gambetta 
as President of the Republic, I had strongly 
recommended M. de Gontaut not to let him 
articulate to the end that pretension to an arrogant 
right of control and exclusion, but it was certainly 
not with the intention to allow that stranger, or 
any other, for that matter, to believe himself entitled - 
to place an interdict on the institution and dynasty 
which represented to the most eminent degree 
our greatness in the past, and constituted our 
greatest hope for its recovery. As for myself, I 
should have never forgiven myself for attaching 
to the recollection of such a weakness a name 
borne before me by more than one generation, 
which had served, and not altogether without 
glory, both France and the Monarchy. Never 
did I feel myself to be so much of a Royalist as 
on the day I perceived clearly that a German 
wanted to prevent my being so. One might 


128 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


have never been a Royalist, one could not cease 
to be one that day. At present, when the pas- 
sions, then at their height, have calmed down, I 
feel convinced that every Frenchman will under- 
stand me. 

Between M. de Gontaut and myself there 
could be no disagreement of opinion on such a 
subject. My letters to him, therefore, were not 
intended to dictate to him words which emanated 
naturally from his inmost heart as they did from 
mine; I wrote to him, simply to confirm and to 
impress on his mind our agreement to that effect 
at every fresh incident. It was that idea which 
presided at the conception of the letter I again 
addressed to him on October 25, and only a few 
days before the ever-to-be-regretted incident that 
was to witness the destruction of our common 
hopes. 

‘‘T am constantly thinking of you, and of what 
your position at Berlin will be while the debate 
runs its impassioned course here. I have no 


doubt that the ill-will against any monarchical . 


combination is at its height there. Herr von 
Bismarck is evidently pursuing it with that in- 
stinctive hatred of everything calculated to raise 
France to her former position, and with that 
mixture of genuine impatience and_ simulated 
dread he displays against everything that may 
aid the interests of the Catholic Church. Un- 
fortunately, I am much afraid that the French 


a 


THE MINISTRY OF MAY 24, 1873 129 


Republicans, even the most illustrious and of the 
most recent standing, will not hesitate to accept 
that support which confers so little honour on their 
cause, All this will make it a difficult time for 
you (uz guart @heure difficile a passer) as well as 
for us, and you will need all your vigilance and 
more to detect before it is too late, and to frustrate 
all the bad tricks they will play us in order to in- 
crease our home difficulties. I can only repeat to 
you what I have already said. When you happen 
to meet with sincere people, really uneasy at the 
idea that we are going to set Europe on fire in the 
interests of the temporal power of the Papacy, try 
to dispel their uneasiness with valid reasons. You 
lack no means to convince those whom it is pos- 
sible to convince. With regard to the others, save 
your breath, put on the appearance of perfect tran- 
quillity, of being confident of your cause, display 
neither excitement nor agitation. After all, our 
territory, take it as you will, is liberated; our 
debts are paid, and we are no longer at the 
mercy of a whim. I know how precarious and 
insecure that independence is with our arsenals 
empty and our frontier open. But they will, at 
any rate, have to find new pretexts in order to 
fasten new quarrels on us. Equally, no doubt, the 
stronger need never be at a loss for a pretext. 
Nevertheless, there is still sufficient interest in 
Europe for an unfortunate nation trying to re- 


trieve her position, the traditions attached to the 
K 


130 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


Monarchical cause are still sufficiently strong to 
render provocation on the part of the ‘crowned 
revolutionary’ at Varzin practically impossible, 
as long as we refrain from giving him the oppor- 
tunity. Take no notice whatsoever of things said 
or done to annoy you, unless you consider them 
too serious to be passed over, and do not give 
Herr von Bismarck the satisfaction of appearing 
to mind his anger. We have right if not might 
on our side, and we should show the calmness 
suitable to the situation which is not without its 
dignity.” 

I may be permitted to add, that I had by 
my side, or rather above me, in the attitude of 
Marshal MacMahon, the model for that dignity 
which seemed to me to be incumbent, at that 
critical moment, on all the representatives of 
France. Owing to a scruple, the nature of which 
I have pointed out, the Marshal, having pro- 
mised to the various parties to remain, did not 
think himself justified to depart from that neu- 
trality and to associate himself personally with the 
design pursued around him; nevertheless, from 
the bottom of his heart he was intensely interested 
in it. He made no secret of his wish for its 
success, although the result would have entailed the 
descent from the foremost position he had attained. 
That, to his thinking, was such an insignificant 
fact that he seemed not only not to trouble 
himself about it, but not to perceive, an indiffer- 


THE MINISTRY OF MAY 24, 1873 131 


ence which did not exist to the same degree with 
his predecessor. But when informed of the attempt 
to discredit his advisers by spreading all sorts of 
rumours against them, he was the first to tell them 
to take no heed. To those who would endeavour 
to question our good faith he willingly pledged 
his reputation of personal loyalty in guarantee of 
ours. Above all was he convinced of his ability to 
arrive finally at an understanding with the King 
of Italy. I do not remember whether it was on 
that occasion or ona similar one that occurred 
later on that he said to me—‘“‘I will write to 
Victor Emmanuel ; he knows me, we have fought 
side by side; whatever I say he will believe.” 

If, unfortunately, M. de Gontaut’s answer had 
not reached me too late to be productive of any- 
thing but regrets, I should have had the satisfac- 
tion of being able to verify that the line of conduct 
agreed on between us would produce its effect, 
even at Berlin. The best course to take in this 
world is not to yield to intimidation. When a 
resolution is properly taken, even those who are 
displeased with it resign themselves to make the 
best of it, and would fear to show their annoyance 
by a too conspicuously bad reception. ‘‘ Very in- 
teresting, those forthcoming events in Paris,” 
remarked one of the Prussian ministers to M. de 
Gontaut. ‘With France one never knows what 
will come next. What wonderful resources you 
have! What vitality!” = 


132 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


And M. de Gontaut sent me at the same time 
German newspaper articles, which, without rein- 
stating us in their favour, had considerably lowered 
their tone. His diplomatic colleagues already 
began to inquire of him with regard to the course 
the restored Monarchy was likely to adopt, and in 
such a manner as to show him that each one, 
looking upon the thing as an accomplished fact, 
was debating with himself how best to turn it to 
his own profit. The same impression was com- 
municated to me from London by the Duc De- 
cazes, from Vienna by the Marquis d’ Harcourt, 
and by General Leflé from St. Petersburg, where, 
it should be said, our relations had never ceased 
to be cordial.’ 

Hence, I remain convinced, that however many 
and great the obstacles, owing to the division of 
parties, might have been at home to the restora- 
tion of the Monarchy, no spoke would have been 
thrown in its wheels from beyond the frontier. 
Everything would have simply passed off as it did 
in 1814, with even this advantage to the grand- 
nephew of Louis XVIII., that the territory being 
free, and France’s ransom paid, he would have 
resumed in the councils of Europe the place 


1 In the course of that summer of 1873, one of our friends of the 
Assembly, and a distinguished diplomatist, the Comte de Chan- 
dordy, while travelling in Switzerland, where Prince Gortschakoff 
was spending the season, had at my request paid him a visit, and 
had found him as kindly disposed as M. de Gontaut had found him 
the year before. Prince Gortschakoff scarcely noticed the objections 
with which the Conservative Government was assailed. 


THE MINISTRY OF MAY 24, 1873 133 


occupied by his forebears without owing anything 
to anybody, and without having to ask them for 
anything. 

Dis aliter visum. The Monarchy, alas! was 
not called upon to undergo the ordeal whence, I 
feel confident, it would have emerged with credit 
to its principle and to the welfare of France, as it 
had emerged from similar ones before. And it 
was not, as I have heard it hinted more than once, 
the fear of exposing France to serious diplomatic 
difficulties that prevented the Prince who was 
naturally chosen to fill the throne, to come to an 
understanding with the representatives of the 
parliamentary majority. Nor was it the appre- 
hension of having to make concessions with regard 
to religious questions that was repugnant to his 
conscience. No questions of general policy, any 
more than question of constitutional organization, 
were raised, still less debated, by him during 
those parliamentary negotiations which for a little 
while were believed to have paved the way to 
a much-desired agreement. The understanding 
was complete on all points but one—the expedi- 
ency or rather the possibility of taking away from 
the French army the standard under which for 
nearly a century it had fought, conquered, or 
suffered, and which misfortune had as much 
endeared to it as glory. That this has been the 
only, absolutely the only subject on which it 
seemed impossible to arrive at an agreement has 


134 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


been practically known: all along; recently, how- 
ever, evidence more authentic than any that had 
been advanced before, namely, that of a confidant 
and representative of the Comte de Chambord, 
has removed whatever doubt there may still have 
existed ; and this is a fact of such importance to 
history, which would have always been more or 
less reluctant to put faith in it, that the friends of 
truth cannot be sufficiently grateful to the Mar- 
quis de Dreux-Brézé for having rendered them 
that service, whatever the inaccuracies may be 
that have crept into other parts of his story.’ 

My letter to M. de Gontaut conveyed, I 
imagine, the very general impression consequent 
on the publication of the famous letter from 
Frohsdorf, which reached us on October 29. 

“The letter of M. le Comte de Chambord has 


1 IT was all the more pleased to have M. de Brézé’s confirmation 
on a point on which I have always been convinced, notwithstand- 
ing the doubt apparently still existing on the subject in the minds 
of people who ought to have been completely posted up in the 
events of that time. For instance, M. de Gontaut himself, in the 
notes that have been communicated to me, states confidently, that 
among the number of points discussed between the Comte de 
Chambord and those who intended to propose his restoration to 
the Assembly was that of mznzistertal responsibility, a provision 
restricting the royal prerogative which M. le Comte de. Chambord 
could not make up his mind to accept. In M. de Brézé’s Souve- 
nirs, ministerial responsibility, in common with the other conditions 
ofa parliamentary régime, figures among the points granted with- 
out discussion by the Comte de Chambord in the note M. Chesne- 
long® had submitted.to him at Salsburg, before being brought back 
to Patis to be communicated to-M. Ghesnelong’s friends. AUTHOR. 





"2 M. Chesnelong has given a full account of all this int “a very recent work, 
La Campagne Monarchique d'Octobré 1873, E. Plon, Nourrit et Cie., Paris, 
1895.—TRANS. ; 


THE MINISTRY OF MAY 24, 1873 135 


caused all the parties unanimously to abandon 
any idea of the present restoration of the Mon- 
archy. Consternation reigns in the camp of all 
decent people,’ for the success was as good as 
certain. We ought to be thankful that we have 
in this emergency a man like the Marshal around 
whom we can group ourselves.” 

As at the same time I was urgently requesting 
M. de Gontaut to come to Paris in order to take 
his part in the important resolutions of the 
Assembly in view ofthis unforeseen situation, he 
could neither watch the impression produced at 
Berlin by this change of scene, nor inform me in 
writing of it. Hence I have to recall to mind 
our conversations to enable me to state that at 
the first moment a feeling of surprise, mingled 
with apprehension, dominated every other. The 
effect seemed so disproportionate to the cause 
that people had great difficulty to understand the 
scruple which had stopped the Comte de Cham- 
bord midway. The military chiefs, above all, 
knowing as they did the effect of symbols and 
outward emblems on the imagination of an army, 
and alive to the risk of upsetting its moral con- 
ditions, those chiefs did not disguise their aston- 
ishment. ‘‘ Why,” said Moltke to M. de Gontaut, 

1 The author writes “ honnétes gens,” but he evidently uses the 
term in the sense in which it was used during the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries in France; when the adjective “‘honnéte” did 


not only imply honesty, but “good form,” peeled with the usages 
of good society, etc.,.etc.-—TRANS; . . 58 


136 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


when the question was discussed in his presence, 
‘“why should the King of France be more diffi- 
cult than our Emperor, who, while reserving his 
own ensign for his palace, has left the German 
tricolour to his troops?” It was exactly the 
same remark Manteuffel had made to one of my 
friends one day, at a dinner party at M. Thiers’. 
““That brave French army which I have learned 
to appreciate so highly should not be deprived of 
its standard,” he said. ‘It will be sufficient for 
the King to display his own colours on his 
helmet.” 

Others who were watching the crisis, and who 
were equally impressed, asked themselves whether 
the disappointment of the Conservatives would 
not result in bringing the Republican minority of 
the Assembly back to power amidst a gust of 
reaction which, even if M. Thiers were replaced 
at its head, could not fail to place that Assembly 
at the mercy of the revolutionary party; and 
they (the spectators) expressed their opinion, not 
without a certain show of impatience, that France 
always went from one extreme and from one 
danger to another. When, therefore, the news 
spread that the Assembly had secured to Marshal 
MacMahon a prolongation of his - presidential 
power for seven years, there was a general feeling 
of satisfaction. This solution was neither the 
Monarchy which had inspired a kind of mistrust, 
nor the advent of M. Gambetta, or some one 


THE MINISTRY OF MAY 24, 1873 137 


like him, and of whom people were afraid. The 
solution, assuredly the best one for the moment, 
although insufficient and precarious, inasmuch 
as it, while insuring tranquillity for the present, 
offered no like guarantee for the future, answered 
perhaps all the better to the degree and the 
character of the interest others took in us. It 
would seem that that sentiment showed itself in 
the terms in which the Prussian Under-Secretary 
of State assured our chargé d’affaires, M. le Mar- 
quis de Savye, “that his Government viewed 
with satisfaction the powers conferred upon the 
President of the Republic, on which it looked as 
a new guarantee for the prosperity of France, 
which, together with the maintenance of the 
harmony and the friendly relations of the Republic 
with the foreign powers, constituted its most 
ardent wish.” Twice in that little speech had 
the word “Republic” been uttered with evident 
gusto. 

The ministerial changes that followed on the 
re-constituting of the Marshal’s powers involved 
no change to me; at any rate, not for some 
months to come, during which I remained at the 
head of the Cabinet; after which, for various 
reasons, the portfolio of Foreign Affairs devolved 
on my old friend, the Duc Decazes. I am free 
to admit that I felt some regret at having to 
abandon the functions and attributes which had 
once more placed me amidst surroundings-where 


138 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


I had spent my youth, and in the centre of grand 
interests, the study of which had always exercised 
a great fascination over me, and constitutes even 
to-day in my retirement my favourite occupation. 
Nevertheless, I was the first to acknowledge that 
I had been most usefully replaced, and that they 
could not have hit upon a better substitute. I 
had been too much mixed up with ardent struggles, 
I had aroused too much enmity and prejudice on 
all sides, to remain in power very long in an 
Assembly the divisions of which I unfortunately 
knew too well; and I fostered no illusion in that 
respect. On the morrow of crises such as those 
through which I had just passed, the foreign 
policy of a nation wants conducting on a basis 
of continuity and sequence. The Duc Decazes, 
who had been less mixed up with our dissensions 
than I, was enabled to represent France worthily 
for four years without the need of recanting any 
of his convictions. His credit for having wielded 
that power is none the less because of the facility 
with which he did this, in spite of the oscillations 
and backsliding of our home policy. During that 
time he mapped out a line which his successors 
had only to follow.’ It is a service for which 
one cannot be too grateful to his memory. | 
knew, moreover, how well prepared he was for 
the task he had to accomplish, by reason of the 
exceedingly great pliancy of mind, his charm and. 
grace of manner, his skill in managing men, for I: 


THE MINISTRY OF MAY 24, 1873 139 


had seen him at work during the years we had 
spent together in the diplomatic career. When 
M. de Gontaut expressed to me his affectionate 
regret at the termination of our short collaboration, 
I was enabled to assure him that he would lose 
nothing by the change, and he must have seen 
since then that I was not mistaken. 


III 


THE EPISCOPAL CHARGES AND THE 
CRISIS OF 1875 


THE EPISCOPAL CHARGES AND THE CRISIS 
OF 1875 


I 


NEITHER the ambassador nor his new minister 
were to enjoy for any length the kind of calm 
that had succeeded the check to the Monarchy, 
and the ill-disguised satisfaction of Herr von 
Bismarck thereat. For if it was not in our power 
to be Royalists actually and actively, we still 
remained—M. Decazes, as well as M. de Gontaut 
and myself—reported Clericals, and that was quite 
enough to make us unworthy of any confidence 
or consideration on the part of the inventor of 
the Kulturkampf. His irritation against every- 
thing pertaining to the Catholic Church was even 
going to be pushed to its height by a startling 
manifestation of religious zeal a very few days 
after the constitution of the new Ministry. 

The occasion or the pretext for it was a cry 
of pain and indignation uttered by Pius IX. in 
his captivity against the odious and_ hourly 
increasing rigorous treatment to which the Church 


was subjected in Germany. That eloquent wail 
° 143 


144 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


was dragged from the generous Pontiff by an 
attempt which plainly brought to light the 
scandalous reality of the situation. A prince of 
the Church, Cardinal Ledochowski, Archbishop 
of Posen, at first sentenced to two years detention 
and an enormous fine, was moreover deprived of 
his spiritual powers by a lay tribunal which had 
arrogated to itself the right to depose him, a 
proceeding as contemptible as it was ridiculous, 
and which, in subjecting the whole of the inner life 
of the Church to the disciplinary power of the 
State, was but the strict application of the new 
legislation. An Encyclical denounced to the 
Christian and civilized world that attempt against 
the sacred rights of conscience, in terms the just 
severity of which was not questioned by the 
sincere organs of Liberal opinion. It was but 
natural that the bishops, to whom the pontifical 
document was addressed, finding themselves 
threatened in the independent discharge of their 
ministrations, should have made themselves the 
echo of their spiritual head’s voice ; it was a duty 
which those who, like the bishops in England 
and in Belgium, had the unrestricted liberty of 
speech were the first to recognize and to discharge 
conspicuously. Several French bishops, impelled 
by the same feelings, and having even fewer 
motives to show any consideration to the German 
despotism, yielded to the temptation of following 
the others’ example, and the only reproach against 


EPISCOPAL CHARGES AND CRISIS OF 1875 145 


them was that they had taken no time to reflect 
that their condition was, unfortunately, not the 
same. If, moreover, in the pastoral letters to 
which they gave publicity their patriotic feeling 
added some sharpness to. the expression of their 
faith, if here and there their language seemed 
more or less impregnated with the bitterness still 
brimming over in every French and Christian 
heart, if all this were true, then, conscientiously 
speaking, it could not be accounted as a crime 
to them. But those.who had to bear the burden 
of the day had the right to remind them of the 
reserve imposed by a situation as yet indifferently 
consolidated, and of which only they who bore 
the burden could estimate the danger. The 
Church assuredly commanded no one to forget 
the obligations due to one’s country, and the first 
of those-obligations was not to expose the country, 
by provoking language, to acts of reprisal which 
might re-open her wounds, that were still smarting 
and but barely healed. 

In more than one instance the Prussian Govern- 
ment at Berlin or the German ambassador in 
Paris had shown great sensitiveness to far less 
harsh things said in the French Press, hence we 
fully expected that blame dispensed from such 
high quarters would not pass without protest. 
It was pretty certain that Count Arnim in par- 
ticular would feel seriously hurt at it, for that 


ambassador was at that moment more irritable 
: LG 





146 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


than ever, probably by reason of the foreboding 
of his near downfall. He complained of every- 
thing, and equally held the French ministers 
responsible for everything; one day it was the 
rudeness of a lady who declined to sit next to 
him at dinner at the Marshal’s, the next, the 
severe appreciations enumerated in the course of 
the Bazaine trial with regard to the conduct of 
the Prussian generals during the war. Hence, 
and as a matter of course, came he to complain 
of the episcopal charges. M. Decazes was 
prepared for his visit, and was able to answer 
him that he had already devised measures to 
stop a course of polemics, the awkwardness of 
which had been felt beforehand. And, in fact, 
a circular from the Minister of Public Worship, 
M. de Fourtou, had requested the bishops not to 
renew attacks calculated to arouse the susceptibility 
of neighbouring governments. That document, 
couched in a sad but firm tone, was not to be 
published officially. It was not to our interest to 
establish beyond a doubt the fact that what was 
allowed to pass elsewhere without objection we 
did not consider ourselves in a position to tolerate 
at home. But the Press easily got wind of it, 
and M. de Gontaut was obliged, as it were, to 
read the document to the Prussian Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, Herr von Biilow, who showed 
his appreciation of what we had done. And as, 
after all, the prelates who had received the notice 


EPISCOPAL CHARGES AND CRISIS OF 1875 147 


concurred in the suitability of it, we might cherish 
the hope that the trouble caused by the noisy 
incident would quickly be forgotten, as had been 
the case with several analogous disagreements. 

Herr von Bismarck was, however, not of the 
same mind; the pontifical allocution, the echo 
of which placed him, as it were, without the pale 
of public opinion, had wounded him to the quick. 
Whatever his belief in and worship of material 
force, his political sense warned him not to despise 
the action of the highest moral power ; the fact is 
proved by his subsequent conduct, when retracing 
his steps and emerging from the error of ways 
into which he had flung himself, he endeavoured, 
more or less, to obtain the absolution of Pius [X.’s 
censures by public homage to Leo XIII. But at 
that particular moment, in his impatience at being 
struck by a power which he was at a loss to reach, 
it was on something nearer to hand and on us 
that, to use a vulgar expression, he tried to vent 
his ill-humour. Are we to believe, as some com- 
petent judges were inclined to believe, that having 
found a grievance against France which might be 
invested with a semblance of justice, he would not 
lightly relax his hold of it, but rather keep it care- 
fully in reserve by means of a prolonged discussion, 
in order to utilize it in case of need—that is, if his 
home difficulties became so urgent as to compel 
him to provide a diversion from them beyond the 
frontier? Be this as it may, when Herr von Biilow 


148 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


informed him of M. de Gontaut’s communication, 
he showed his displeasure at his minister's having 
been satisfied with so little. Contrary to his habit 
of personally communicating as seldom as possible 
with the ambassadors, he sent word to M. de 
Gontaut to come and see him. He received him 
very coldly, and assumed at once a very decided 
tone. ‘The German Government,” he said, 
‘does not share your opinion that the circular 
of M. de Fourtou is a sufficient satisfaction, it 
requires something more than that. It is not 
sufficient to warn the bishops; they must be 
punished; that is the only way in which you 
can prove that you have no share in the insults 
we receive from them, and that you repudiate 
your responsibility with regard to them. Do not 
be induced into any error,” he added; ‘it is a 
question affecting our security. Your bishops 
foment the revolt in the Empire, and that is what 
we will not tolerate. In particular is this the case 
with the Bishop of Nancy,” he remarked, with 
still greater emphasis, ‘‘ whose jurisdiction is as 
yet a mixed one, and extends to the territories 
recently annexed. If you allow those proceedings 
to continue, it will be you who will have made 
war inevitable, and we will make war before the 
Clerical party, possessing itself of the power, 
declares it in the name of the persecuted Catholic 
religion, That is why,” he went on, in a frank 
tone he had not adopted before, “that is why 


EPISCOPAL CHARGES AND CRISIS OF 1875. 149 


your projects of monarchical restoration never 
pleased me. I had my suspicions as to the 
influence your Clericals would bring to bear on 
the Comte de Chambord.” M. de Gontaut 
having pointed out to him that, as far as he 
knew, there was no means of penal repression 
with regard to bishops who had only made use 
of the common liberty in France as others had 
done elsewhere, Herr von Bismarck retorted : 
“You make a mistake, you have two means at 
your disposal; you can bring them before the 
Council of State on a writ of appeal against the 
abuse of their functions (‘ Appel comme d’Abus’),} 
or else you can cite them before the ordinary 
courts for having insulted a foreign monarch ; and 
if you refuse to avail yourselves of that right, 


' The word “adus” (abuse) signified for a long while and ina 
special sense the attempts of ecclesiastics against the jurisdiction 
and rights of laymen. The appeal to the lay authorities against 
those encroachments was called “Appel comme d’Abus.” The 
“ Appel comme d’Abus ” was, above all in France, the resistance of 
the civic authorities against the encroachments of the ecclesiastical 
powers. The “Appel comme d’Abus” first became common in the 
fourteenth century. The law of the 18th Germinal of the year X. 
(April 8, 1802), still in operation at the present day, designates as 
“abus” by ecclesiastics : (1) Usurpation or excessive use of power ; 
(2) Infraction of the laws and rules of the State ; (3) Infraction of 
thé French canonical laws, attempts against the liberties, franchises, 
and customs of the Gallican Church ; (4) All enterprises or pro- 
ceedings which in the exercise of religion may compromise the 
honour of citizens, arbitrarily trouble their freedom of conscience» 
degenerate into oppression against them, and cause public injury 
or scandal. - Ecclesiastics have the same means of redress against 
a civic functionary troubling them in the exercise of their religion. 
The Council of State adjudicates in those matters, but it can only 
decide whether there has been abuse or not; it cannot inflict _ 
penal judgment.—TRANS. 


150 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


your law also grants that right to the representa- 
tive of the insulted sovereign, and we will avail 
ourselves directly of it.” In face of a decision 
which appeared as irrevocable as the language in 
which it was expressed was calm, discussion was 
out of the question, and M. de Gontaut had no 
alternative but to take his leave with the positive 
declaration of Herr von Bismarck ringing in his 
ears that the minimum of reparation the Prussian 
Government would accept would be the citation 
before the Council of State of the Bishop of 
Nancy, whose language was deemed more violent 
and more offensive than that of any one else. 

Moreover, Herr von Bismarck took care that 
the conversation should not remain a secret very 
long. M. de Gontaut had barely had time to 
dispatch his account of it to Paris when a paper, 
whose source of inspiration was a secret to no 
one, published an article on the same theme, and 
in terms absolutely identical with those he had 
heard from the lips of the Chancellor. 

‘The moment France identifies herself with 
Rome,” said the Mord-Deutsche Zeitung,’ “she 
becomes our sworn enemy. The peace of the 
world becomes impossible with France subject to 
the pontifical theocracy.” And the Chancellor 
himself very openly used language the meaning 
of which was still less ambiguous. “I am not 


' The author has 7Allemagne du Nord, which would mean Nora- 
Deutschland, and to my knowledge there is no paper of that name. 
—TRANS. 


EPISCOPAL CHARGES AND CRISIS OF 1875 151 


the ememy of France,” he said, in a sufficiently 
loud tone to be overheard by hearers on whom 
he imposed no secret; “I have proved it well 
enough by inducing the Emperor to accept the 
proposal of M. Thiers with regard to the anti- 
cipated evacuation; but I declare that, should 
France support the Catholics in Germany, I shall 
not wait until she be ready. That will be in two 
years; before then I shall seize -a favourable 
opportunity.” And a few days later, in the 
rostrum of the Reichstag itself, he took the op- 
portunity, although the subject under ‘discussion 
did not lend itself to it, to speak of a possible 
war with us as a contingency of which he had fore- 
cast the most minute chances. “I have been re- 
proached,” he said, ‘‘ with having made use in 1866 
of the Hungarian deserters against Austria ; I have 
merely availed myself of the rights of warfare ; and 
if one day we found ourselves involved in a war 
with France whose chief then might be Henri 
Comte de Chambord, we should have no cause for 
complaint if they constituted a pontifical legion 
with the Catholics of South Germany, incited to 
desert by the bishops who preach disobedience to 
the laws.” Those alarming rumours soon became 
sufficiently general for the Empress to refer to 
them. One day at a Court dinner she came up 
unaffectedly to M. de Gontaut, and reminded him 
of their conversation of a few months previously. 
‘“T warned you that your troubles weré not at 


152 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


an end,” she said; ‘‘and that there were even 
graver difficulties in store for you than those you 
had gone through in the past. Was I right?” 
“Yes, Madame,” replied M. de Gontaut; ‘and 
your Majesty’s words have recurred to me more 
than once.” ‘Are you not treated as you ought 
to be?” she added, with a kind of uncomfortable 
though interested tone, glancing in the direction 
of Bismarck in another part of the room. ‘As 
far as that goes, yes. There is never a want of 
politeness, but the reality is very sad and very 
difficult.” M. de Gontaut was speaking in a low 
tone of voice. ‘‘Do you think people are listen- 
ing?” asked the Empress, somewhat eagerly. 
“No, I do not think so, but we might be over- 
heard;” and in a few words M. de Gontaut 
explained to her the new subject of the dispute. 
At that time I was still M. de Decazes’ col- 
league, and he was kind enough to communicate 
to me the dispatches he received. The conversa- 
tion of Herr von Bismarck was, as a matter of 
course, the subject of a consultation between us, 
in which we were free to confess to one another 
that we felt even more embarrassed than uneasy. 
Though M. de Gontaut was assuredly correct in 
alleging a want of legal power which, as we shall 
see directly, was real, he had not been able to 
close Herr von Bismarck’s mouth completely with 
regard to his pretensions ; and the latter, by invok- 
ing against the bishops whom he accused by the 


EPISCOPAL CHARGES AND CRISIS OF 1875 153 


administrative procedure of the ‘“ Appel comme 
d’Abus,” showed himself an expert adept of our 
new parliamentary Gallicanism. In reading again 
the dissertation he sent to Count Arnim in support 
of his demand, I cannot help being even struck by 
the likeness of his argument to that we hear daily 
(once not later than a few weeks ago) unfolded in 
the rostrum of the Chamber by the Republican 
organs.! It is the same convenient forgetfulness, 
or rather the same denial of the spiritual independ- 
ence of the Church, the same refusal to recognize 
the new moral conditions and changes brought to 
bear upon ancient legislation by the introduction of 
the liberty of the Press and of worship into the laws 
of nations. The bishops receive a money stipend 
from the State; whatever be ‘the origin of that 
remuneration, that fact alone makes them function- 
aries of the State like every other category of func- 
tionaries ; as such they are bound to obey the Go- 
vernment, which in that way becomes responsible 
for all their acts; and it was in virtue of that title 
that Herr von Bismarck asked us to bring them 
to justice by taking administrative action against 
them. The lawyers at Herr von Bismarck’s 
elbow had not less carefully read him his lesson 
on the practical bearing of Articles 12 of the law 


1 That dissertation may be found in the volume entitled 
Antécédents du proces @ Arnim, pp. 117—153 (the French version 
of the Vorgeschichten already mentioned). Count Arnim was accused 
of not having supported the .claim of his chief with. sufficient 
energy.. He had no difficulty in refuting that accusation. 


154 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


of May 19, 1819, and 7 of the law of March 22, 
1822, both of which provided a judicial way to 
foreign sovereigns and their representatives for 
obtaining redress for insults and offences of which 
they believed themselves entitled to complain. 
In that rather complete enumeration of all the 
weapons at our possible disposal against the clergy 
there was, however, one the absence of which 
from the list may well cause our surprise to-day, 
because the practical application of it has since 
then become as common as it is convenient. Not 
a word was said to us about withholding the stipend 
of the incriminated bishops. Could it be that 
the most assiduous search had failed to bring 
to light either a legal foundation or even a pre- 
cedent sufficiently recent to be remembered for 
that method of “taming” dignitaries holding 
episcopal rank? In any case, that omission will 
no doubt appear extremely regrettable to our 
Republican priests; it would have provided a 
precedent emanating from an authority which they 
might have quoted with as much honour as 
profit. 

The most cursory examination was sufficient to 
show us that neither of the two means between 
which Herr von Bismarck had told M. de Gontaut 
to choose for his (Bismarck’s) expected satisfaction 
was for us honourably practicable. We were in 
no way disposed to drag from the discredit into 
which it had then justly fallen the superannuated 


EPISCOPAL CHARGES AND CRISIS OF 1875 155 


procedure of the ‘‘ Appel comme d’Abus,” of which 
the constitutional Monarchy had made but sparing 
use, to which the second Empire had only resorted 
once, and which had emerged from each ordeal 
riddled with biting epigrams. In its right place, 
perhaps, in a social organization where the Church, 
enjoying certain powers in temporal matters, might 
be suspected of abusing those powers, and where 
the State professing a religion might, to a certain 
point, pretend to some competence in spiritual 
matters ; but the ‘“‘ Appel comme d’Abus” has no 
longer any appreciable meaning in a purely lay 
society, the very principle of which emancipates 
it from all threats on the part of religious author- 
ity. A verdict which has neither a moral value, 
nor entails a material consequence, is nothing but 
a puerile vexation, the only effect of which is to 
secure a noisy publicity to facts at which it pre- 
tends to tilt. I doubt whether the high-minded 
and serious-minded men constituting the Council 
of State would have lent themselves, even at our 
request, to the touching-up of the old scenery of 
that comedy. They would have been bound, as 
it were, to tell us that the most severe censure 
of the acts of a foreign government did not come 
within any of the cases provided for by the organic 
clauses, inasmuch as such appreciation could 
neither be construed into az excess of power, nor 
into a contravention of the laws of the State, and 
least of all into ax attempt to raise trouble in men's 


156 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


conscrences.' As for the idea of resorting to the 
ordinary tribunals under the provisions of the 
press-laws, the proposal to adopt such a remedy 
could assuredly not have been serious, inasmuch 
as the remedy would have been worse than the 
disease. What French magistrate or Council 
would have consented to bring bishops, his own 
countrymen, to the criminal’s dock (sur fe bane 
ou stegent les malfarteurs) to allay the suscepti- 
bilities of the Chancellor of the German Empire ? 

one could have been found to play that sorry 
part, one dreads to contemplate the storm of 
abuse he would have raised among the audience 
the moment he opened his lips, and the kind of 
reply he would have had from the opposing 
counsel. Where is the jury that would have 
listened to or even have admitted the claimant’s 
arguments? The alleged offence would have been 
withdrawn from the judicial arena, but embittered, 
envenomed, magnified a hundredfold by the con- 
spicuousness of the debate, the noise of the Press, 
and the unanimity of the acquittal. The result 
was such a foregone conclusion as to lead to the 
belief that Herr von Bismarck, who must have 
foreseen the result, was not far from fostering a 
hope to that effect. 


1 1 had serious thoughts of reducing all this to the phraseology 
of the Ecclesiastical Courts. But after I had found the seemingly 
English equivalents, I came to the conclusion that the ordinary 
reader would fail to understand them, inasmuch as I did not under- 
stand them myself. It would have been the blind leading the 
blind.—TRANS. 


EPISCOPAL CHARGES AND CRISIS OF 1875 157 


We were therefore practically reduced to ex- 
pressing to Herr von Bismarck the regret at not 
being able to comply with any of his desires. 
How would he have received that answer? It 
was difficult to foretell. Admitting (and I am 
inclined to that belief) that from the outset he 
had somewhat elevated his voice in order to 
intimidate us, and that he would in reality have 
hesitated to resort to the extreme measures with 
which he had threatened us in vindication of a 
grievance, which, after all, consisted of words 
only ; admitting all this, yet the least we could 
expect from his wounded self-love was the taking 
of one of those steps which, on more than one 
occasion, he was about to take; namely, the 
recall of his ambassador and the breaking-off of 
diplomatic relations. This would have led to a 
strained and violent (? vzodenze) situation, especialy 
dangerous between two neighbouring nations, who 
were daily engaged in settling delicate matters, 
and would have held suspended over them, 
like a Damoclean sword, the imminent risk of 
more declared hostility. Meanwhile, all this 
meant, as far as Prussia was concerned, a great 
encouragement to the eager designs of the military 
party ; in Europe it meant a feeling of alarm 
experienced by all, no matter what their interests ; 
in France a check to the progress of reviving 
public prosperity, and lastly, what perhaps con- 
cerned us still more, the arousing of a very 


158 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


general feeling of disapproval of the ministers 
of religion, who, forsaking their mission of peace, 
would in that way have sown trouble around 
themselves, and perhaps have let loose the storm. 

Such an effect, in itself very deplorable, would 
have caused nowhere more regret than in Rome, 
and to the Holy Father himself, who—as we know 
from our ambassador, M. de Corcelle, who was 
a great favourite with him’—took a heartfelt share 
in all our difficulties. Actuated by an altogether 
fatherly feeling towards France, Pius IX. was in 
no way desirous to see the uphill task of our 
re-establishment compromised by manifestations 
doomed to remain barren in favour of a cause 
which, unfortunately, we were no longer in a 
position to serve.” 


1M. Claude-Francois Tircuy de Corcelle must not be con- 
founded with M. le Baron Chaudron de Courcel, the present French 
ambassador in London, who, I believe, is a Gallican, and probably 
entertains a different view of the ecclesiastical policy of France 
from that of his almost-namesake.—TRANS. 

* I take this opportunity to remind the reader that the conduct 
of Pius IX. to the French Government was, in point of delicacy 
and disinterestedness, beyond all praise. He never gave a greater 
proof of that feeling than when we were obliged to recall from its 
station at Civita-Vecchia the Orézogue, which had been dispatched 
thither in order to provide him with a retreat in the event of his 
security being threatened at Rome. In taking that praiseworthy 
precaution M. Thiers had neglected to inform the Government of 
Victor Emmanuel, which, amidst the confusion of its taking posses- 
sion of the Holy City, would probably have offered no objection to 
any of M. Thiers’ wishes. Nevertheless the presence of a war vessel 
(“a vessel flying the military flag,” says the author) in a port with- 
out the authority of the power to which that port belonged was 
(the moment the kingdom of Italy was recognized) in such evident 
contradiction with the elementary rules of the law of nations as 


EPISCOPAL CHARGES AND CRISIS OF 1875 159 


That was the condition of affairs, and it will be 
admitted that it gave already sufficient food for 
serious consideration, the more in that this time 
there was not, as in the case of the obstacles that 
had confronted our monarchical hopes, a capital 
interest at stake, I mean an interest affecting the 
national security and greatness, which have to be 
defended at any cost. An incident which we had 
not the slightest reason to expect -suddenly im- 
parted to the crisis an altogether acute character. 
I have already said that most of the bishops had 
paid a deferential attention to the advice of the 
Minister of Public Worship, and acknowledged 
the moderation of his tone and the gravity of his 
appreciations. The saint-like Archbishop of Paris, 
Cardinal Guibert, though one of those who had 
plunged headlong into the controversy, had not 
only preached but given them the example -to 
that effect. Hence there had been silence in that 
direction for more than a month, when that 
silence was suddenly broken by a pastoral letter 
from one of the bishops in the South of France, 
to make the indefinite prolongation of that presence practically 
impossible. No objection was taken, however, while M. Thiers 
remained in power, but the moment he had been replaced by the 
Conservatives, the journals of the Left made it a point to raise 
the question, and they themselves urged the Italian Government 
(which had probably not thought of it) to demand the withdrawal 
of the Orénogue. As a matter of course, as soon as the demand 
was preferred we could but comply with it. Nothing could com- 
pare with the touching resignation with which Pius [X.—without 


addressing to France the faintest reproach—heard of the disap- 
pearance of that last proof of France’s powerless sympathy. 


160 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


which missive was, unfortunately, couched in 
terms closely resembling those which had already 
caused so much excitement. The worthy prelate, 
in his distant see, had certainly not calculated 
the effect that would attend his step beyond the 
Rhine; but, contrary to his intention,it was, never- 
theless, considering the situation, nothing less than 
a challenge flung in Herr von Bismarck’s face,’ 
the consequences of which it was impossible to 
calculate, in the event of our being accused of 
complicity. An ultimatum, an altogether direct 
one this time, might come to us at the arrival of 
the next messenger. Unless we wished to be 
confronted by the alternative of submitting to it, 
or to decline doing so, we had but a few hours to 
take the initiative. 

I do not know who in this emergency suggested 
to M. Decazes an expedient which, I think, no 
one will blame him for having eagerly caught at, 
seeing the narrow strait in which he found himself. 
Only one Conservative paper, 7 Unzvers, had re- 
produced the pastoral letter ; all the others, warned 
at the outset by us, had ignored the matter of 
their own accord. It was to indict, not the bishop, 
but the paper, under the exceptional powers we 
still enjoyed by the “state of siege” proclaimed 


1 The author says, “par le visage de M. de Bismarck.” I have 
translated it according to his probable meaning, but the preposition 
“dar” is rarely used in that sense now-a-days. We must remember, 
though, that M. le Duc de Broglie is a member of the Académie 
Frangaise, and has the authority of Voltaire for using the preposition 
in that sense. —TRANS. 


EPISCOPAL CHARGES AND CRISIS OF 1875 161 


in Paris during the war, kept up by the Commune, 
and which M. Thiers during his two years of 
administration had not withdrawn. That same 
evening 7 Univers was suspended for two months 
for having published a document whzchk might 
cause political difficulties. 

I will willingly admit that the subterfuge was 
the reverse of heroic; I comforted myself for 
having given my sanction to it with the thought 
that there was nothing very heroic either about 
those who, warned of a grave peril, practically 
exposed their country to all the consequences of 
it when they themselves ran no risk whatever. 
Compared to the trouble they might have caused 
the penalty was light.1 


1 T can well conceive that to-day, the imminence of the danger 
being over, those who have lost the recollection of it should tax us 
with timidity ; but I confess to having been surprised, and even 
inclined to smile, when I read in the Correspondence of the cele- 
brated editor of ? Univers, M. Louis Veuillot, posthumously pub- 
lished since then, that the measure against his paper was taken, in 
concert with the Prussian Government, by Catholics formerly on 
the staff of Ze Correspondant out of sheer resentment at their former 
quarrels with 7 Univers. 1 doubt whether self-importance ever led 
a man of parts to a supposition so utterly removed from—I will not 
say the truth, but the probability. It would have required a mar- 
vellous love of memory and cool-headedness still to have recol- 
tected, after the storms we had weathered and those that threatened 
at that moment, the former dissensions between certain Catholics 
on the delicate applications and extreme consequences of their 
common faith, So far as I was concerned, M. Veuillot’s person 
was the thing furthest from my thought in that interview with 
M. Decazes. That of Herr von Bismarck worried me a little 
more. Besides, I cannot help thinking that in his inmost soul 
M. Veuillot never bore us a deep grudge for having made’a martyr 
of him at such a trifling cost to himself. Moreover, M. Veuillot’s 

M 


162 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


The next question was, what Herr von Bismarck 
thought of all this? It would appear that he felt 
somewhat inclined not to show himself satisfied, 
and I also think that he felt some regret at having 
to forego the startling demonstration of his power 
on which he had counted, for the first thing he did 
was to write to Count Arnim—‘ There is, as far 
as I can see, no necessity to give 7Univers a 
gratuitous advertisement by representing its sup- 
pression as in accordance with our wishes.”? But 
this is not the only instance of the Scriptural 
saying being verified—‘ ye thought evil against 
me, 6%¢ God meant it unto good.” It was the 
noise he had made about his grievances—in 
reality of no importance—that prevented his in- 
sisting upon a more complete reparation. His 
threatening declarations had produced a fictitious 
state of uneasiness and excitement, the prolonga- 
tion of which was irksome to all sincere friends of 
peace in Europe. When they saw a way out of 
the situation, there was a general feeling of relief 
at being let off with nothing more than the alarm. 
M, Decazes having, moreover, taken the oppor- 
tunity to state in answer to an interpellation on 
the relations between France and Italy, that he 





friends, and they were many in the Assembly, were not quite so 
susceptible as he, for they had made up their minds to interpellate 
us, but they gave up the idea when we informed them of our 
reasons, and pointed out the awkwardness of having to state those 
reasons publicly. 

1 Antécédents du proces @ Arnim, p. 151. 


EPISCOPAL CHARGES AND CRISIS OF 1875 163 


was assiduously labouring for the maintenance of 
peace by removing all misunderstandings and 
preventing all conflicts, and that he would also 
defend France against all regrettable agitation, no 
matter whence it came, the general approval that 
greeted his prudent language everywhere showed 
Herr von Bismarck that he would be neither 
understood nor followed should he show himself 
more difficult. Graciously or not, satisfied or 
dissatisfied, he declared himself satisfied. But the 
incident once at an end, the impression left was 
not favourable to him. Unstable situations like 
that to which Europe was committed after so 
many successive commotions, and to which she 
will probably stand committed for a long while to 
come, have this peculiar characteristic ; they cause 
public opinion to veer round very easily, and to 
consult uneasily, now that point of the horizon, 
then the other, according to the fear as to whence 
the alarm signal may come. That was what Herr 
von Bismarck had not sufficiently foreseen. None 
of the imaginary designs with which he had 
credited Monarchical and Catholic France had 
been realized, but the relentless hostility he nursed 
against the religion of more than half of Europe, 
and of at least a third of his own countrymen, 
had engendered more serious perils than those 
designs themselves. Henceforward it became a 
question of who should try his hardest not to be 
involved in the difficulties he created for himself. 


164 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


‘‘T shall not follow him into that path,” said the 
Emperor of Austria himself to our ambassador. 
‘He wished to drag us into his unfortunate reli- 
gious campaign,” said Prince Gortschakoff to 
General Leflé ; ‘‘ but we formally declared to him 
that we would not join him, but we remain friends 
all the same.” Queen Victoria expressed herself 
to the same effect to the Emperor in a private 
letter, the existence of which was known, though 
its contents were not, her ambassador having 
allowed the secret of it to leak out. ‘‘ What does 
this man want?” said one of M. de Gontaut’s 
diplomatic colleagues to him. Until then he had 
been on the most cordial footing with Bismarck, 
while during and even after the war he had 
shown himself the reverse of favourable to 
France. ‘‘ What does this man want?” he re- 
peated. ‘The powers will have to come to 
an understanding one day to put a stop to his 
encroachments on the liberty of others.” To have 
noted that sentiment before having to appeal to it 
in the much graver crisis which was to burst 
forth very soon was at any rate useful, and as 
such the bad quarrel he had tried to fasten on 
us was not altogether to be regretted. 


EPISCOPAL CHARGES AND CRISIS OF 1875 165 


II 


During one of those fits of real or simulated 
passion to which Herr. von Bismarck had yielded 
in order to justify the overbearing persistency of 
his claims, a sufficiently significant phrase had, as 
we have seen, dropped from his lips. ‘If France 
does not get rid of her pontifical policy, I’ll not 
wait to declare war on her till she is ready, and 
that will be in two years.” 

That sentence alone suffices to show what 
eager attention and accuracy of information were 
brought to bear from Berlin on the progress of 
the reorganization of our army. For among~all 
the suspicious observers who exercised that sur- 
veillance on us, Herr von Bismarck was far from 
being the most ostensibly concerned with regard 
to the use we should make of our strength when 
we had recovered it. The most constant solici- 
tude about this was shown in military circles. 
There, the usual wind-up to all conversations was 
' to the effect that, as we must be without a doubt 
resolved to seek the revenge for our defeats as 
soon as our strength would enable us to pretend 
to it, it would be as foolish as imprudent-on the 
part of Germany to wait for, instead of fore- 


166 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


stalling, our convenience in that respect. Viewed 
from that point, every scrap of news in our 
papers, with reference to the completion of our 
lines of defence, the perfecting of our armaments, 
the instructing of our young officers into the 
latest improvements in modern tactics, became the 
subject of impassioned comment, which in the 
shape of warnings or threats reached the ears of 
M. de Gontaut. ‘Could we not manage to talk 
a little less of our experiments with small arms, 
cannon, army corps—in one word, of all the 
elements of our military reorganization?” he wrote. 
Then he hastened to add—‘“ And to talk less of 
them would not mean to concern ourselves less 
with them.” The advice was unquestionably 
sensible, but apart from the difficulty of getting 
the Press, on which one cannot impose silence at 
will, to follow it, there was one spot where, and 
there were certain times when, the observance of 
silence would have been impossible; and that 
was in the rostrum of the Assembly, when a law 
of a similar character to that on the recruitment 
of the army, and quite as important as the other, 
came on for debate—namely, the law regulating 
the constitution of the cadres of the active army ; 
or, after having decided the number and the 
nature of the soldiers with the colours, we also 
had to decide by whom and in what manner they 
should be commanded. 

We have already seen how important a factor 


EPISCOPAL CHARGES AND CRISIS OF 1875 167 


the first of these two capital laws, namely, that on 
the recruitment, had been in the negotiations we 
had engaged in for the liberation of the territory ; 
one point in particular had nearly caused the 
miscarriage of the whole, viz. the intention of the 
Assembly to impose compulsory and_ personal 
military service on every Frenchman. If it had 
persisted in that demand, from which the whole 
weight of M. Thiers’, authority. was scarcely 
sufficient to make it deviate, our deliverance, as 
we also saw, would have been indefinitely ad- 
journed. Similarly, in the new law there was a 
provision apparently more inoffensive than the 
other, and which, during the first stages of the 
debate, passed unperceived ; but which; exciting 
as it did the public mind in Germany, might have 
been fraught with a much graver consequence, 
and have compromised the security and inde- 
pendence we had but just recovered. That pro- 
vision dealt with the increase of the number of 
battalions of which each infantry regiment was to 
consist. The Government and the Commission 
had fixed the number at three, the Assembly 
increased it to four. I was present at the sitting 
in which the improvised amendment, involving 
the introduction of that fourth battalion, was 
adopted, and I even watched the debate with an 
altogether particular interest, because the career 
of some young officers with whom I was on 
terms of personal friendship depended largely on 


168 AN AMBASSADOR: OF THE VANQUISHED 


it. I am therefore enabled to state distinctly the 
motive of that resolution, adopted somewhat 
hurriedly, and to which the minister, after having 
opposed it, was obliged to give way. The 
increase of the number of chefs de batarllon 
(majors) would relieve the block among the 
subalterns caused by the too numerous promo- 
tions during the war, and provide an easier and 
more elastic form of hierarchical advancement. 
That was in reality our main idea; all other, and 
especially the intention to increase the numerical 
strength of our effective troops by a prevarica- 
tion or subterfuge, was altogether foreign to the 
majority to which I belonged. The proof whereof 
is, that when the minister, in order to re-establish 
his disturbed financial equilibrium, proposed in 
his turn to reduce the number of companies of 
which the new battalions should consist from six 
to four, which was the original number, that 
mode of compensation met with no opposition 
whatever, although, all things told, the result of 
the two modifications combined was to reduce 
rather than increase the real strength of the 
fighting unit. 

But that did not matter in the least. Whether 
well understood or the reverse, the moment the 
measure, commented on by more or less sincere 
interpreters, became known, there was a_ blaze 
along the whole of the line and in all the ranks 
of the German Press; a general cry arose: the 


EPISCOPAL CHARGES AND CRIsIS OF 1875 169 


Assembly in a burst of patriotic impatience had 
with one stroke of the pen increased the numeri- 
cal strength of the best part of the French army, 
viz. the infantry, by at least one-fourth. This 
increase did not respond to any requirement for 
the country’s better defence, seeing that neither 
the Marshal nor his ministers had thought of it, 
hence it evidently meant preparation for a pre- 
meditated and not far distant attack-. The fourth 
battalion, the recollection of which had slipped 
the minds of many of us after having voted it, 
became the signal for the expected battle to which 
(the signal) no patriotic German could remain deaf, 
unless he was positively bereft of hearing. 

Such was the theme developed simultaneously, 
and with a kind of emulation, by all the organs of 
publicity known to receive their inspiration from 
official quarters, such as the Mord-Deutsche Zet- 
tung, the Frankfurter Zeitung, the Post of Berlin, 
etc., etc. The last-named paper especially boasted 
a writer who gave unrestricted flight to his fancy, 
and who one day penned a sensational article 
with the threatening heading—‘ Is there a pros- 
pect of war?” And in order to justify the cry of 
alarm, he felt himself bound to do something more 
than merely cast suspicion on our military laws. 
In order to aggravate their character he, with great 
glee, no doubt, but with affected terror, traced a 
connection between them and another measure of 
much greater importance which the Assembly 


170 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


had passed at the same time, and which, however, 
did not seem capable of presenting the slightest 
appearance of bellicose intent even to the most 
malevolently-disposed perspicuity. 

Through a coincidence, in fact, to which no 
one had paid the least attention, the promulgation 
of the new law on the cadres had been pre- 
ceded by a few days by that of the law entitled, 
‘La lot dite des pouvotrs publics,” which by the 
feeble majority of a few votes had just provided 
the Republican form of government with a regular 
constitution (law on the public powers, February 
25, 1875; law on the “cadres,” March 28). I 
have endeavoured to explain in its proper place 
how the transaction between the discouraged 
Monarchists and the Republicans who had im- 
bibed wisdom had been effected, a transaction 
whence sprang the somewhat hybrid Republican 
expedient under which we live up to the present 
day. People may continue to comment on, to 
explain, to condemn, or to justify in various ways, 
and for many a year to come, the rapprochement 
brought about in that manner between political 
men who were divided on the previous day, and 
who were to be still more divided the day after ; 
but no historian will be able to evolve from that 
rapprochement the shadow of a thought, still less 
of a threat, calculated to cause the faintest anxiety 


1 Literally “a law regulating the public powers ;” practically, a 
set of constitutional laws—a constitution.—TRANS. 


EPISCOPAL CHARGES AND CRISIS OF 1875 171 


to the most suspicious neighbour or the most 
timorous friend of peace. It was the impromptu 
result of an absolutely inner evolution which, it 
may be boldly affirmed, was swayed by no con- 
sideration, nor even by a retrospective thought of 
foreign policy. | 

That, however, was not the opinion, or at any 
rate not the supposition, of the German writer. 
In his opinion the only motive that could have 
led the two opposing parties to a fusion was the 
design to present a combined face to a common 
enemy. No Royalists could have become Repub- 
lican, and no Republicans could have adopted 
institutions that had more than one trait of resem- 
blance, except to prepare themselves by mutual 
sacrifices, to quench a thirst equally parching in 
both for national vengeance and retrieval. The 
Assembly before its separation wished to have 
the signal honour to preside itself at the revenge, 
and to recover the whole of the territory it had 
been compelled to cede at its birth to Germany. 
It was in order to deliver that supreme attack 
that the newly-constituted Republic grouped on 
the same ministerial benches M. Buffet and M. 
Dufaure, M. Léon Say and M. Decazes. 

Equally the paper did not fail to point out that 
the most active agents in the operation just con- 
cluded were political men known for their fidelity 
to the memory of. the House of Orleans... And 
the princes of that family, soldiers heart and soul, 


172 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


were generally honoured with the reputation of 
having suffered as much as, if not more than any 
other from the spectacle of France’s humiliation, 
and credited with aspiring to the glory of con- 
tributing to lift her out of that position; an 
honour which, as is equally well known, brought 
upon them the particular displeasure of Herr von 
Bismarck. Thus, all the signs of a combined 
plan were patent; the constitutional law had 
had the effect of closing up the ranks of the 
aggressors, and of preparing leaders for them ; 
the military law doubled the potentiality of their 
means of attack. It was Germany’s duty to be 
on her guard. 

To what degree were we justified in believing that 
the fiction, composed with such evident gusto, had 
been inspired by the ex¢tourage of the Chancellor ? 
That question can never be answered positively, 
considering that every bad case may be denied, 
and the issue of the movement thus provoked did 
not finally turn out to the advantage of those that 
had provoked it. But inasmuch as the gist of 
the story, if not all its details, was reproduced 
with a touching unanimity though with different 
shadings by all the habitual interpreters of the 
master’s thoughts, it was sufficiently clear that a 
real or assumed belief in it was certain to please. 
Hence no one doubted that this paper war had 
received its original impulse, at any rate indi- 
rectly, from high quarters. The extravagance 


EPISCOPAL CHARGES AND CRISIS OF 1875 173 


and agitated tone which marked that polemical 
outburst did not seem, moreover, to be out of 
keeping with the state of mind, or rather with the 
state of nerves, of the Chancellor, as observed by 
those who came into personal contact with him. 
His ever irascible temperament was particularly 
high-strung at that moment. His generally fret- 
ful and quarrelsome humour had passed from 
the chronic to the acute state, which might be 
accounted for by the series of successive disappoint- 
ments his policy had experienced. But moderately 
satisfied with the to him insufficient reparation 
he had obtained from us for the wounds inflicted 
by papal or episcopal censure, he had sought for: 
a more complete one, first at Brussels, then at 
Rome. In several haughtily-worded notes he 
had claimed from the Belgian Government certain 
modifications of their Press-laws, which would 
admit of the repression of the attacks against 
him in which the Catholics indulged. He had 
brought pressure to bear on the Italian Government 
to raise obstacles to the publication of documents 
emanating from the Vatican of which he saw fit 
to complain. The ministers of King Leopold 
had nobly refused to pass any measure derogatory 
to the liberty of the Press sanctioned by their 
Constitution, and threatened to have recourse, if 
violence were offered to them, to the support of 
the Powers that had guaranteed the neutrality of 
Belgium. Victor Emmanuel, in order to oppose a 


174. AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


like refusal, entrenched himself behind “the law 
of guarantees,” which was a condition of his estab- 
lishment at Rome, and by which his Government 
had pledged itself not to interfere with the com- 
munications to the Church from its head. The 
dissension was complete, for even Spain con- 
tributed to fill the cup of the Chancellor’s miscal- 
culations. Indeed, the Spanish Republic as well as 
ours had for the time being found an unexpected 
auxiliary in the founder of the new Empire. But 
in that instance the game had not been successful, 
inasmuch as the advent of Alfonso XII. had been 
accomplished in spite of his efforts, and in spite 
of the official support he had lent at the eleventh 
hour to the ephemeral dictatorship of General 
Serrano. Intensely disgusted at having lost the 
scent on so many different tracks, he gave 
way to fits of impatience, and had even days of 
discouragement. He talked of resignation and 
retirement, a usual form of sulks, as is well 
known, with men who believe themselves neces- 
sary, and who, spoilt by Dame Fortune, deem it 
a piece of impertinence on her part not to exempt 
them from all untoward complications. Being in 
such a frame of mind, it was but natural that he 
should endeavour to make a show with the power 
that was left to him by trying to terrify those 
whom he felt certain could offer no resistance. 
He indulged in threats against France which, 
caught up and repeated by his confidants, were, 


EPISCOPAL CHARGES AND CRISIS OF 1875 175 


perhaps, canvassed in a more serious spirit than 
he intended, but which, nevertheless, were power- 
ful encouragements to the bellicose aspirations of 
those around him. 7 

Besides, the threats were not always confined 
to words; there were also official acts, and in 
particular one very important one, which could 
not have been carried out without superior con- 
sent, and which, by the comments-to which it 
gave rise, was eminently calculated to increase 
the general trouble. An Imperial Order (in 
Council), foreseen by no one, suddenly stopped 
the exportation of horses from Germany. The 
publicly alleged motive for this interruption of one 
of the most active and profitable traffics of the 
Empire was the necessity of preventing the too 
numerous purchases of the French Minister for 
War; contracts, it was said, had been made for 
more than ten thousand cattle expected in France. 
This altogether extraordinary purchase of cavalry- 
remounts seemed to be the completion of our 
equally unjustified increase of our line regiments. 
To put a stop to the former appeared, therefore, 
a measure of national security, and the German 
Press did not fail to testify its approval noisily. 

The alarm thus propagated by all the echoes of 
the Press, as well as by military circles, rapidly 
spread through the whole of Germany, and prin- 
cipally to the smaller courts, which foresaw. with 
terror the day when their aid would be once more. 


176 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


required. The most clear-sighted and generally 
prudent minds were affected by what was rapidly 
developing into a genuinely contagious emotion. 
For instance, the Prince Imperial in passing 
through Munich appeared to be in a state of 
violent agitation. He seemed ‘all in a heap” 
(tout cbourtffé), wrote our consular agent in that 
capital. It was the English chargé d@ affaires who 
had to take the defence of France, and to assure 
the Prince that there was not a word of truth in 
all the plans imputed to us. There was, never- 
theless, and as a consequence of that visit, a 
meeting of all the superior officers at the Ministry 
of War to discuss the situation. 

M. de Gontaut was in Paris on a few months’ 
leave of absence when the rumbling of the storm 
was beginning to be heard. M. Decazes recom- 
mended him to return to his post without delay. 
On the day fixed for his departure, he met in the 
lobbies of the Assembly with a personage of 
importance among the Republican party, one of 
those whom the new constitution brought nearer 
to power. ‘‘ How do we stand with Germany ?” 
asked M. Ernest Picard. ‘We must not allow 
our confidence to be carried away by our fear,” 
replied M. de Gontaut. ‘There are, neverthe- 
less, two things for which I cannot answer; namely, 
for your discretion in Paris, and for the nerves of 
Herr von Bismarck.” Very shortly after his arrival 
in Berlin, he had to face his duty of trying to 


EPISCOPAL CHARGES AND CRISIS OF 1875 177 


dispel the suspicions of the Imperial Government, 
by submitting the natural and perfectly sincere 
explanations of the facts that had given rise to 
those suspicions. But though the demonstration 
was not difficult, the incriminated measures being 
in reality thoroughly inoffensive, his task was, for 
all that, one of the most difficult he had to dis- 
charge in the course of his mission. 

In fact, the most elementary experience of 
diplomatic matters tends to show, that even in the 
ordinary relations of two States bordering on one 
another, no dissension could be more grave and 
more easily productive of conflict than one bearing 
on the purport, nature, and character of their arma- 
ments. When a difference of that kind arises, 
and grows embittered, it is really not susceptible of 
any pacific solution whatever. The right of every. 
nation to constitute and to dispose of her military 
forces at her own will, to spread them according 
to her own convenience over the various points of 
her territory, is a condition of her independence, 
and a sovereign prerogative, which in principle 
she cannot and must not allow to be questioned 
by anybody, and the pretension to hinder or 
criticize which she must ever be entitled to resent. 
Yet, in point of fact, this or that manner of exercising 
that right, this or that increase of troops respond- 
ing to no need of surveillance or defence, this or 
that unwarranted concentration of troops on a 


particular frontier, all this may denote hostile. 
N 


178 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


intentions; and in such a case, the neighbour, 
finding himself threatened, has no doubt the right, 
in order not to be taken unawares, to demand the 
explanation of and justification for those move- 
ments. The discussion raised under such con- 
ditions bears on a point of fact always susceptible 
of being contested ; it is purely a question of pro- 
portion, of expediency, and, above all, of good 
faith. If there be a want of sincerity on either or 
both sides, if one of the parties refuses to supply 
the explanations demanded, or if the other, after 
having obtained them, persists in his unfounded 
anxiety, two rights, or if one likes two preten- 
sions, stand confronted, between which no agree- 
ment is possible. How many wars during the 
last two centuries have been due to such an origin 
or such a pretext ? 

The question that awaited M. de Gontaut was, 
then, one of those the treatment of which by an 
ambassador, under no matter what circumstances 
and in no matter what country, is always fraught 
with the gravest danger. But to the represent- 
ative of France at Berlin the ordeal presented a 
particular character of gravity. Could he fail to 
remember that the debate was going to be shifted 
at once to the very ground on which ten years 
before Austria had found herself on the eve of 
Sadowa? Was it not because the Vienna Cabinet 
failed to account to Herr von Bismarck’s satisfac- 
tion for the dislocation of troops, real or false, 


EPISCOPAL CHARGES AND CRISIS OF 1875 179 


supposed to have taken place on the Bohemian 
frontier, that it found itself compelled to reply at 
less than a twenty-four hours’ notice to a chal- 
lenge which Austria’s armies proved unable to 
meet? It would even appear that this manner of 
believing, or pretending to believe, herself threat- 
ened, in order to justify an abrupt commencement 
of hostilities, had become an hereditary and tra- 
ditional method with the sovereigns of the House 
of Brandenburg. For it was that employed by 
the Great Frederick before engaging with Maria- 
Theresa on the struggle that had set Europe on 
fire for seven years; and Herr von Bismarck, in 
order to compel Francis Joseph’s appearance on 
the tented field, had only in those circumstances, 
as in several others, to follow the example of the 
hero whom he had taken as a model. In both 
cases the demand for an explanation on the nature 
of the armaments had only preceded by a few 
days, and as a simple matter of form, the overture 
of hostilities. That twofold recollection was a 
sufficiently instructive warning to remind M. de 
Gontaut of the trap or yawning chasm that might 
be hidden behind the interrogatory he had to 
undergo. 

To what extent was he to accept it, in what 
terms was he to reply to it? There was a rock 
to steer clear of here. Among the number of 
conditions a vanquished nation may be compelled 
to endure in the days of distress and despair, 


180 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


there was one (and the most humiliating of all) 
which we might well have fancied to be lying at 
our door; it was that imposed conspicuously 
and deliberately by victorious Napoleon on 
crushed Prussia; nevertheless, by a fortunate 
omission that condition had been spared to us. 
No limitation, in the shape of a maximum figure, 
had been imposed on us with regard to our 
military forces. No restriction whatsoever had 
been stipulated with regard to their nature, their 
distribution, and their use; we remained free to 
be armed as we liked. 

Truly, Herr von Bismarck pretended now and 
again that at Versailles M. Thiers had promised 
him that the new Government would not raise 
the number of “effective” troops beyond that of 
Napoleon III. But if such a sentence had been 
uttered at all, it had to be looked upon as a mere 
bit of conversation dictated by the circumstances 
of the moment, and which constituted no promise 
for the future, and at best only pledged the 
speaker. According to the letter of our treaty, 
we had no rights nor obligations with regard to 
Germany other than those that regulate the 
neighbourly relations between two adjacent States. 
It was essentially important not to allow any 
others to be created by a practice which would 
have soon degenerated ,into a prescriptive right. 
Any explanations that were either too accommo- 
dating, too eager, above all too much tinged with 


EPISCOPAL CHARGES AND CRISIS OF 1875 181 


emotion, would have added de facto a clause 
and an additional rigour to the Treaty of Frank- 
fort, by appearing to recognize as legitimate a 
kind of control over our military condition. 

M. de Gontaut got through this pass with the 
tact and skill particularly his own. In an inter- 
view with the Minister for Foreign Affairs he 
was bound, as it were, to present the distorted 
facts in their true light; but he volunteered the 
statement in a natural, candid—I might almost 
say, unconcerned—tone which was neither that of 
an inferior who has to give an account, nor that 
of an accused person trying to justify himself. 
Besides, the truth came to light by itself; the 
vote for the Fourth Battalion explaining itself 
by what was recorded in writing beforehand, 
z. é. during the incidents of the discussion that 
had preceded it; and the purchase of horses 
having been made, not on account of the French 
Minister for War, but on that of dealers accus- 
tomed to trade in that way with Germany, and 
whose transactions during that year did not 
exceed the ordinary average. In short, the 
Minister who at the beginning of the interview 
had shown signs of listlessness submitted easily 
enough to the evidence. He admitted that if, 
in fact, there had been some uneasiness at the 
measures taken in France, that uneasiness was 
really unfounded, and when M. de Gontaut as- 
sured him with some show of warmth that during 


182 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


the visit he had just paid to France, and being 
of the peaceful disposition he was, he had neither 
met with a single person nor heard a single word 
that was not in harmony with his own feelings in 
that respect, the Minister showed neither signs 
of incredulity nor of doubt; and the interview 
was brought to an end by regrets expressed in 
common on the injury an imprudent, ignorant, and 
often interested Press did to the public peace. 
M. de Gontaut soon perceived that Herr von 
Biillow had not kept his satisfactory impressions 
to himself, for a few days later the Emperor, on 
meeting M. de Gontaut at some gala reception, 
showed himself more gracious than ever to him, 
and on the French military attaché, Prince de 
Polignac, paying his respects, he said to him in 
a loud voice, so as to be heard by every one: 
‘“They wished to sow trouble between us, but 
that is done with.” 

A proof of good-will from such high quarters 
was assuredly of great weight; M. de Gontaut, 
however, did not think it sufficient to justify his 
full confidence. The Emperor had _ evidently 
been inspired in his utterance by Herr von Biilow, 
and the recollection of what had occurred with 
reference to the episcopal charges had taught the 
ambassador that the Chancellor was not always so 
easily satisfied as his minister, and did not scruple 
to return to the charge on certain matters, even 
on those which were apparently definitely settled. 


EPISCOPAL CHARGES AND CRISIS OF 1875 183 


It was, therefore, more in sorrow than in surprise 
that he noticed after that not one of the alarming 
symptoms had absolutely vanished. — 

The tone of the Press, which had become more 
mild for a moment, very soon resumed its bitter- 
ness; there was the same constant eagerness to 
admit and to spread all items of news which, 
by distorting our intentions, might arouse the 
susceptibility of public opinion in Germany. The 
denials Herr von Biilow had promised to have 
inserted in the official journals, on points the 
untruth of which he had admitted, were only given 
in a partial and inadequate form; the stories that 
went the round of military centres, not excepting 
those that emanated from the General Grand- 
Staff, always maintained their character of affected 
anxiety, of impatience, and provocation. But the 
truly significant fact was that, especially among 
his colleagues of the Corps Diplomatique (before 
whom assuredly people spoke more unrestrictedly 
than when he was present), M. de Gontaut could 
not help noticing the most lively preoccupation. 
The English, Russian, and even Austrian am- 
bassadors, although the latter was ever the most 
reserved, vied with one another in impressing on 
M. de Gontaut’s mind the necessity of his recom- 
mending increased caution and prudence. ‘“ Do 
not go away,” said one of them to him, in answer 
to his expressed intention of his leaving Berlin 
for a few days; ‘‘do not go away, there is no. 


184 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


saying what may happen in your absence.” The 
language of M. van Nothomb, the Belgian 
Minister, and the dean (“doyen”) of the diplo- 
matic agents, was most explicit of all; and he, 
moreover, was considered an authority, because 
he had resided for many years at the Prussian 
Court, and in the differences that had recently 
arisen with his Government had had occasion 
to come into contact with the Chancellor more 
than any of the others, and been enabled to 
appreciate the state of the latter's temper. 

A conversation M. van Nothomb had had, first 
with the Chancellor then with Marshal von 
Moltke, and the substance of which he commu- 
nicated to M. de Gontaut, was by no means 
reassuring. “France,” Herr von Bismarck had 
said, ‘‘will be unable to sustain for any length of 
time the financial burden entailed by her military 
re-organization ; she will be compelled to reduce 
her armaments or to make war; she stands 
inevitably committed to an act of madness or to 
an act of inconsequence.” 

And the Marshal, after having developed the 
same theme, had observed: ‘‘They may say 
what they like; I look at facts only. A battalion 
may mean a thousand men; a hundred and forty- 
four battalions mean, therefore, a hundred and 
forty-four thousand men France has just added 
to her army. It means the offensive within a 
short delay, and we ought not to wait for it.” 


EPISCOPAL CHARGES AND CRISIS OF 1875 185 


Another conversation, if not more significant, 
at least more original and characteristic, contri- 
buted to open M. de Gontaut’s eyes to the fact 
that the peril had not been averted, notwith- 
standing the official assurances that had been 
given to him. That conversation has become 
public property to such an extent, and in con- 
sequence of the discussions and contradictions to 
which it gave rise, that to give it verbatim, as M. 
de Gontaut reported it while he was under the 
influence of the emotion it had caused him, is not 
violating any professional or private secret, but, 
on the contrary, rendering a service to history. 

At a dinner at the English ambassador's, M. 
de Gontaut met with a Prussian diplomatist of 
high rank, Herr von Radowitz, who had occupied 
an important post at the Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs, and was credited with enjoying the 
confidence of Herr von Bismarck. Herr von 
Radowitz had just returned from St. Petersburg, 
whither, notwithstanding his already official 
appointment to the Court of Athens, he had 
been sent as chargé d’affaires, in the absence of 
the ambassador on leave. There seemed to be no 
proportion between his acknowledged diplomatic 
merit and the insignificant mission and employment 
ad interim which he had accepted ; besides, it is 
not customary anywhere to give to an ambassador 
on leave a substitute occupying a rank pretty 
nearly equal to hisown. Every one had made that 


186 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


remark, and naturally arrived at the conclusion 
that in reality Herr von Radowitz’s temporary 
translation to St. Petersburg, devoid of reason as 
it seemed, was intended to disguise a confidential 
mission. What was the nature of the communica- 
tion Herr von Radowitz had been charged with 
for the Czar? There was no light on the subject, 
and people went on commenting and surmising to 
no purpose. As a matter of course, M. de Gontaut 
was not behindhand, and succeeded no_ better 
than the others in getting to the bottom of the 
secret. But he suspected (and he saw later on 
that he had been right) that a step intended to 
promote more intimate relations between the two 
Imperial Courts could bode but little good to us. 
It made him all the more anxious to ascertain the 
opinion of this interesting fellow-guest, with whom 
he was so unexpectedly brought into contact, on 
the subject that occupied every one’s mind. 
Hence he plunged spontaneously into matters 
by talking about the unfounded anxiety the Press 
had aroused, and of his own satisfaction at having 
been enabled to dispel them from Herr von 
Biilow’s mind. ‘I am aware of it,” said Herr von 
Radowitz, ‘‘and I know that the Chancellor was 
equally satisfied with the report of the interview 
the minister. addressed to him. But you are 
bound to admit that there was cause to be 
surprised at the impromptu increase of your 
regiments, while we were not favoured with an 


EPISCOPAL CHARGES AND CRISIS OF 1875 187 


explanation on the subject. You gave it, and it 
seems to have been considered sufficient.” Then 
he added, in a somewhat pointed manner: “If I 
were not authorized to say this, I should hold my 
tongue.” 

Practically this was investing beforehand with 
an official character everything he believed him- 
self justified in saying. M. de Gontaut, there- 
fore, thought it advisable to repeat most of the 
considerations he had developed before Herr 
von Biilow, so as to allow his interlocutor to give 
to each of the considerations reviewed his mark 
of. approval. The perfectly correct conduct of 
the French Government and its irreproachable 
attitude having been acknowledged by Herr von 
Radowitz, M. de Gontaut went on: “ But why, 
then, those constant provocations of the Press,” 
he said, “when it would be so easy for you to 
put a stop to them?” 

‘““That would not be so easy as you appear to 
imagine,” replied Herr von Radowitz; ‘those 
papers, and especially the Mord-Deutsche Zeitung, 
enjoy a considerable importance, and if there 
were an attempt to direct them in a way that did 
not suit them, it might lead to an interpellation in 
the Chamber, and to lively debates. And that 
direction itself on the part of the Government, is 
it as easy as you think? You probably have no 
conception of what we are told constantly in the 
name of those parties that constitute the majority. 


188 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


‘You feel assured, maybe, with regard to the 
present, but what about the future? Can you 
answer for that?’ or else, ‘Can you make sure 
that France, having recovered her prosperity and 
re-organized her military forces, will not be in a 
position to conclude those alliances which she is 
not in a position to conclude to-day, and that the 
resentment she harbours as a matter of course on 
account of the two provinces that have been 
taken from her will not inevitably impel her to 
declare war upon Germany? And if meanwhile 
we had allowed France to recover, to prosper, 
and to resume her old position, should we not 
have everything to fear from her? And if the 
thirst for revenge be the inmost thought of 
France (and one cannot see how it could be 
otherwise), why wait to attack her until she have 
contracted alliances?’ In common fairness you 
are bound to admit, philosophically, politically, 
and even from a Christian point of view, that 
those deductions are not without foundation, and 
that such preoccupations may prove a safe guide 
to Germany.” 

M. de Gontaut had sufficient control over him- 
self to restrain his indignation at this naive 
exposition of such a strange theory ; nevertheless, 
he replied with some show of animation: ‘“ You 
admit then,” he said, ‘that our policy is sensible, 
moderate, and beyond reproach. You have at 
this moment not the least cause to harass us or 


EPISCOPAL CHARGES AND CRISIS OF 1875 189 


to declare war upon us. And yet that does not 
satisfy you. And because you foresee that at 
some future period you may have some cause for 
uneasiness against us you have not at present, 
you devise measures to attack us. But may I ask 
you to consider carefully whither such a doctrine 
would lead, if generally practised? The world 
would not have peace fora single day, and war 
would not cease to afflict the whole of the globe. 
What they tell you with regard to us may be 
equally conceived with regard to all the other 
Powers. To-day, forinstance, you are at peace 
with Russia; nevertheless, you may have reasons 
to fear that she will trouble you at some future 
period ; and that, in your opinion, would constitute 
a reason for attacking her?” 

“Oh,” interrupted Herr von Radowitz, “that 
would not be the same thing. Why should we 
think about making war on Russia, with whom 
we have never ceased to entertain excellent 
relations? Such is not the case with France. 
We have been too often at war with her, and 
two hundred and fifty years ago she ravaged the 
Palatinate and wrested Alsace from Germany.” 

M. de Gontaut declined to go back into history 
so far as that, and reminded his interlocutor with 
a smile that if that mode of historical retrospection 
was admissible, France might also claim to have 
some grievances against Germany, whence in 
times of old had come to her all the invasions 


190 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


of barbarians. ‘‘ And,” he added, “I may be 
allowed to say, seeing that you referred to 
Christian motives, that the acts to which you 
have referred just now would be the reverse of 
Christian.” 

The interview, which had lasted for more than 
an hour, could of course not proceed in that 
tone, and Herr von Radowitz himself brought it 
to an end by some flattering remarks to M. de 
Gontaut personally, assuring him that no one 
was more fit than he to promote the maintenance 
of friendly relations between the two countries, 
and that he had full confidence in the pacific 
assurances a man of his stamp would give. 

“But,” he concluded, in a somewhat sceptical 
tone, “you are giving me those assurances for 
this year; would you be equally ready to give 
“them: forthe next?” 

“Yes,” replied M. de Gontaut emphatically. 

As a matter of course, M. de Gontaut did not 
fail to inform his colleagues of a doctrine likely 
to interest them all, and the novelty of which 
was its least merit. That manner of eliminating 
the elements of good faith from the intercourse 
of nations, of keeping them constantly on the verge 
of hostilities by reducing to a dead letter the 
obligations imposed by treaties, did not commend 
itself to many. Some, in fact, refused to look 
at the matter in a serious light, or, considering the 
assurances given sufficient for the day thereof, 


EPISCOPAL CHARGES AND CRISIS OF 1875 191 


were inclined to let the future take care of itself. 
Herr von Radowitz, moreover, had the reputation 
of being somewhat intemperate of speech, espe- 
cially after a good dinner. ‘“ All the more reason,” 
replied M. de Gontaut, “to let none of his words 
fall upon deaf ears, inasmuch as, on the spur of 
the moment, he may say something he would 
have better left unsaid.” 

However, before M. de Gontaut.was many 
days older, he gathered from pretty sure quarters 
positive information as to the nature of the 
mission that same Herr von Radowitz had just 
accomplished at St. Petersburg, and on the plans 
Herr von Bismarck must have confided to the 
trusty envoy charged with that mission. True, 
the information came from a Russian lady, but 
she happened to be in a position to know many 
things, seeing that her husband filled the office 
of a chamberlain after having been an ambassador, 
and that her father had been for a long while 
one of the Czar’s Ministers. According to her, 
Bismarck’s proposals might be summed up as 
follows. That Russia should allow him. to do 
what he considered essential to the security of 
the German Empire, and Germany would allow 
her to do in the East what he (Russia) deemed 
necessary to her interests. In one word, they 
were to share and share alike. Unrestricted 
liberty for Germany in the West, equally unre- 
stricted liberty for Russia in the East. It was, in 


192 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


different words, the bargain proposed by Napoleon 
I. to Alexander I. at Tilsitt. But, instead of 
accepting the proposal, Russia had pretended not 
to understand what Germany was driving at. 
For the moment, then, the plan had miscarried. 
But it might be taken up afresh at any moment, 
and it accorded but too well with the order of 
ideas developed by Herr von Radowitz. It was 
in order to have an absolutely free hand with 
regard to France that Alexander II.’s attention 
was sought to be diverted to Asia.’ 

Having been warned in so many ways that 
the horizon was by no means clear, M. de Gon- 
taut had to seize every opportunity of meeting 
with Herr von Biilow, in order to watch carefully 
the changes that might occur in the ministerial 
atmosphere, and in a little while he was bound 


1 The particulars of the character of Herr von Radowitz’s mission 
to St. Petersburg were confirmed at that selfsame moment by 
Leflé, in accordance with the general opinion prevailing in diplo- 
matic circles at St. Petersburg. As a matter of course, the facts 
have been denied by Herr von Bismarck and his defenders, and 
it was on that occasion that Herr von Bismarck expressed himself 
so severely with reference to Herr von Radowitz. ‘“ He has never 
been my confidant,” he said ; “he has inherited from his father 
the deplorable habit ina diplomatist to talk too much, and to blurt 
out everything after his third glass.” 

[The author does not give his authority for this statement, but I 
have an idea that it is to be found in Mr. Beatty-Kingston’s 
translation of Unser Reichskanzler, by Dr. Moritz Busch (Mac- 
millan, 1884), and the reader more particularly interested in 
that special phase of the attempted bribing of Russia had better 
read pp. 267-70 of the first volume of that work, taking care, 
however, to take Busch’s statements with sevéral grains of salt.— 
TRANS. | 


EPISCOPAL CHARGES AND CRISIS OF 1875 193 


to confess to himself that the minister’s language 
became less explicit and more reserved than it 
had been in their first interview. ‘He was 
obscure, vague, very reticent, and shifty in his 
language,” wrote M. de Gontaut. Finally, the 
Minister hinted at a conversation the German 
ambassador in Paris, Prince Hohenlohe, was 
supposed to have had with M. Decazes, the 
purport of which conversation was. somewhat of 
a puzzle to M. de Gontaut, who had no know- 
ledge of the fact. He had not long to wait for 
the explanation. 

Pondering the threatening conversation of Herr 
von Radowitz, the Duc Decazes had made up his 
mind with as much discernment as promptitude, 
There was nothing to show that the confidant 
had not echoed the thoughts of his master, he 
certainly did not evolve them from his own imagin- 
ation. Under the cloak of apparent satisfaction 
with the actual state of things, no promise of any 
kind had been given; on the contrary, France 
was to be left in fear with regard to the future. 
The utmost she could count upon was two years 
of respite, and it would have been foolish to trust 
even to that. M. Decazes, therefore, did not 
hesitate for a moment to communicate the very 
text of M. de Gontaut’s dispatch to our repre- 
sentatives with such governments as might be 
supposed to take a direct and personal jnterest 


in European politics, In a confidential circular 
o 


194 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


he pointed out to his diplomatic agents the 
advisability of careful attention to the reflections 
suggested by the document, and of losing no 
opportunity to lay stress on the peril to the 
common peace involved in the strange thesis 
that seemed to gain ground in the councils of the 
new Empire. There was some credit due to M. 
Decazes for having lost no time in taking that 
step, which was in many quarters considered a 
hasty one, and criticized for a moment as a tend- 
ency to show a somewhat exaggerated fear with 
regard to language which, after all, lacked an 
official character. The sequel soon showed that 
this very salutary precaution was in no way pre- 
mature. The ground, moreover, was already 
everywhere prepared for that kind of warning, as 
I have had occasion to point out before. The 
imperious arrogance of Herr von Bismarck, as 
characterized in his latest acts; the haughty 
pressure he had endeavoured to bring to bear on 
Germany, the idea he had frequently expressed 
of claiming international legislation against the 
Press that offended him, had caused a general 
feeling of impatience with regard to him. The 
yoke was getting heavier each day. The idea 
that the troubles he had caused for himself at 
home impelled him to seek a diversion to them 
outside, was also generally entertained. Our 
chargé d affaires in London, M. Gavard, had 


occasion to notice that this apprehension was 


EPISCOPAL CHARGES AND CRISIS OF 1875 195 


strongly felt by the English Minister, Lord 
Derby, who fancied, though, that Austria was 
fated to experience the first blows. But the 
Queen of the Netherlands, that very distinguished 
princess whose salutary warnings Napoleon ITI. 
had made the mistake to neglect, sent privately 
for our Minister, M. Target, for whom she cher- 
ished a great esteem, and assured him that she 
fully shared all M. Decazes’ fears;. which were, 
moreover, confirmed by her own information on 
the subject. ‘Everything is going wrong at 
Berlin,” she said. All she added was that the 
Emperor of Russia, with whom she kept up a 
private correspondence, would soon pay his annual 
visit to his uncle at Ems, and that she counted 
on his presence there to intervene favourably at 
the decisive hour. 

Truly it was in that direction that our clear- 
sighted Minister for Foreign Affairs had already 
cast his glances. Inasmuch as there was at St. 
Petersburg a monarch who had several times 
declared that not only did he not wish for an 
enfeebled France, but that he wished her to be 
strong, on condition of her being wise, it was 
but natural to appeal to his judgment. Hence, 
several weeks before, when disquieting but “as 
yet vague rumours began to circulate, General 
Leflé, returning to his post after a leave of absence, 
had been instructed by Marshal MacMahon him- 
self to acquaint the Czar with the feeling of fear 


196 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


generally prevailing. The ambassador met with 
the same friendly disposition so often shown to 
him ; but it was argued that France was too prone 
perhaps to take the alarm, that she attached too 
much importance to rumours propagated by the 
Press, was inclined to believe too implicitly 
in the evil designs of Bismarck, to which in 
any case Emperor Wilhelm would not lend 
himself. 

‘Make your mind easy,” the Czar said to him ; 
“if you were seriously threatened, you would 
know it quickly enough. And,” he added, after a 
few moments of hesitation, which gave the greater 
weight to his guarantee, “you would know it 
through me.” ! 

That, assuredly, was a promise, but with regard 
to a future which the Czar persistently believed 
to be far distant. M. Decazes proposed to him- 
self to obtain its renewal in a manner to secure its 
timely and effective accomplishment, no matter 
how quickly events might succeed one another, 
and to that effect dispatched to General Leflé a 


1 See, for all the particulars of that interview, and those that 
followed with Prince Gortschakoff, the dispatch of General Leflé, 
published in the /zgaro of May 24, 1887. 

[I have a much more minute account of that transaction than the 
article in the Fzgaro referred to, but my notes are dated July 1884. 
It is impossible to give them here, and my recollection as to their 
source is somewhat vague. They were, however, evidently taken 
for the purpose of showing the possibility of a Russo-Franco entente 
which has since then been more or less established, and the im- 
possibility of an Anglo-French alliance which is being advocated 
to-day.—TRANS. ] 


EPISCOPAL CHARGES AND CRISIS OF 1875 197 


confidential letter under the same cover with that 
of his general circular. 

‘The strange doctrine developed by Herr von 
Radowitz,” said the dispatch, “is one of those 
calculated to fill with the intensest indignation the 
straightforward and honest conscience of that 
great sovereign, and it is but in accordance with 
his usual dignity to treat it as it deserves to be 
treated. If I am not as confident as Prince 
Gortschakoff would wish me to be, it is not 
because I am in doubt with regard to the support 
his sovereign would lend us against the spread of 
baneful tendencies, any more than with regard to 
the efficacy of his influence, 2/ 2¢ were exercised in 
time. But it is just because his will to maintain 
peace is well known in Berlin, it is because they 
know that he would energetically protest against 
any perverse designs, it is just because of all-this 
that I cannot divest myself of the fear that those 
designs will be carefully hidden from him, and 
that one day they will make up their minds to 
confront him with an accomplished fact. I should 
have that fear no longer, and my security would 
be absolute the day his Majesty would declare 
that he would look on a surprise as on an insult, 
and ¢hat he would not permit such an iniquity to 
pass. One word like that would simply insure 
the peace of the world, and it would be worthy of 
Emperor Alexander to utter it. His Majesty has 
deigned to tell you that in the day of danger we 


198 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


would be warned, and warned by him... . But 
if he himself were not warned in time, his 
Majesty would be obliged to understand and to 
acknowledge that he also had been deceived and 
taken by surprise, and that, as it were, he had 
been made the involuntary accomplice of the trap 
laid for us, and I, moreover, wish to be certain 
that his Majesty would avenge what practically 
would constitute an insult to himself, and shield 
with his sword those who trusted to his aid.” 

General Leflé himself has told us that being 
instructed to read some extracts from this eloquent 
letter to Prince Gortschakoff, the latter asked to 
see the whole of it, and also the various docu- 
ments that might have inspired it. He afterwards 
asked that the whole of the documents might — 
remain in his hands, in order to place them in their 
integrity before the Emperor. ‘The Emperor 
must be made acquainted with the whole of the 
truth,” he said. ‘I know my master, and he will 
appreciate your step.” 

One single line—that which referred to the 
drawing of the sword—seemed to have stopped 
him for a moment. ‘That is rather strong,” he 
had said; “never mind, leave it as it iss We 
shall not draw the sword; there will be no need ; 
we shall be able to manage without.” And two 
days later he sent back the documents that had 
been entrusted to him with the following lines : 
‘General, the Emperor has this morning handed 


EPISCOPAL CHARGES AND CRISIS OF 1875 199 


me the documents you confided to me; he has 
instructed me to thank you for this proof of con- 
fidence. His Majesty has added that he would 
confirm to you vzvé voce everything he had said 
through me.” And a few days after that, the 
General, having had the opportunity of approach- 
ing the Emperor in order to pay his respects 
before the sovereign’s departure for Berlin, gave 
the following account of the interview— 

‘His Majesty was loud in his praise of the calm- 
ness and prudence of M. de Gontaut at the ex- 
position of the very strange theories of Herr von 
Radowitz; and as I ventured to remark on that 
subject to what aberrations and mental excess a 
blind passion was apt to lead, his Majesty said 
emphatically : ‘A blind passion is the mildest term 
for it! But all this, I trust, will subside. In 
any case you know what I told you, and I-will 
keep my promise. Az revoir ; be sure that I will 
remember, and I hope there will be no surprise.’ ” 

From all this it will be gathered that there had 
been no time to lose if the ambassador had to 
apply to the Emperor personally for that reassur- 
ing guarantee, for there would have been no means 
of running after the sovereign when once he 
had started on his journey. But M. Decazes 
had special reasons to congratulate himself on his 
hurry when, having received, during the evening 
of May 4, General Leflé’s telegram giving an 
account of the Imperial interview, he was told 


200 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


next morning, z.¢. on May 5, that Prince Hohen- 
lohe, the Ambassador of Germany, was waiting 
to see him. 

That visit was altogether unexpected. Prince 
Hohenlohe, being about to absent himself from 
Paris for some time, had already taken his 
leave, and was supposed to be ex rvoude for the 
last twenty-four hours. He was supposed to have 
gone with his mind at rest, inasmuch as he had 
stated more than once that, thanks to the explan- 
ations tendered by M. de Gontaut, and confirmed 
by his own information, all the clouds that had 
darkened the minds of his Government had been 
dispelled. The day of his departure and his un- 
expected re-appearance were therefore calculated 
to surprise, and the nature of the message of which 
he was the bearer did not tend to diminish that 
feeling. 

“T have been apprised by Herr von Biilow,” 
he began, in a somewhat embarrassed tone, “that 
M. de Gontaut, in the reports he addressed to 
you, has shown himself too optimistic. Herr von 
Biilow is not quite so satisfied with the explana- 
tions of the French Government with regard to 
its armaments as M. de Gontaut would have 
wished you to believe. He finds it difficult to 
believe that the law on the cadres has been 
passed for the sole purpose of securing the pro- 
motion of a few captains, and he thinks it more 
consistent with ordinary caution to count on your 


EPISCOPAL CHARGES AND CRISIS OF 1875 201 


application of your military laws to the fullest 
extent they are capable of being extended. Herr 
von Biilow himself believes that France harbours 
no hostile intentions, and has faith in your pacific 
intentions, but the German Grand-Staff persists in 
the belief that the final aim of your military organ- 
ization is a war with Germany. Another grievance 
which is causing a good deal of uneasiness at 
Berlin is your accumulation in the strong rooms of 
the Bank of six hundred millions of notes with- 
drawn from circulation ; they seem to constitute a 
veritable war-fund. In short,” he concluded, “ no 
appeasement will be possible while the French 
papers shall continue to denounce the intentions 
of Germany.” 

Prince Hohenlohe added that he was not in- 
structed to make this communication, which only 
appeared to have been addressed to him. for 
his private information, and because he did not 
seem to attach sufficient importance to France's 
armaments. 

A cool head is the first and foremost qualifica- 
tion of the diplomatist as well as of the soldier. 
M. Decazes was not lacking in that qualification, 
seeing that he took advantage at once of the 
alleged non-official character of the communication 
to receive it in silence and without as much as 
wincing. While accompanying Prince Hohenlohe 
to the door, he only said: “Az revoir ; we'll talk 
of all this when you come back.” We may take 


202 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


it for granted, though, that he would have had 
greater difficulty in remaining perfectly placid if 
at that moment he had not had in his pocket 
an assurance that henceforward France would not 
stand alone in the resentment he himself felt at the 
contemptible attempt at a surprise. 

Everything, in fact, was “passing strange” in 
the language to which he had just been obliged 
to listen. It was the direct contradiction of all 
the assurances that had emanated successively 
from the lips of the Minister, of the Emperor 
himself, then of the Ambassador, and finally of 
the Chancellor through the intermediary of a 
spokesman who had professed himself specially 
authorized to that effect. For what reason and to 
what end did they give themselves the lie in that 
way? What new fact had cropped up to justify 
the re-opening of the discussion after they declared 
it to be closed? All this was very puzzling. 

There was one supposition, though, which it was 
difficult to admit ; namely, that Prince Hohenlohe 
should have spoken as he did without being, not 
only authorized, but specially invited to do so by a 
superior authority. There are certain commissions 
one does not undertake without being obliged. 
If Herr von Bilow had only communicated his 
personal feelings to his ambassador, the latter had 
no motive whatsoever to pour out in his turn their 
confidential particulars into the heart of the French 
Minister for Foreign Affairs. Such effusions are 


EPISCOPAL CHARGES AND CRISIS OF 1875 203 


not customary in diplomacy, in the conduct of 
which it is always fair to assume that an indis- 
cretion is committed with an ulterior purpose. 
And inasmuch as at that very moment Count 
Arnim was being indicted and stood in jeopardy 
of losing his head for no other reason than because 
he had failed to please his chief, it was highly 
improbable that Count Arnim’s successor would 
take on his own account an initiative that might 
complicate matters. Such a step would have con- 
stituted an infraction of discipline analogous to 
that of a sentry on duty firing without orders. 
Equally inadmissible was it that Herr von 
Bismarck merely intended to put the French 
Government on its guard, and to confine himself 
to a simple warning without taking further action. 
Did it stand to reason that, having denounced 
the armaments of France as a future perit to 
Germany, he would be content to fold his arms, 
to allow France to complete those armaments 
unhindered, and await their completion with the 
alternative of offering a tardy opposition? When 
had he been known to be satisfied with empty 
threats, to speak without acting? No. Prince 
Hohenlohe’s step, if spontaneously taken, would 
have been a heedless and unpardonable blunder 
on his part, but if ordered without an ulterior 
purpose it would have denoted a still more in- 
credible absence of tact on the part of a statesman 
who. was only taxed with an absence of scruple. 


204 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


Absolutely there remained but one _ possible 
explanation, and it was that adopted by M. 
Decazes—as, I imagine, it would have been 
adopted by every man of sense in his position ; 
namely, that the non-official protest against our 
excessive armament was but the prelude and the 
preparation for an official summons to reduce. 
That was the logical and therefore necessary 
consequence of the step. Admitting this to be 
the case, was M. Decazes mistaken in assuming 
that on the day such a demand would be forth- 
coming, and would have to be submitted to France 
and the Assembly, it would prove the signal for 
an appeal to arms? I think I may take it upon 
myself, in this instance, to answer for him, and | 
feel confident that not one of my colleagues of 
those days will care to contradict me when I say 
that the Minister who would have proposed to us 
to modify a single one of our military laws in com- 
pliance with a request to that effect by Germany 
would not have been allowed to finish the sentence 
in the tribune. The consequences of such recep- 
tion would have been patent to every one of us. 
We were better aware of the terrible chances of 
another war than any one; we knew better than 
any one how empty were the cadres, of which 
we had just mapped out the lines; and there was 
not one of us but who had a brother, a son, or a 
friend whom the vote we should have been bound 
to give might not send into captivity or to his 


EPISCOPAL CHARGES AND CRISIS OF 1875 205 


death. But that would not have mattered. To 
have accepted the control of our military con- 
ditions at the hands of our victor of yesterday, 
who was so obviously interested in maintaining 
us in a permanently weak state, would have 
been consenting to remain in subjection for an 
indefinite period. Anything was better than 
to submit tamely to conditions. [I am _ in- 
clined to think that—with the exception of Herr 
von Bismarck, to whom our humiliation without 
firing a shot would perhaps have appeared prefer- 
able—all the firebrands of the German Grand- 
Staff did us the justice to count upon a resistance 
which would have satisfied their impatience to 
resume the campaign. But although M. Decazes 
was prepared to accept that prospect as resolutely 
as any of us, he experienced nevertheless a feeling 
of emotion, which I defy any man of heart not to 
feel when he knows that the fate of his country, 
and perhaps the lives of a million of men, may 
depend on a word of his. He was still under 
the influence of that emotion (according to the 
narrative of one of his personal friends) when 
the Ambassador of Russia, Prince Orloff, with 
whom he was on most intimate terms, came to 
see him. 

“But what, after all, shall you do if you are 
attacked at a moment’s notice?” asked the Prince, 
when his friend had told him everything. ‘* What 


206 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


shall we do? We shall retreat behind the Loire ; 
that is where we will concentrate our army, and 
we shall wait and see if Europe will stand tamely 
by and allow a defenceless nation to be invaded 
and devastated without a reason.” 

In spite of all this, there was not the slightest 
trace of his temporary excitement in the instruc- 
tions he dispatched to M. de Gontaut, informing 
him of the step taken by Prince Hohenlohe, and 
of the consequences that seemed unavoidable. 
On the contrary, an exceedingly well-written 
dispatch went into all the possible explanations 
of that unforeseen re-appearance, after which M. 
Decazes dwelt on the only admissible one. He 
even carried his conscientious examination of 
matters to the length of seriously discussing the 
alarm that had been expressed to him on the 
score of the accumulation of available securities 
in the coffers of the Bank, and he pointed out in 
sober earnest the strange nature of that mistake, 
not a single bank-note having been withdrawn 
from circulation except on payment of its equal 
value in coin, which would diminish instead of 
increasing the resources of the Treasury in the 
event of war breaking out. Concluding from all 
this that an impending summons to disarm might 
be looked for, he instructed M. de Gontaut to 
decline all conversation on the subject if such a 
proposal were broached, ‘inasmuch as,” he was 


EPISCOPAL CHARGES AND CRISIS OF 1875 207 


to say, ‘“‘no instructions could have been given 
to him in view of a demand which was neither 
based on any clause of the treaty nor justified by 
any fact.” This would enable him to gain the 
necessary time until the arrival of the Russian 
sovereign and his Chancellor; and M. Decazes 
forwarded under the same cover the exact text 
of the promises given to General Leflé in order 
to enable M. de Gontaut to claim their fulfilment. 
The main thing was to prevent all discussion 
and interchanging of notes while waiting for an 
intervention which, confronted with an already 
accomplished fact and aroused self-pride, might 
prove either less efficacious or more hesitating. 
But it was not enough to open Russia’s eyes 
only—the whole of Europe, governments as well 
as peoples, must alike be warned at that moment, 
when a threat might be suspended over any of 
them. We might this time, and above all, use- 
fully invoke English public opinion, the ill-will of 
which in 1870 had been almost as fatal to us as 
Russian neutrality. The idea of this had already 
presented itself to our excellent chargé @affaires, 
M. Gavard, who on receiving a telegram inform- 
ing him in a few words of Prince Hohenlohe’s 
conversation, had, without express instructions to 
that effect and of his own accord, immediately 
repaired to Lord Derby’s. “I spoke,” he said, 
‘impelled by a feeling of emotion which was by 
no means feigned, for I imagined that there was 


208 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


immediate danger.”' The effect was completed 
and insured by an article in next day’s Zzmes, 
which exposed the seriousness of the situation, 
and imputed the whole of the blame for it to 
the German military party, whose intentions it 
showed up. 

The theories enunciated by Herr von Radowitz 
were also exactly reproduced and generously 
combated in it, and the anonymous writer wound 
up with the following stirring peroration :— 
‘““Those theories imperil everything that still re- 
mains intact of that moral force called the right of 
nations. That consideration ought assuredly to 
awaken Europe from her indifference, and remind 
her of that scarcely flattering but ingenious 
recommendation of the peasant-woman who, on 
leaving her children by themselves at home, said 
to them: ‘If anything should happen to you, 
don’t cry “stop thief.” No one would come, 
because you alone would stand in danger of being 
robbed. But if you want the neighbours to come 
to you, shout “fire,” for a fire might set the whole 
village ablaze.’ ” 

The effect was deep and instantaneous ; it was 
like a flash of lightning tearing the clouds asunder. 
Whence came the flash of light? M. Decazes had 
always been credited with having had a hand in 
its production ; as a matter of course he has always 


1 Charles Gavard, Un Diplomate a Londres Lettres et Notes, 
p. 242. 


EPISCOPAL CHARGES AND CRISIS OF 1875 209 


denied the flattering imputation. And, in fact, 
the Zzmes correspondent, whom every one in Paris 
knew, was sufficiently well-informed and endowed 
with sufficient political sense to have spoken with- 
out inspiration. 

Nevertheless, there was, even in Paris, a spot, 
more or less assiduously frequented by the diplo- 
matic world, where the reality of the crisis was 
called in doubt; namely, M. Thiers’ drawing- 
room. M. Thiers, from a foible sufficiently 
common with eminent men who feel themselves 
stricken with age, did not like and almost 
usually made it a point to depreciate his suc- 
cessors, whom, justly perhaps, he refused to 
consider his equals. Moreover, he failed to 
perceive that time, which glided past him without 
impairing his brilliant faculties, also brought to 
light, and by his side, in the case of others,-the 
developments due to maturity and experience ; 
nevertheless, the man of fifty or thereabouts was 
persistently regarded by him as a beardless 
politician. 

From that point of view, then, M. Decazes was 
simply a diplomatic novice, and did not cease to 
incur M. Thiers’ censure. In the present instance 
M. Thiers made merry over his exaggerated fears ; 
he would have willingly reproached him with 
want of tact in not having succeeded in worming 
himself into the good graces of Herr von 


Bismarck. Those remarks tended to produce 
P 


210 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


a bad effect, reproduced as they were in the 
dispatches of all the foreign representatives who 
had had the good taste to continue their visits to 
the late President of the Republic, and treat him 
with the same regard as when he was in power. 
M. Decazes, therefore, considered it advisable to 
put an end to those comments, and through the 
intermediary of one of our mutual friends, Count 
de Bourgoiny, he placed before that enlightened 
though ill-disposed judge the most significant of 
the documents in his possession. M. Thiers 
opened his eyes very wide, gracefully bowed to 
the evidence submitted to him by acknowledging 
the difficulty of the situation, and sent to M. 
Decazes the assurance that he had to fear no 
opposition in the Assembly either from him or 
from his friends. He volunteered to say the same 
to Prince Orloff, in order to impress upon the 
Czar and his advisers that Russia’s siding with 
France would evoke the unanimous gratitude of 
all parties. 

Truly, nothing could be more deserving of 
honour than such conduct, and the justified trust 
of M. Decazes in M. Thiers’ patriotism redounded 
to his own credit. But what was, perhaps, less 
correct and at the same time less generous, was 
the subsequent demeanour of some of M. Thiers’ 
friends in their efforts to misrepresent this very 
natural proceeding on the part of two sterling 
(dons) Frenchmen. According to them, it was 


EPISCOPAL CHARGES AND CRISIS OF 1875 211 


M. Decazes who, at a loss how to get out of the 
difficulty, came in a state of great excitement to 
throw himself upon the reputation of wisdom M. 
Thiers had maintained with the Courts of Europe. 
The inexperienced helmsman was said to have 
abandoned for some hours, and during the storm, 
the helm to the old pilot. The simple com- 
parison of a few dates would suffice to show the 
ridiculous falsehood of that story. 1 do not pre- 
tend to say what might, or would have been, the 
result of M. Thiers’ conversation with the Russian 
Ambassador if it had occurred in time ; a support 
of that kind would unquestionably have been of 
real use. But, as it happened, the game was 
won, and conviction carried to the mind of the 
Czar before the news of it had time to transpire, 
even in Russia.’ 

Everything had been prepared, then, to cause 


1 Strangely enough, this little story, based upon a curiously dis- 
figured fact, was repeated with great assurance by a Republican 
candidate at an election contested by me. I was compelled to give 
it an absolute denial, based upon the formal evidence to that effect 
of M. Decazes himself. Since then, that candidate, having become 
a Deputy, has figured among the twelve or thirteen Ministers for 
Foreign Affairs that have succeeded M. Decazes, and has therefore 
been enabled to convince himself personally that he was misin- 
formed. The only trace of M. Thiers’ intervention which I could 
find in M. de Gontaut’s correspondence was a remark of the 
Emperor of Russia, expressing his pleasure that a rapprochement 
was taking place between M. Thiers and Marshal MacMahon. 
M. de Gontaut, not having understood the meaning of that remark, 
asked M. Decazes for an explanation of the sentence, and the 
Minister told him everything that had occurred between him and. 
M. Thiers. 


212 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


the summons to disarm, if it did come to us, to 
be received with a sentiment of moral reproof as 
unanimous as it would have been energetic, and 
it was even because of that that it did not come. 
There is no better parry, nor a surer, than that 
which absolutely forestalls the thrust. Certain is 
it, however, that at the very moment when the 
natural conclusion of so many reiterated threats 
was expected, there was an unforeseen and simul- 
taneous retrograde movement along the whole of 
the line, political as well as military. The Press 
was the first to give the signal, just as heretofore 
it had been the first to open the attack on the 
morning of May 10; hence, on the day the 
Emperor of Russia was to arrive in Berlin, there 
appeared in the Word-Deutsche Zeitung an article 
expressing deep surprise at the uneasiness pre- 
vailing throughout Europe, seeing that between 
the German and French Governments THERE 
HAD NOT CROPPED UP THE SLIGHTEST INCIDENT 
CALCULATED TO CAUSE ANXIETY: the big char- 
acters of the latter part of the sentence are not 
mine. And in order that nothing might be want- 
ing to this audacious perversion of the truth, the 
same paper mentioned, in proof of its assertion, 
the departure of Prince Hohenlohe, who assuredly 
would not have left his post if there had not 
been a perfect understanding between the two 
Governments. Of course there was not a word 
of the poisoned arrow the ambassador had shot 


EPISCOPAL CHARGES AND CRISIS OF 1875 213 


before leaving. As a sequel to those statements, 
the ingenuousness of which raised a smile, there 
came a bitter protest against the article in the 
Times, in which an unknown writer had thought 
fit to slander the innocent intentions of the Empire 
and the Chancellor. Then, immediately after the 
Emperor’s arrival, Prince Gortschakoff was the 
first to come and see M. de Gontaut. ‘ You 
have been very uneasy; you may-set your mind 
at rest,” he said. ‘The Emperor, who wishes to 
see you, will give you even a more positive 
assurance. Bismarck has shown himself to be 
animated by the most pacific intentions. He 
gave his word that the relations with France were 
never better.” 

What had happened then? The truth soon 
transpired. Alexander had been forestalled by a 
few days by his ambassador in London, Count 
Schouvaloff, who, returning to his post, had taken 
Berlin ex route, and acquainted the Chancellor 
as well as Emperor Wilhelm with the very firm 
resolves of his sovereign. He warned him (says 
a writer, who must have been very well informed) 
to be careful as to what he was going to do, and 
assured him that if he would not believe him, 
others would soon follow in whom he would be 
obliged to put faith. Thinking himself fortunate, 
perhaps, to have been warned in time, Herr von 
Bismarck deemed it prudent to be guided by that 
pointed advice, the rather that the old Emperor, 


214 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


who had probably not clearly understood the 
direction in which he was being led, showed him- 
self very determined not to advance another step. 
In the interval a dispatch from London, couched 
in the sense M. Gavard had already announced, 
had come just in time to turn the movement of 
conversion that had already begun into a com- 
plete reversal of tactics. According to the same 
writer, Herr von Bismarck publicly, and with 
imperturbable audacity, maintained that the whole 
of the noise had been caused by Stock Exchange 
speculators ‘‘ bearing” the market, and by the 
intrigues of the Clericals.’ 


1 Extracted from an article in the Edinburgh Review (for October 
1879), entitled “‘Germany since the Treaty of Frankfort.” The 
author of this book, an authority assuredly, thinks that the writer 
of the article must have had access directly or indirectly to the 
official documents bearing on the question. Absolute want of time 
has prevented my comparing my re-translation from the French 
with the original text, and also my perusal of the whole; I feel 
pretty certain, though, of not having made any important mistake, 
either with regard to the spirit or the wording. Yet, with all due 
deference to both the author of the book and the author of the 
article, I cannot wholly agree with their estimate of the Emperor’s 
share in the matter. The late Emperor Wilhelm was not gifted 
perhaps with the spirit of initiative, nor was he very prompt to take 
a decision; but, powerful as Bismarck was, Wilhelm would not 
have allowed him either to inaugurate or to pursue a policy like 
that discussed above without his (Wilhelm’s) sanction, and without 
his being informed day by day—nay, hour by hour—of the incidents 
due to that policy. Wilhelm was not the man to be led in any 
direction blindfolded, and Bismarck knew this but too well. “He 
spares me no shocks” (literally, he does not forget to stir me up), 
said Bismarck to one of M. de Gontaut’s successors, M. de Saint- 
Vallier, the same who had the French Embassy in the Pariser Platz 
rebuilt at a cost of £24,000; “he spares me no shocks; and I 
should be all the better without those little letters in his own hand- 


EPISCOPAL CHARGES AND CRISIS OF 1875 215 


From that moment, all the clouds being dis- 
pelled, the situation, as a matter of course, became 
less strained. The interview between the Czar 
and M. de Gontaut took place at the Russian 
Embassy. It lasted a good while, and was as 
thorough as it was cordial. The sovereign, in 
rising to intimate that the conversation was at 
an end, summed up the whole by the following 
words, uttered solemnly and with deep emotion: 
‘“‘ Peace is necessary to the world; every one has 
quite enough to do to look after his own business 
at home. Count on me, and set your mind at 
rest. Convey to Marshal MacMahon the assur- 
ance of my esteem for him personally and my 
sincere wishes for the consolidation of his Govern- 
ment. I trust that our relations may become more 
and more cordial. We have many interests in 
common; we must remain united.” 

But the strangest thing of all was this—not a 
single syllable seemed to have been uttered, either 





writing which he does me the honour to write.” Wilhelm was 
not quite so straightforward as many people seem to think. Queen 
Victoria had a proof of that in 1866, when, being on the eve of 
declaring war against Austria, he sent word to her that peace was 
assured. It is an open secret that her Majesty was by no means 
pleased with this instance of dissimulation. Here is another proof 
of Wilhelm’s duplicity : “ Pray do not forget that the King zs suf- 
posed to be ignorant of all this,” wrote Bismarck to Prim, when he 
wished to revive the Hohenzollern candidature for the throne of 
Spain. In fact, Wilhelm I. often reminds one of that Scotch parson 
who, having heard a ribald song, refused to sully his lips with it, 
but proposed to his congregation that his clerk should whistle it to 
them.—TRANS. 


— 


216 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


in the conversations between the two Emperors, 
or in those between their Ministers, about those 
ill-fated armaments of France that had caused 
so much noise. Prince Gortschakoff told M. de 
Gontaut without the least reserve that in his con- 
versations with Bismarck he (Gortschakoff) had 
pointedly referred more than once to the right of 
every State to organize its military resources at its. 
own will and pleasure, and that to this reiterated 
remark on his part his interlocutor had opposed 
neither objection nor reservation with regard to 
special cases; nay more, that he had shown neither 
a mark of dissent nor a sign of confusion. Nor had 
there been the slightest reference to the unusual 
scene at the Quai d’Orsay, although that reckless 
step would assume a still stranger complexion if 
considered as null and void and not followed up. 
Finally, even Prince Hohenlohe received instruc- 
tions to pretend to have forgotten that unfortunate 
bit of business, for, on his return to Paris, he had 
to come to one of the Marshal’s receptions and 
assure him that he came back as a messenger of 
peace, of which his sovereign intended to remain 
the vigilant and strict guardian. 

Neither M. Decazes nor M. de Gontaut were 
bound to remind people of what they were 
evidently determined to forget. M. de Gontaut 
was all the more disposed to preserve silence with 
regard to the whole of the latest incident, inas- 
much as he had had barely time to acquaint 





EPISCOPAL CHARGES AND CRISIS OF 1875 217 


himself with the particulars. The letter setting 
forth those particulars having preceded by but a 
few hours the effect produced by the presence of 
the Emperor of Russia, M. de Gontaut was, as a 
matter of course, absolved from worrying himself 
with the matter. It was owing to this that a fact 
which gave the real key-note to the situation has 
remained practically unknown, and was scarcely © 
mentioned, a few years later on, in the retro- 
spective polemics in the German Press on the 
real character of that short-lived crisis.‘ It is, 
nevertheless, the contrast between the solemnity 
of the act and the inaneness of its result which 
the officious apologists of Herr von Bismarck will 
never be able to explain satisfactorily. They can 
only exculpate his intentions by inculpating his 
intelligence, and the latter attempt will convince 
no one. Either the words M. Decazes heard 
from the German ambassador’s lips were void of 
sense, or else they were the premonitory signs 


1 It was, in fact, four years later that, in consequence of an article 
published in the Figaro in October 1879, a controversy was started 
in the German papers on the subject of the so-called crisis of 1875. 
All the journals supposed to have been inspired by Herr von 
Bismarck maintained that the designs with which he was taxed 
were only so many fabrications meant to serve as a pretext to the 
French and Russian Governments to account for their 7approche- 
ment. 1 do not intend to enter into the details of those respective 
discussions that gave rise to insulting remarks about M. Decazes 
and Prince Gortschakoff. I maintain the alternative I suggested. 
Either the step which Herr von Bismarck instructed Prince 
Hohenlohe to take was a solemn farce, or it was the preface to a 
summons which would have entailed war, for compliafice with it 
would have been assuredly declined. 


218 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


of a storm which would have broken forth on the 
morrow if we had not been in a position to arrest 
it. This was pointed out in covert terms, though 
with a precision essentially British, by the English 
minister, Lord Derby, when interpellated in Par- 
liament on the part England had played under 
his guidance in a game in which the general 
peace was at stake. ‘Jt had been said,” Lord 
Derby informed his hearers, “ dy personages of the 
highest positeon and authority,’ that, in order to 
avoid a war, it became necessary that France 
should interrupt her armaments, and there was 
veason to fear that the first step would be a formal 
demand by Germany to France to discontinue her 
armaments. Lf that step had been taken, tt would 
have been difficult to maintain peace.” 


Lid 


Thus ended, as it were in smoke, the strong 
commotion by which the whole of the political world 
had been stirred for six weeks. No trace of it 


' Who were those persons of such high authority and position 
whom Lord Derby designated as having given him that salutary 
warning? It was generally believed that his words pointed to a 
direct intervention on the part of the German ambassador in 
London, Count Miinster, who, it was said, had been instructed to 
express himself in the same sense to the Foreign Office with Prince 
Hohenlohe in Paris. But that fact, affirmed by the whole of the 
European Press, has been positively denied by Herr von Bismarck 
and by Count Miinster himself. We are, then, left to suppose that 
Lord Derby simply wished to allude to the step taken by Prince 
Hohenlohe, and brought to Lord Derby’s knowledge by M. Gavard. 


EPISCOPAL CHARGES AND CRISIS OF 1875 219 


remained anywhere except in the mind of Herr 
von Bismarck, but there it was deep and lasting. 
For the first time in his career, and on the very 
stage he ruled despotically, he had appeared before 
an ironical audience, been convicted of duplicity 
and want of power. In vain did he multiply his 
denials with affected superciliousness ; he read the 
signs of a malicious incredulity on the faces of all 
who surrounded him, especially in the political 
and diplomatic world. His displeasure was great, 
and during the first hours vented itself in bitter 
terms, aiming at the highest in station. To begin 
with, there was Lord Derby’s speech, which was 
of a nature to exasperate him, and to which he 
replied in his accredited paper by a denial couched 
in such violent terms as to border on insult. But 
it was especially against the Russian Minister that 
he refrained with difficulty from giving vent- to 
his irritation, even in public. He accused him of 
having seized, nay manufactured, the opportunity 
to afford his master a sensational entrance on the 
political stage by having cast him for the part of 
arbiter of peace—when that peace was in no way 
threatened. 

‘Humour him,” said Prince Gortschakoff to 
M. de Gontaut, and seemingly impressed by the 
state of mind of the Chancellor; ‘‘ humour him, 
he is in a sombre mood and in a nervous state, 
and is constantly railing us on the Quos Ego of 
Virgil, which he says we pronounced before the 


220 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


storm had arisen. Do not show yourself too satis- 
fied before him.” 

The advice was full of wisdom, but Prince 
Gortschakoff would have done better perhaps to 
have been guided by it himself, and not to have 
shown his own feeling of triumph too ostensibly. 
That is, if we are to judge by another and rather 
strange Press incident which made even a good deal 
of noise at that moment, and which even to this 
day is rather variously interpreted by those who 
narrate it. At the moment of the Czar’s departure 
from Berlin for Ems, the Stuttgart papers pub- 
lished a telegraphic dispatch, addressed in the 
Emperor’s name by his Chancellor to the Em- 
peror’s sister, the Queen of Wiirtemberg. It was 
written in French, and not in cipher, and ran as 
follows: ‘‘The hot-headed one of Berlin gives 
formal assurances of peace.” The astonishment 
was universal, and, in fact, it would have been 
difficult to conceive anything less diplomatic than 
this almost offensive epithet alluding to the fore- 
most statesman of Germany; but what appeared 
stranger still was the want of caution which had 
sanctioned, nay, seemed to have invited its pub- 
jicity. The irritation of the Press devoted to 
Herr von Bismarck was great, and not without 
cause. A sufficiently natural and altogether 
credible explanation has, however, been given to 
a proceeding so utterly out of the usual course ; it 
was simply a mistake in the translation of the tele- 


EPISCOPAL CHARGES AND CRISIS OF 1875 221 


graphic signs. The telegram, written with the 
ordinary abbreviations, said: “I carry away with 
me from Berlin formal assurances of peace.”? An 
accent placed on the last letter of the word 
‘“emporte” had transformed an altogether in- 
offensive tense of a verb into an ugly-sounding 
adjective, and as the message itself contained only 
useful news, it was but equally natural that no 
steps should have been taken to prevent the 
indiscretion of the telegraphist. That no doubt 
was also the explanation that disarmed Herr 
von Bismarck’s susceptibility, which, without such 
rectification, would assuredly not have been with- 


1 The explanation I beg to give here of that telegram, which has 
remained famous, and which strongly aroused the anger of the 
German Press, is, I have been assured, that of the Wiirtemberg 
journalist who published the telegram first AUTHOR. 

[For the better understanding of the reader I give the telegrams 
in French, ‘ 

The telegram supposed to have been sent : “J’emporte de Berlin 
assurances formelles de paix.” 

The telegram as it was transcribed and published in the papers : 
“L’emporté de Berlin donne des assurances formelles de paix.” 

It will be seen at once that there is a discrepancy of two words 
between the telegram supposed to have been sent by Gortschakoff 
and the one alleged to have been received ; and even if we allow 
for the absence of the word “ des” in the former for the purpose of 
abbreviation, there is still the word “ donne” to be accounted for. 
Of course, the Russian Chancellor could not have been guilty of 
sending such a message, nevertheless the presumption was strong 
against him. The error might be much more easily accounted for 
by the fact that the telegraphic operator who received the message 
was probably a Wiirtemberger, and Wiirtembergers have never 
been particularly partial either to Bismarck or his régime. I, how- 
ever, should not like to take the responsibility of such an ee 
tion.— TRANS. ] 


222 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


out cause. But those mishaps are always 
awkward, for the simple reason that they would 
probably not impose upon people but for a corre- 
sponding foundation of truth. And even when 
the error was explained, Herr von Bismarck could 
not have felt inordinately flattered with a portrait 
in which people fancied that they could detect a 
certain likeness to the original. 

There was, however, one thing to be genuinely 
and seriously feared, namely, that Herr von 
Bismarck, taking advantage of the influence he 
usually exercised over his sovereign, would endea- 
vour to make the latter share his dissatisfaction. 
Would he not attempt to persuade him that he 
had been drawn into atrap, and that both threats 
of war and pacific intervention were only parts of 
a comedy arranged beforehand in which the most 
telling 7é/e had not fallen to his master? Emperor 
Wilhelm’s annoyance at having been duped in 
that way might lead to fresh complications in a 
situation but barely consolidated. If a similar 
attempt was made to embitter the mind and prick 
the self-esteem of the aged sovereign it met with 
no success. Having reached the limits allotted to 
the life of man, he was too much surfeited with 
glory, he felt too keenly the need of rest that 
comes with advancing years, to be easily moved 
by trivial susceptibilities. His confidence in his 
nephew seemed in no way shaken, and the dis- 


EPISCOPAL CHAR@ES AND CRISIS OF 1875 223 


appointed statesman was perforce obliged to champ 
his bit silently (de rvonger son frein en silence’) : 
and to borrow from the Latin poet, as he did—“ to 
hide within his inmost soul the resentment of his 
insult,” but with the determined intention to vent 
it later on, which he did after three years, when a 
Congress at Berlin brought the two Chancellors 
side by side. On that day the German considered 
himself free to take his revenge by riddling the 
Russian with darts, which, though still covered 
with quasi-friendly veneer, did put an end for 
a long while to the friendly relations. of the two 
Empires. 

Meanwhile, instead of the grand culprits whom 
he had to acknowledge himself powerless to reach, 
there was one of less power whom he fancied to be 
within his reach and at his mercy ; and that one, 
whose offence originated in less exalted sphefes, 
and which (the offence) was therefore all the 
more galling to him, had to pay for all the others. 
That was M. de Gontaut. If, in fact, it could be 
shown that the whole of this business was the 
result of a plot hatched between Russia and 
France, then M. de Gontaut, placed as he was 
in the very centre whence the movement started, 
must have been one of the principal artisans of 
it. In that respect, Hegemon Bismarck was not 
altogether’ on the wrong track, and his anger 


1 Anglicé=“to brood over his disappointment in -silence.”— 
TRANS. - ‘ 


224 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


made him clear-sighted. It was, in truth, M. de 
Gontaut, who, by lending an attentive and intel- 
ligent ear to all the rumours circulated around 
him, by refusing to be lulled to sleep with official 
denials, by his tact in listening to and inviting 
confidential and instructive communications, had 
given the alarm, subsequently transmitted from 
Paris to St. Petersburg. It was, above all, the 
conversation between M. de Gontaut and Herr 
von Radowitz, the graphic and faithful narrative 
of which, placed in the nick of time before the 
Czar, had led to the Imperial veto at the crucial 
hour. It was then, in reality, M. de Gontaut 
who had prepared the piece of ordnance the 
unexpected play of which had disabled the 
Prussian batteries, and Herr von Bismarck had 
as much cause to bear him a grudge for it as 
France has to this day to be grateful for it to 
his memory. 

M. de Gontaut fostered no illusions with regard 
to the means at the disposal of the Chancellor, 
and of which he liked to make use for the purpose 
of avenging his wounded pride, or to rid himself 
of some one to whom he objected. In default of 
any other experiment, that made on me during 
my short-lived tenancy of the Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs ought to have taught him all he wanted. 
He was, therefore, not in the least surprised to 
see that very obliging Press which had blown 
hot and cold, preached war and peace with the 


EPISCOPAL CHARGES AND CRISIS OF 1875 225 


same docility during the crisis, turn on a given 
day on him, place him, as it were, on the stool of 
repentance (/e mettre en quelque sorte sur la 
sellette*), in order to pursue him with its attacks, 
and in a little while with its invectives. M. de 
Gontaut was executed in due form. The whole 
of his life,—past and present, public and private, 
—all his family and social relations were sifted with 
a like libellous bitterness, and with’a marvellous 
ensemble and that perfect accord of the most 
diverse instruments, which accord, at every fresh 
evolution, attested the unity of direction. Among 
many insignificant or commonplace grievances 
preferred against him, and the expression of which 
was often trivial, there was one, which, repeated 
with persistence, sufficiently indicated the origin 
and the aim of that polemical controversy intended 
to injure him. M. de Gontaut was represented 
as having profited by his relations with the Court 


1 The French “ stool of repentance,” a cross between the English 
pillory and the Scotch cutty-stool, was a kind of wooden seat set 
up in the Criminal Courts, and on which they placed the accused 
to undergo his last interrogatory when the conclusions of the 
counsel for the prosecution (which might be either the king’s 
procurator or the procurator-fiscal) went against him with regard to 
the application of capital punishment or at least of penal corporal 
punishment. The “stool of repentance ” implied moral degradation, 
and it was for that reason that its use was limited to persons accused 
of crimes entailing corporal punishment. A person accused of lesser 
crimes underwent his last interrogatory standing behind the seats 
allotted to the members of the bar. (Ovdonnance Criminelle de 1670, 
Titre IV. Art. 21.) The “stool of repentance” was abolished by 
an edict of Louis XVI., May 1, 1788, which edict was confirmed by 
the Constituent Assembly, Nov, 3, 1789.—TRANS, 

Q 


226 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


and the sympathy of the German Catholics to 
convert his embassy into a centre of intrigue and 
hostility against the policy of the Chancellor. 
The consequence was a most natural one. Ger- 
many could not stand tamely by and watch the 
agent of a foreign and always inimical power 
becoming the head and soul of an opposing coterie 
with impunity. The recall of M. de Gontaut was 
therefore a question of dignity with the Empire, 
nay, almost a question of public security. Herr 
von Bismarck owed it to himself to insist on that 
recall. In fact it was soon said that he was sure 
to obtain it, and even was already in a position 
to designate M. de Gontaut’s successor. He had, 
it was added, made choice of M. Thiers as the 
only one among French men of politics who 
understood the situation, and with whom he could 
get along comfortably. 

Nothing is more contrary to the customs of 
international courtesy which constitute the bond 
between civilized States than personal attacks on 
a distinctly-named ambassador in active service. 
Even in those countries where the Press enjoys 
an almost unrestricted freedom, only organs of 
the lowest stamp and blind to all notions of 
decency would infringe the law of politeness to 
such an extent. On the part of a disciplined 
Press, strictly obedient to orders like that of 
Germany, that conduct became a veritable scandal, 
and M. de Gontaut’s colleagues, rallying round 


EPISCOPAL CHARGES AND CRISIS OF 1875 227 


him to protest against an insult that affected 
them all, did not hide their dissatisfaction. But 
what neither they nor any one else could have 
surmised, was the fact that Herr von Bismarck 
—finding, no doubt, that the execution he had 
instigated was coming too slowly—made it a 
point to bestir himself in the matter. On no 
theory, in fact, but that of his desire to make 
M. de Gontaut’s stay in Berlin impossible can 
one explain the Chancellor’s attitude towards 
him the first time he was, as it were, obliged 
to receive him after the annoyance and disgust 
the ambassador was accused of having caused 
him. The turn he at once gave to the con- 
versation was such that if the dialogue had 
been carried on both sides with the same dis- 
regard of courtesy and mutual respect, the two 
interlocutors, after having parted in that- way, 
could have never met one another again. 

At the date of that first interview, December 
31, 1875, several months had already gone by 
since the exciting period of the past spring. 
Herr von Bismarck himself had taken advantage 
ef his frequent absences during the summer, 
spent at his own home in the country, or at some 
watering-place, to avoid the visits M. de Gontaut 
had at various times endeavoured to pay to him. 
. Their relations had been simply confined to the 
leaving of cards. : 

It would have been easy, therefore, to avoid all 


228 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


allusion to a past the recollection of which was 
gradually being effaced, and M. de Gontaut en- 
deavoured to set the example in that respect by 
expressing his satisfaction that at the opening of 
the year there was no subject likely to produce a 
disagreement between the two countries. ‘I am 
glad you think so, and still more glad to hear you 
say it,” remarked Herr von Bismarck abruptly. 
‘“You are no longer under the impression, then, 
that I wish to recommence the war and set the 
whole of Europe on fire?” And having once 
started, he entered without transition upon a long 
and entirely uncalled-for apology of the whole of 
his conduct, which at that moment no one called 
in question. The evident aim of this gratuitous 
justification was to shift the responsibility of the 
trouble that had been imputed to him from the 
outset (that was the stereotyped theme) on to the 
shoulders of the Stock Exchange agitators and 
Clericals, and to attribute to them, above all, the 
false news sent from Paris to St. Petersburg. 

“It is from France, I know, that Orloff gave the 
signal for the alarm,” he said ; ‘and you yourself,” 
he added, looking fixedly at M. de Gontaut, who 
was seated opposite him, “you yourself went to 
St. Petersburg last year to tell them that I wanted 
another war.” 

Surprised, but in no way troubled by this 
personal attack, M. de Gontaut replied: ‘ No, it 
was not last year that I went to St. Petersburg ; 


EPISCOPAL CHARGES AND CRISIS OF 1875 229 


it is two years and two months ago that I stayed 
there for a little while.” 

“Your memory is playing you false; it was 
last year.” 

M. de Gontaut had no difficulty in proving 
that his interlocutor and not he was mistaken. 
Having been silenced on that point, Herr von 
Bismarck did not even trouble himself to apologize 
for the persistent and scarcely polite manner in 
which he maintained his error. 

That strange incident would have been suffi- 
cient in itself to convince M. de Gontaut that the 
Chancellor meant to provoke a personal discussion 
which would probably have become very animated, 
and the account of which, left—in the absence 
of all witnesses—to the Chancellor’s own dis- 
cretion, would assuredly have shifted all the 
wrongs on to the ambassador’s shoulders. The 
latter, therefore, took the prudent precaution to 
let the avalanche of words, which, moreover, 
nothing could have stopped, pass by, and to reply 
to it as briefly as possible, simply confining him- 
self to a mild defence of the reproaches preferred 
against him, and to rectify misrepresented facts 
avoiding all the while everything in the shape of 
recriminations which he might have easily made 
clinching and triumphant, but which by embitter- 
ing the discussion might have led exactly to the 
goal aimed at. He contained himself sufficiently 
to contest none of the proofs the Chancellor 


230 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


advanced as to his own moderation. He offered 
no objections to protestations like the following 
one— 

‘“‘If people refuse to believe in my pacific pro- 
testations, it will be useless for me to continue 
them. Virtue is really no good in this world.” 

‘There is this much to be gained by it,” replied 
M. de Gontaut, smiling ; ‘‘ one’s own conscience is 
at peace.” 

Owing to that prudent attitude the interview 
came to an end without an apparent rupture, and 
M. de Gontaut, on reaching home, after that very 
heated interview, could write to M. Decazes: ‘I 
believe that he was very vexed at my reserved 
attitude. I scarcely expected that my interview 
with him would at once take the turn it did take; 
but when I saw what was in store for me, I made 
up my mind to say as little as possible, lest I 
should play into his own hand. I felt that if I 
attempted to discuss with him, I should perhaps 
have great difficulty in containing myself, and 
might probably be carried further than I meant to 
go. I also understood more clearly, maybe, than 
I ever understood it before, the extent of my 
responsibility and the necessity of suffering per- 
sonally rather than compromise the interests of 
my country and my Government. That was the 
thought, my dear friend, which enabled me to 
keep my patience during a painful and almost 
offensive interview. I could not have resigned 


EPISCOPAL CHARGES AND CRISIS OF 1875 231 


myself to it except under such considerations. The 
position is not an agreeable one, but one must put 
up with it as long as possible. As far as I am 
concerned, I have made up my mind to provide 
myself with a double stock of patience and caution 
until the day the Marshal shall think fit to relieve 
the sentry on duty.” 

The provocations having remained unanswered, 
and the insinuations apparently not understood, 
Herr von Bismarck had to make up his mind to 
speak frankly, and to gain his end by proceeding 
discreetly. Prince Hohenlohe was _ instructed 
once more to communicate to M. Decazes a letter 
from Herr von Biilow, the writing of which had 
probably been as much against the grain on the 
latter’s part as the reading of it was productive 
of visible discomfort to the reader. The recall of 
M. de Gontaut was requested in formal -terms. 
The reasons alleged in support of this demand 
were neither serious nor clearly defined; but the 
bitterness of language was evidently intended to 
make up for the insufficiency of motive. It was 
a downright indictment incriminating the smallest 
act of all the members, even the humblest, of the 
French Embassy. Everybody there, according 
to the epistle, was conspiring against the Empire, 
from the Consul-Secretary,! who lived on a footing 


1 In French Chancellier du Consulat. Every French consulate 
of importance has attached to it a chancellier, who is appointed 
by the President of the Republic. He is the secretary, cashier, 


232 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


of the closest intimacy with the correspondents of 
the French papers most hostile to Germany, to 
the secretaries and military attaché who let their 
tongues wag too freely, and up to the ambassador 
himself, who had become the chief of a camarzlla, 
fomenting Ministerial intrigues in a sense openly 
hostile to the Chancellor. The ambassador was 
also conspiring to procure the Chancellor’s dis- 
grace with his sovereign, and, in one word, 
aimed at reviving the traditions of the Court of 
Catherine II., but seemed to forget that such 
attitudes on the part of a diplomatic represent- 
ative would not be tolerated in this century. 
Interpolated with this sentence there was an 
historical reminiscence with reference to Catherine 
II.’s Court, the aptness of which reminiscence 
was not perfectly clear. Then the letter went 
on to say that English Ministers would never 
suffer an ambassador to keep up relations with 
parties hostile to the Cabinet constituted by the 
Queen.' In short, Herr von Biilow declared 





keeper of the archives, notary, librarian, clerk (in the meaning of 
the term “clerk of the court”), and even, if needs be, writ-server to 
the consulate. A similar chascellier is attached to all legations, 
but in the case of very important embassies, such as that of Berlin, 
it is often a consul of the first or second class who performs those 
duties. In my time the French Embassy at Berlin consisted of, 
besides the ambassador, one secretary of legation first-class, one 
secretary of legation second-class, four secretaries of legation 
third-class, one naval attaché, one military attaché, one consul for 
the clerical work, and a couple of young at/achés.—TRANS. 

1 I am not at all certain of that. I fancy English Ministers, 
unless the thing became too flagrant, would take no notice. At 


EPISCOPAL CHARGES AND CRISIS OF 1875 233 


that he could not continue his diplomatic inter- 
course with M. de Gontaut. 

There is no need to point out that this declar- 
ation was not based on any right, or even on any 
diplomatic usage. If, in virtue of a generally- 
observed rule of courtesy, a Government, before 
accrediting an ambassador to a foreign Court, 
ascertains whether that choice will be agreeable 
to the Court which is to receive him; when once 
that agreement has been obtained—and it would 
require grave motives to have it withheld—there 
is no means of coming back on that decision. 
The diplomatic agent, after he had entered upon 
his duties, would scarcely care to have the 
duration of his mission limited or threatened at 
any and every moment through the whims or ill- 
will of a Power which he may be compelled now 
and then to contradict or oppose, and which, 
nevertheless, might have nothing to allege against 
him except the warm and zealous defence of the 
interests of the nation whose representative he is. 
What, indeed, could be more convenient to a 
Power than to be able to get rid at will of a 


any rate they took no notice when, about 1881, M. Challemel- 
Lacour, then ambassador in London, and the late President of the 
Senate, joined in the Irish agitation, showed his sympathy with 
the late Mr. Parnell, then in prison, and would scarcely ever 
discuss any other subject than Irish politics with the late Lord 
Granville, who on one occasion said: “I should like to know some 
one who enjoys sufficient authority over M. Challemel-Lacour to 
tell him in confidence that he may talk politics to me »; by which, 
of course, his lordship meant other politics than Irish.—TRANS. 





234 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


negotiator she might consider too cautious, or of 
an observer whose perspicuity might appear 
embarrassing to her? 

What, in this particular instance, would have 
been the situation of M. de Gontaut’s successor if 
Herr von Bismarck’s haughty and unceremonious 
dismissal of M. de Gontaut himself had been 
accepted? Warned beforehand that he was only 
an ambassador on tolerance, and that he would 
have to vacate the place the moment he ceased to 
please, the documents such an ambassador would 
have handed to the sovereign would not have 
been credentials, but a kind of declaration of 
homage of a vassal to his liege lord. It would 
have been (to apply the historical reminiscence 
referred to by Herr von Bismarck more pertin- 
ently than he did) the exact case of the ambassador 
of mutilated Poland to the Court of Catherine. 
All that M. Decazes had to do, then, was simply 
not to appear to admit, or even to understand, the 
pretension, the motives for which he was, never- 
theless, bound to refute. 

His task was made particularly easy by the 
vague character of what he called ‘‘a tendency 
suit” (an attempt to establish a_ precedent) ; 
in other words, of a more or less cleverly 
dovetailed collection of trivial facts, not one 
of which would stand the test of serious ex- 
amination, and some of which referred to 
subordinate agents who had already left Berlin. 


EPISCOPAL CHARGES AND CRISIS OF 1875 235 


As for the reproaches addressed to M. de 
Gontaut, not a single proof was forthcoming, and 
it would, indeed, have been particularly awkward 
to use greater precision, inasmuch as the relations 
at which Herr von Bismarck took offence were 
principally, as every one knew, the intimate 
relations of the Empress and the Princesses with 
the Gontaut family; truly a singular grievance, 
and which an ambassador of the Empire could 
not express in too clear terms with any regard to 
decency. As for the German Catholics belonging 
to the Parliament, in spite of the assertions of 
some of the papers, and notwithstanding M. de 
Gontaut’s esteem for their character and admir- 
ation for their talent, he had carefully abstained 
from associating with them; a reserve rendered 
all the easier, moreover, by the attitude of those 
Catholics themselves, who were anxious,-‘as I 
have already had occasion to remark, to avoid the 
faintest shadow of entertaining relations with the 
alien, as much on account of their patriotic scruples 
as from precaution not to compromise their 
popularity. M. Decazes even expressed himself 
with ironical finesse on the subject. 

“We have no intention to mix ourselves up 
with your home affairs; we know that if we were 
suspected of taking too great an interest in them, 
it would be the means to attenuate rather than 
aggravate your difficulties.” Finally, he concluded 
by saying very emphatically: “It is but just to 


236 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


M. de Gontaut to say that without him we should 
not have been able to place our relations on the 
footing they are to-day.” 

Then, in order to remove all expectation of a 
different answer, he declined the offer of a copy 
of the document that had just been read to him. 
He merely promised to inform Marshal Mac- 
Mahon of everything he had just read. In a 
question of dignity and honour the Marshal’s 
sentiments precluded all shadow of a doubt. 
“Patience, my poor friend,” wrote M. Decazes 
to M. de Gontaut, giving him an account of the 
conversation. 

We have seen that M. de Gontaut had laid 
in a stock of that virtue which was not yet 
exhausted. Nevertheless, he already foresaw the 
day when it would be exhausted,—in other words, 
the day when he would no longer feel himself 
backed up by the sincere and unreserved con- 
fidence of his Government. If, from that point 
of view, the accord of feelings that had never 
ceased to reign between M. Decazes and himself 
left him no doubt, he was not quite so confident 
with regard to the change that was going on 
at that very moment in the home condition of 
France. The National Assembly had_ been 
dissolved,’ and the elections for the Chamber 
intended to replace it put the Conservatives in 
the minority. In the new Cabinet, of which M. 


1 On December 30, 1875, by its own vote, as it were.—TRANS. 


EPISCOPAL CHARGES AND CRISIS OF 1875 237 


Dufaure became the head, M. Decazes was the 
only one left of the preceding administration. 
He kept the portfolio of Foreign Affairs, for no 
other reason than because Marshal MacMahon, 
from a very praiseworthy feeling of caution, 
wished to shield France’s foreign policy from the 
hazards of Ministerial instability. But would not 
M. Decazes’ colleagues, not one of whom thought 
like him, be disposed to consider that the declared 
hostility of Herr von Bismarck was calculated to 
try the temper of the new-born Republic too 
much ? 

The German papers, which did not cease to 
tilt against M. de Gontaut, welcomed at the same 
time, and often in the same issue, the advent of 
the Republican party with most auspicious signs 
of good-will, and inserted with loud praise the 
electoral addresses of M. Gambetta. Would 
those who had the power to-day remain insensible 
for any length of time to this difference of 
treatment ? 

Already, in the department of Lower-Pyrenees 
which had just elected M. de Gontaut to the 
Senate, his opponents had accused him of having 
compromised and of continuing to compromise, 
in virtue of his Clericalism, the good relations 
with Germany, and pretended to substantiate 
their imputation by the evidence of MM. Thiers 
and de Rémusat, without, I feel convinced, being 
in the least authorized to do so, The Journal des 


238 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


Débats, the most moderate of all the organs of the 
French Republicans which supported the new 
Ministry, had, without contesting the eminent 
merits of M. de Gontaut, insinuated more than once 
that he would be better suited to another post. 
M. de Gontaut considered it only consistent with his 
dignity not to let those insinuations and verbal 
stabs pass unnoticed, and a candid explanation 
on the subject with M. Decazes was the easier, 
inasmuch as those stabs both in character and 
origin aimed at the Minister as well as at his 
Ambassador. 

‘Tell me candidly, my dear friend,” he wrote 
to him, “if your new colleagues have confidence 
inme? If I should happen to inspire the least 
mistrust, I have no desire to remain here; I do 
not care to be an ambassador at all costs. Attacked 
as I am already by the Chancellor and the 
German Press, if in addition to this the Govern- 
ment of my own country has no confidence in 
me, you will easily understand that, as a man of 
honour and conscience, I must not retain an 
unbearable position.” 

Being ready to admit the hypothesis that 
Bismarck threatened to annul his bargain, and 
refused to promise the renewal of his good-will 
unless the recall he had demanded was granted, 
M. de Gontaut wrote a few days later: “ That 
man will not forgive me for the service I have 
been able to render to my country with honour, 


EPISCOPAL CHARGES AND CRISIS OF 1875 239 


thanks be to God, and assuredly there is nothing 
in that either to astonish or to stop me. But 
having failed to reach me, that he should vent 
his spleen on France and try to embitter the 
relations of the two countries, that would be 
almost monstrous. As for myself personally, my 
dear friend, on no consideration will I allow 
myself to become the pretended or real cause 
for evil relations between Germany and France ; 
and on the day when you acquire the certainty 
of what at present seems to me only a possibility, 
I would beg of you, and if you will permit the 
expression, I would command you to tell me so 
without mincing words, and my resignation will 
be forthcoming very quickly.” 








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THE EASTERN QUESTION AND THE BERLIN 
MEMORANDUM—THE ELECTIONS OF 1877 
—THE RESIGNATION 


THE EASTERN QUESTION AND THE BERLIN 
MEMORANDUM—THE ELECTIONS OF 1877 
—THE RESIGNATION 


I 


Arter the demand for M. de Gontaut’s recall, 
politely but clearly shelved by Marshal MacMahon 
and M. Decazes, the ambassador’s position at 
Berlin continued to be strangely delicate and pecu- 
liar. Herr von Bismarck’s dislike was shown to 
him more and more brutally every day by all the 
organs of the Press which received their orders 
from the Imperial Chancellerie. It did not prévent 
his becoming the object of daily-increasing good- 
will on the part of the whole of political society, 
of the royal family—including, besides the Em- 
press, the Prince and Princess Royal—and not 
even excepting the Emperor himself, who never 
pronounced M. de Gontaut’s name without adding 
to it the following expression—the highest proof, 
perhaps, he was enabled to give of his esteem : 
‘‘He is an honest man and a perfect gentleman.” 
This contrast was too evident to remain unnoticed 
by the public, even if it had not suited Herr von 


Bismarck to draw attention to it in Parliament. 
243 


244 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


By a bold display of omnipotence he showed that 
he would not shrink from pointing that contrast 
even there. At the first opportunity afforded to 
him to explain to the Reichstag his attitude with 
regard to the bellicose humours of the previous 
year, he resumed his apologia with all the old 
arguments, affirming, moreover, that the Emperor 
at his age, being anxious to avoid quarrels, would 
not have consented to engage in a war without an 
adequate motive, and that, besides, such a war 
could not have been declared without contracting 
a loan of five or six millions of marks; which loan 
would certainly not have been granted to him in 
order to perpetrate the “colossal piece of idiotcy ” 
of preventing the possible attacks of France in 
the future. ‘‘ That would have been,” he went on, 
“the opinion of diplomatists who, through lack of 
experience, have drawn their knowledge from dis- 
reputable sources, and of highly-placed personages 
yielding to drawing-room cabals, too ignorant of 
affairs to form a solid judgment, and also animated 
by too little kindness for the establishment of the 
Empire.” Herr von Windthorst having taken up 
the parable to point out that it was the Press which 
had spread those alarms, and that when a cer- 
tain portion of the Press spoke, the source whence 
it drew its inspiration—nay, whence it drew even 
its substance—left no matter for doubt, Herr von 
Bismarck retorted that this intervention of a 
Catholic in no way surprised him, the highly- 


THE EASTERN QUESTION 245 


placed personages to whom he had alluded being 
famed for their sympathy with the Centre rather 
than with the policy of the Government. If M. 
de Gontaut had no difficulty in recognizing a 
portrait of himself in the description of ‘ diplo- 
matists who fish in troubled waters,” the Empress, 
whose repugnance for the policy in connection 
with the Kulturkampf was well known, found 
herself just as clearly designated, atid it was no 
doubt in order to reply to this public provocation 
that she showed herself more gracious than ever 
to M. de Gontaut on the occasion of a ball at the 
French Embassy on the following day, and which 
ball she honoured with her presence. | 

For how long could those strained relations, 
which brought trouble even in the Imperial house- 
hold, have continued without snapping? What 
would have happened if some serious difference 
had cropped up afresh between France and 
Germany? All this it would have been impos- 
sible to determine even then, for an unforeseen 
diversion abruptly ended the situation. It so 
happened that at that very moment Berlin ceased 
to be the exclusive stage for the discussion of the 
question in connection with the powerful interests 
of the European policy; and a new series of 
events was being unfolded, in which no doubt 
the two countries respectively had still an active 
part to play, but which were no longer placed in 
direct conflict. 


246 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


Every one knows, and there is no need for me 
to recall how, in the course of the year 1875, an 
insurrectionary movement broke out in the pro- 
vinces of Bosnia and the Herzegovina. Considered 
of small importance at the outset, it gradually pro- 
vided the opportunity for the display of a feeling 
of violent irritation on the part of the whole of the 
Christian populations still subject to the domin- 
ation of the Porte against the tyrannical and 
arbitrary ~égzme of which they were the victims. 
It soon became evident that if some kind of satis- 
faction was not afforded to their just grievances, 
the uprising would become general on the shores 
of the Lower Danube, as well as at the foot of 
the Balkans, and one that the Turkish forces by 
themselves would have considerable difficulty in 
suppressing. 

It was, moreover, certain that the provinces 
recently freed from the yoke of the Porte, like 
Servia and Roumania, would not remain callous 
to the sufferings of the oppressed, whose lot they 
had shared for a long while; and Russia herself 
soon gave the world to understand that she also 
could not for ever remain deaf to the cries of 
agony of her co-religionists. Hence, it was the 
existence of the Ottoman Empire, the integral 
territorial condition of which has always been 
considered as one of the bases of the law of 
European nations, which might be at stake. And 
that everlasting Eastern question, the primary 


THE EASTERN QUESTION 247 


cause of so many bloody struggles, bade fair to be 
revived once more in a threatening and acute 
form. If the conflagration was allowed to rage 
unchecked in those countries containing so much 
inflammable material, no one could predict either 
its extent. or the destruction it might cause. 

It was but natural that the Powers which have 
been in the habit of considering themselves the 
guardians of the decaying Porte, and who in 
its days of trouble lavish not altogether disinter- 
ested consolation and advice on it—it was but 
natural that they should endeavour to obtain from 
it administrative measures calculated to alleviate 
the sufferings and to satisfy the claims of its 
subjects quivering with fear and excitement. 
Preliminary communications were started, both 
to prepare the Porte to set on foot the reform 
deemed necessary, and to settle in concert with 
the Powers themselves the programme of the 
measures they intended to propose to it. It was 
a long and complicated negotiation, mainly carried 
on at Constantinople itself, but which had, never- 
theless, to be pursued simultaneously in nearly 
all the capitals of Europe. M. de Gontaut’s 
personal share in these negotiations was, as a 
rule, but slight, inasmuch as he could only watch 
the phases of them from a long distance, and 
because the subject, in virtue of its far-spreading 
importance, did not come within the active sphere 
of an embassy. Nevertheless, Berlin, which has 


248 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


always been a much-frequented “half-way meeting- 
place” for the interchange of diplomatic com- 
munications, became more than ever, and owing 
to the preponderant influence of the new Empire, 
a centre whither converged all the information 
of a more or less important character. It was, 
therefore, no small gain to France to have 
stationed there beforehand a very attentive and 
intelligent spectator, who, seated in the first row, 
had no need to hold all the wires of the piece to 
enable him to detect the mechanism of the various 
springs at work, and to master the passions as 
well as the motives of all the actors. The 
most cursory perusal of his dispatches suffices to 
appreciate the superior tact and judgment he 
brought to bear upon his part of a mere observer, 
which is neither the least delicate nor the least 
precious part of the profession. The perusal of 
those dispatches shows, furthermore, how his 
task was facilitated by the friendly and confidential 
relations he had previously established with his 
colleagues of all nations, English, Russians, 
Austrians, Belgians, and even Ottomans, who 
kept him posted in everything that happened, 
without even mistrusting his discretion or doubting 
his word. Equally easy is it to note at every 
page the beneficent influence he exercises around, 
in virtue of his counsels always breathing the 
spirit of prudence and conciliation. 

There even arose one particular occasion when 


THE EASTERN QUESTION 249 


he was, as a matter of course, called upon to put 
himself forward, and enabled to co-operate with 
M. Decazes in the cautious policy the latter had 
adopted, and the outlines of which he had more 
than once explained in the Chamber. The real 
difficulty of the situation (as will have been 
understood already) lay not so much in inducing 
the Porte to follow the counsel that would be 
given to it by the unanimous European Powers, 
as to establish the basis for that common action 
in concert with the counsellors themselves. It is 
a peculiar and at the same time most difficult 
feature of the Eastern question that it is com- 
paratively easy for those interested in it to agree 
while the question is being left to rest, but the 
moment it shows signs of stirring, each one 
concerned in it, having his own interests to guard, 
his clients to protect, his views with regard to the 
future to pursue, divergencies do not fail to crop 
up, and the conduct with regard to it is no longer 
looked at in the same light either in London or 
Vienna, at St. Petersburg or Paris. The danger, 
then, was to avoid quarrelling with each other, 
while trying to come to an agreement with regard 
to the means to influence the Porte. Such a 
division would not only deprive the peaceful 
counsels of Europe of all authority, but might 
lead to fresh complications of more extensive 
bearing. Allies, after all, never lose. sight of 
the fact that they are rivals, and it has occurred 


250 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


before then that while closing up the ranks too 
tightly, in order to march “together,” the would- 
be allies had found their elbows sticking into each 
other’s sides, and had come to blows themselves. 
As for France, the condition to which fortune 
had reduced her made her line of conduct very 
easy, or, to speak correctly, she could only follow 
one line. We had but one interest to guard ; viz. 
to prevent all conflict in which the as yet badly- 
mended imperfection of our military forces would 
have prevented us from taking the least part. 
Prudence commanded us above all to remain 
neutral, but lest such neutrality should try the 
patience of the nation too much, and also impair 
her future prestige, we were bound to prevent 
around us an aggravated state of dissent which, 
whatever its issue, would do us no good. Very 
sensible general instructions recommended, there- 
fore, to our agents to show themselves favourable 
(even without disputing too much over the con- 
ditions) to any and every arrangement which, 
while maintaining the union between the great 
Powers, would permit them to make the whole 
weight of their common intervention felt at Con- 
stantinople. To begin by agreeing with one 
another, then to speak and to act together, that 
was the counsel we wished to give to every one ; 
it was, moreover, the advice dictated by reason 
and humanity. Owing nothing to, and asking 
nothing from, anybody, we were in a_ better 


THE EASTERN QUESTION 251 


position than the others to gain a hearing for that 
advice, 

For a moment it seemed as if that result was 
about to be attained. After a few attempts to 
feel their way and fruitless efforts at conciliation 
both at Constantinople, at Vienna, and on the 
scene of the insurgent provinces themselves, the 
Chancellors of the German, Austrian, and Russian 
Empires, having met at Berlin, succeeded in 
agreeing upon a Memorandum containing the 
demands, or rather the summons, to be addressed 
to the Porte, and submitted their document to 
England, France, and Italy. The terms of this 
Note were distinctly severe. 

In addition to the demand for reforms of a 
general character, such as guarantees for religious 
liberty, the just distribution and the regular appli- 
cation of the taxes, there were others more painful, 
perhaps, to a sovereign threatened in his authority. 
‘The Sultan had to grant an armistice of two 
months to the rebels, and to promise them an 
indemnity for the barbarous acts which the Turkish 
forces, under the pretext of suppression, had com- 
mitted. Moreover, if at the expiration of the 
delay indicated, order had not been restored, the 
Powers announced their intention to devise more 
efficacious measures to check the, evil. The 
extreme severity of these conditions was explained, 
nay justified, by the daily-increasing gravity of the 
news from the East. Owing to the state of 


252 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


terrible excitement equally shared by the Mussul- 
man and Christian populations, everything on 
Turkish territory was rapidly going from bad to 
worse, even in the countries which till then had 
taken no share in the revolt; and it looked as if 
before long there would be security nowhere and 
for nobody. At Salonica, for instance, in a 
bloody riot, in consequence of the abduction of a 
Christian girl, two European consuls, namely, the 
French and the German, had lost their lives. 

The emotion caused by facts of that nature 
was so widespread, and the demand for prompt 
action had become so obviously necessary, that 
not one of the three ambassadors to whom the 
Memorandum was handed, to be transmitted to 
their respective Governments, seemed to doubt 
the latter’s quick assent to it. The most clearly- 
expressed approval was that of the English 
ambassador, who refused to admit the possibility 
of hesitation. He felt himself authorized by the 
general character of Lord Derby’s policy, to 
guarantee the acceptance of the Memorandum. 
As for M. de Gontaut, who had instructions to 
practise as well as to preach a mutual under- 
standing, he saw no reason to deviate from it 
when he was naturally impelled to it. M. Decazes, 
like himself, considered this an opportunity for 
meeting on common ground too precious to be 
lost. He has been accused of, and has even 
reproached himself with, having been too eager to 


THE EASTERN QUESTION 253 


seize that opportunity, But it is not just to appre- 
ciate the fitness of a political act without looking 
at the awkwardness a contrary conduct might 
perhaps have entailed, and the invitation of the 
authors of the Memorandum was couched in such 
pressing terms that a refusal, or even a delay, 
might have discouraged them. The signature of 
France, then, was sent by the return of the mes- 
senger. There was no reason to apprehend any 
difficulty on the part of Italy, and, in fact, there 
was none. But to everybody’s surprise, which, 
however, was nowhere greater than at the British 
Embassy in Berlin, England alone abstained from 
following the generalexample. She was evidently 
afraid that the humiliation inflicted on the Porte 
would be conducive to the increase of an influence 
at which she looked with suspicion. It is well 
known that all political men in England, and-éspe- 
cially the Conservatives, who were in power then, 
are always haunted by the threatening shadow 
of Russia looming over Constantinople. In short, 
the Disraeli Cabinet considered the Note too 
pressing, and refused to subscribe to the threats 
conveyed in its conclusion. A threatening pressure 
was exactly what constituted the merit of the 
Memorandum in the opinion of its authors; the 
* moment it failed to command unanimous consent, 
the whole effect would be compromised. 

Result : a very awkward position for those who 
had signed it, and, it must be admitted, more 


254 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


awkward for France than for any other Power. 
The whole aspect of the affair was, in truth, 
entirely changed the moment the fact which 
should have been instrumental in bringing about 
the concert only served to emphasize the division.. 
The Porte, which might perhaps have been intimi- 
dated had its protectors been unanimous, was 
going to score a victory over their dissensions, 
and would probably be encouraged in maintaining 
a resistance which was already practically forced 
upon it by the fanaticism of the faithful. 
Would it do to use means of coercion, and would 
England, which dissuaded their use, look on with 
indifference? Would she not devise an obstacle to 
their use? Hence, in that case, instead of the 
peace that had been assiduously sought for, there 
would be the impending risk of arousing the 
spectre of war. And even supposing that the 
danger was neither so grave nor so immediate as 
all that, Europe was, nevertheless, divided hence- 
forth into two camps, and which of these two 
was France going to join? Was her place very 
clearly defined in that in which Germany 
seemed to command? Was it in order to take 
up a position there that she would have to cast to 
the winds that moral neutrality which constituted 
almost a guarantee for her material one? Thus 
the situation became sufficiently painful for M. de 
Gontaut, forced as he was to abandon the im- 
partial and conciliatory attitude that had been 


THE EASTERN QUESTION 255 


enjoined upon him. Truly the situation was even 
more disagreeable for the English ambassador, 
thrown over as it were by his chiefs, and the 
involuntary author of his colleagues’ disappoint- 
ment; but this was, after all, but cold comfort to 
M. de Gontaut. 

It was the “unexpected” that put every one’s 
embarrassment to an end; the “unexpected” is a 
powerful factor in all human affairs, and nowhere 
does it play a more important part than in the East. 
It was on May 30 that the Berlin Memorandum, 
with its signatures incomplete and its effect 
discounted beforehand, ought to have been com- 
municated at Constantinople. But on that day, 
Sultan Abdul-Aziz, who was to receive it from 
the hands of the ambassadors, abandoned his 
throne, and four days later he had ceased to live. 
He was overthrown by a palace-revolution,’ the 
promoters of which placed one of his nephews on 
the throne under the title of Murad V. 

A new sovereign is always lavish of fine 
promises. As soon as he was seated on the throne, 
Murad did not fail to announce that he was going 
to fealize spontaneously all the reforms the Powers 
proposed to demand with regard to the general 
administration of his Empire ; and although neither 
he, who was but little known, nor his entourage, 
entirely composed of fanatical sectaries, inspired 
the least confidence for the realization of such a 
high-sounding programme, it was felt that the 


256 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


least one could do was to grant him the necessary 
respite before taking it for granted that he would 
not even make an attempt in that direction. The 
“handing” of the Memorandum was therefore 
postponed to a future but indefinite time, and the 
delay, in order to make the proof a loyal one, 
could not be less than a few months. But there 
are times when months count as years, and when 
the events change under our very eyes within the 
space of a day, not to say an hour. The adjourn- 
ment of a measure under such conditions practi- 
cally means the abandonment. In a very little 
while the Berlin Memorandum had ceased to be 
spoken of, because having become either in- 
sufficient or inapplicable on more than one point, 
it would have answered no longer to the necessities 
of the situation or to the feelings of those who 
had inspired it. 

The whole of the question being opened afresh, 
as it were, the French Minister could apply him- 
self once more to the loyal but ungrateful task he 
had imposed on himself, z.e. to take up anew the 
strands of the broken accord, and to discover on 
the constantly-shifting ground a point that might 
serve as a new centre of union, The chief thing 
was to influence England, for it was she who had 
left the line traced out for common action, it was 
she who had to be converted from the personal 
interest that had induced her to stand aloof, to 
considerations for the general interest, and there- 


THE EASTERN QUESTION 257 


fore of a more lofty character. I doubt whether 
he would have succeeded if Turkey herself had 
not aided in that conversion by a terrible and 
gory sermon. Its humour indulged and its hands 
left free by the hesitations of Europe and the 
protection it fancied it had secured in London, 
the Ottoman Ministry, instead of paying attention 
to the promised reform, flung upon the revolted 
provinces, and even upon those which, like 
Bulgaria, had until then only protested in words, 
wild hordes, recruited from the lowest strata of 
Islam, and the unspeakable excesses and fiendish 
conduct of which made even English opinion 
recoil with horror. The indignation caused by 
those outrages, or “‘ Bulgarian atrocities” as they 
were called then, was turned to account by the 
incomparable eloquence of the leader of the 
Liberal Opposition, Mr. Gladstone, in such a 
manner as to make it impossible for the Con- 
servative Cabinet to take the presumed authors 
of those foul deeds under its protection. ‘I am 
compelled to admit,” said one of the English 
Ministers on a visit to Paris to me, ‘‘I am com- 
pelled to admit that the Turks have not proved 
very creditable clients to us, and that we shall not 
be able to defend them very long.” And he as 
good as concluded that, to save them from being 
ruined completely, it would have been better, 
perhaps, to have resorted to measures of deserved 


severity, which, their principle being admitted at 
5 


258 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


the outset, might have been directed and tem- 
pered in their application by friendly hands. 

But while on that side there were visible signs 
of a tendency to a rapprochement, were there not, 
on the other, symptoms of an impending with- 
drawal in the opposite direction, and in a manner 
that might prove irreparable ? The odious spec- 
tacle afforded by Turkish agents caused a disgust 
in England that impelled her to a better under- 
standing with the Powers. -Was not that same 
feeling of disgust in Russia apt. to arouse a 
generous and boiling impatience it might be 
difficult to keep within bounds? At every fresh 
misdeed on the part of Turkey, a general cry 
resounded throughout the orthodox Empire, which 
cry penetrated to and was re-echoed in the councils 
of the Czar, and impelled him to rush by himself 
to the defence of religion, justice, and humanity, 
without counting on evidently laggard allies. The 
Russian army, already massed on the Ottoman 
frontier, was burning to cross it. 

Again M. Decazes had recourse to M. de 
Gontaut to prevent extremities that might, once 
more, have compromised everything. The Czar 
and his Chancellor were, as usual, to spend the 
summer season at Ems. M. de Gontaut might 
meet them there without stirring from home, as 
it were, and without incurring the suspicion of 
having come after them. There is no need to 
remind the reader that a friendly intercourse of a 


THE EASTERN QUESTION 259 


few weeks in a watering-place may lend itself to 
frequent and confidential conversation. M. de 
Gontaut was to seize the opportunity of those 
daily gatherings to preach patience. It was not 
an easy task. At the outset, the recollections of 
the previous year invested M. de Gontaut’s inter- 
course with his august visitors with a particularly 
friendly and effusive character. But when, having 
come to the question of the day, he ventured to 
utter a few sentences counselling calmness and 
moderation—when, especially in M. Decazes’ 
name, he considered himself justified in submitting 
one or two propositions which, more moderate 
in form than those of the Berlin Memorandum, 
might have facilitated a return to the entente 
with the Cabinet of St. James’, then the aspect of 
the scene changed, and the extremely friendly 
feeling made room for visible signs of displeasure. 
Astonishment was expressed that France should 
show such cool unconcern for the interests of 
Russia, which coolness, it was not denied, was 
apt to cause surprise and even disappointment 
after the service Russia had rendered to her. 
Russia had expected a little more tenacity of 
memory on France’s part. Russia also did not 
fail to remind France that her signature, trans- 
mitted by M. de Gontaut himself, still figured at 
the bottom of that Memorandum, which had not 
been withdrawn, but only suspended, out -of con- 
fidence, which had turned out to be singularly 


260 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


misplaced, in Turkey’s projects of reform. Such 
being the case, they—M. de Gontaut as well as 
his Minister—stood still committed to an active 
policy the mode of which, though not the principle, 
might be susceptible of alteration, and from which 
they were no longer free to depart. 

The subject gave rise to lively discussions, 
revealing on the sovereign’s part a feeling of 
wounded self-love which might have been easily 
embittered by the slightest want of tact or the 
slightest incautious word on the part of the am- 
bassador. M. de Gontaut was sufficiently fortun- 
ate to be able to pour balm into those wounds 
by never departing from an attitude of moderation 
which was not altogether devoid of art. His 
principal and constant argument was to remind 
his interlocutors that the greater the isolation of 
the Porte, the smaller its hopes of finding support, 
the easier would be the overthrow of its resist- 
ance whether moral or material. But in his 
attempts to prevent the discussions from becom- 
ing embittered M. de Gontaut derived his greatest 
aid from the confidence his word inspired, from 
the certainty felt by his interlocutors that there 
were no mental provisos hidden behind the in- 
tentions he expressed, and that he would not 
have condescended either to serve or to second 
underhand any other views than those of which 
he had made himself the interpreter. 

Thanks to that assurance the end of that 


THE EASTERN QUESTION : 261 


stormy season was reached in comparative peace ; 
and the time having arrived when it was no 
longer possible for any one to hope or to wait 
for any beneficial change in the East, it was 
England herself who felt the necessity for getting 
out of the equivocal position in which she had 
placed herself, and took the initiative in proposing 
a Conference at Constantinople between the repre- 
sentatives of the Powers. This was’ practically 
coming back—though somewhat late—to the 
ground for a common understanding which France 
had never deserted, and to which she had never 
ceased to invite everybody, she herself waiting 
for them there all the while. It is not detracting 
from the merits of M. Decazes to affirm that 
nothing aided him more efficiently in the attain- 
ment of the aim he had so constantly pursued, 
than the confidential conversations of M: de 
Gontaut with the two Emperors during the latter 
weeks. 

I say the two Emperors, for the Emperor of 
Germany had also frequently been to Ems, and 
made a third at those interviews. He brought 
back from them—and did not scruple to say so 
very openly—a feeling of complete satisfaction 
both with regard to the policy of France and 
the attitude of her representative. ‘ We are 
united with France,” he remarked on several 
occasions, *‘and I trust that we shall remaih united 
in a task of conciliation and peace.” He was 


262 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


lavish in his praise of M. de Gontaut. ‘He is 
the best ambassador we could possibly have, and 
I verily believe,” he added, laughing, ‘that if 
they wished to take him away, I should make it 
a casus bell.” And when people ventured to 
point out that Herr von Bismarck did not share 
that answer, he answered: ‘‘I am aware of it, 
and it seems incredible to me. I have told him 
many a time that we shall never have any one 
better, and I have also told him that he did not 
see the ambassadors often enough, and, for that 
reason, did not judge them properly.” To which 
he replied, ‘that it was not worth while seeing 
them, because they always had something dis- 
agreeable to say about us. But they are only 
doing their business ; an ambassador is not ap- 
pointed to say nothing but what is good of the 
country in which he is on duty.” 

At every Court there are always a number of 
officious and spiteful listeners ready to report to 
those in power remarks calculated to annoy or 
worry them. Herr von Bismarck, therefore, was 
not left in ignorance of the Emperor’s expressed 
satisfaction with M. de Gontaut, and his irritation 
increased in consequence, without prompting him, 
though, to modify the manifestation of it, so confi- 
dent was he of the strength of his position. The 
conversations at Ems, above all, did not fail to 
cause him an annoyance which he was at no pains 
to hide. And the papers followed suit in repre- 


THE EASTERN QUESTION 263 


senting this confidential intercourse with the 
Imperial personages as a new proof of the ambas- 
sador’s tendency to extend his influence beyond 
his regular attributes. They even formulated the 
theory that Ems being without the centre of his 
diplomatic relations, his right to direct his embassy 
from there was open to question. | 

In order to convey an accurate and thorough 
idea of the complexity of the situation, we ought 
to add that Herr von Bismarck’s feeling of annoy- 
ance was not solely due to M. de Gontaut’s con- 
duct personally ; he was just as dissatisfied with 
the line of conciliation and peace advocated by 
the French Government, of which M. de Gon- 
taut was the organ, and with which line of conduct, 
though not daring to oppose it, he had no inten- 
tion whatsoever to associate himself. 

It may be remembered that of all the enig- 
matical and obscure attitudes during the first 
phase of the Eastern question, Herr. von Bis- 
marck’s attitude was the most enigmatical and 
obscure; and his explanations in the Reichstag 


1 This objection, which the German ambassador. in Paris was 
really instructed to point out to M. Decazes, was all the more 
unwarranted, inasmuch as M. de Gontaut, whenever he absented 
himself from Berlin, left secretaries to act for him in whom he 
had implicit trust. Those secretaries were respectively, during the 
first period of his mission the Marquis de Sarye, and during the 
latter period M. Victor Tiby. But the one and the other were 
excellent agents, who kept M. de Gontaut informed of the slightest 
incidents, attended to current affairs with rare intelligence, and. 
with regard to whom, in his correspondence, M. ‘de Gontaut 
expressed at various times his full satisfaction. 


264 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


on the subject, given apparently against his will, 
did not tend to elucidate it, judging by subsequent 
events. One may, however, affirm with certainty 
that at the moment he was by no means sorry for 
the outbreak of the crisis, and that, after all, it was 
he who at the eleventh hour frustrated all the 
attempts whence a pacific solution might have 
issued. 

That was the bit of burrowing he pursued 
assiduously ; and the fact of his not pursuing it 
more openly was not due to his anxiety to avoid 
the censure of public opinion, for which he cared 
not one jot, and which, if anything, he liked to 
defy, but because he feared to alarm by his double- 
dealing the rectitude and good sense of his sove- 
reign. This difference of tendency between the 
Monarch and his Minister explains all that struck 
one as shady, dark, and enigmatical during the 
negotiations, based upon a policy labelled with 
their name, and which policy was affected by that 
want of accord. 

Wilhelm, cherishing as he did the recollections 
of an old family alliance, and grateful, moreover, 
for the aid his nephew had lent him in 1870, 
unquestionably showed himself strongly in favour 
of the hopes entertained by Russia, and sincerely 
desired the debate, when once it was entered upon, 
to turn to the benefit of Russia’s intended influ- 
ence in the East. But he sincerely wished to 
manage in such a way as to obtain that satisfac- 


THE EASTERN QUESTION 265 


tion without Russia or any one else having to 
resort to the extremity of war, the contagious 
influence of which he always dreaded both with 
regard to Europe and his own neighbourhood. 
His gratitude to M. de Gontaut was due to the 
latter’s efforts to realize that dual wish by working 
to maintain peace while duly observant of the 
susceptibilities of Russia. ‘I have seen and had 
a great deal too much of war in my life,” he said. 
‘At my time of life one wishes to end one’s days 
in peace.” } 

Herr von Bismarck, however, was not swayed 
by such scruples. Far from it; his main concern, 
on the contrary, was to provide sufficient occupa- 
tion for Russia in the East, so as to leave her no 
inclination to meddle afresh with the affairs of 
Western Europe, as she just had done to his cost, 
and in an imperious manner which he resented. 
A war on the Bosphorus—whether successful or 
the reverse, whether fraught with complications 
with England or not—such a war meant the re- 
moval of Russia from Germany’s path for a long 
while to come. It meant the de facéo realization, 
whether voluntary or enforced, of proposals which 
Herr von Radowitz had been instructed to make 
at St. Petersburg, to leave the East to be dealt 
with by the Czars, and the West by the Hohen- 
zollerns. It had, indeed, been declined, but it 
would practically have to be accepted when all the 
Muscovite forces had their hands full on the 


266 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


Black Sea. Therefore, the conflict, feared by 
his sovereign, suited the Chancellor marvellously 
well. And the moment he detected tendencies to 
a rapprochement on the part of the Powers, the 
moment the chances of a conflict seemed to grow 
more distant, he had a means ready to hand to 
revive those chances, to shuffle the cards anew, 
a thing not very difficult to do in a game so 
complicated in itself. 

That was what he intended to do once more, 
and with a vengeance, in the Conference assembled 
in Constantinople at the instance of England, and 
which Conference had been very reluctantly ac- 
cepted by Russia. For a short while it seemed 
as if conciliatory tendencies would prevail. The 
prudence and moderation of the English pleni- 
potentiary, the Marquis of Salisbury, seconded 
the views of our plenipotentiaries, MM. de Bour- 
going and de Chaudordy ; Austria was well-nigh 
rallying to them, and the Russian Minister, the 
fiery Ignatieff, almost resigned to them. It was 
that very moment—no doubt fixed upon before- 
hand—which the Prussian envoy, who of all men 
was the most gentle and inoffensive in daily life, 
and who up to then had been silent, selected to 
burst forth abruptly, treating all the efforts for 
peace with almost insulting scorn, and declaring 
that it was unworthy of great Powers to remain 
content with mere impotent compromises in the 
case of such serious questions as these. The 


THE ELECTIONS OF 1877—THE RESIGNATION 267 


effect was sudden and decisive. The stentorian 
voice was Herr von Bismarck’s own, giving a 
signal for the fight. A few timid denials from 
Berlin did not suffice to drown the sound, Hence- 
forward all hope of agreement was at an end, 
Russian ardour and Turkish fanaticism, over-excited 
to an equal pitch, refused to listen any longer, and 
a recourse to armed strength became unavoidable. 
‘“They are at no pains to hide their joy here,” 
said one of M. de Gontaut’s colleagues to him, 
one who was in a position to gauge Herr von 
Bismarck’s sentiments better than no matter who. 


Il. 


The war between Turkey and Russia broke 
out, in fact, in the spring of 1877, and M. de 
Gontaut, who had conscientiously endeavoured 
to prevent it, was not to see the end of it. 
Before fortune, undecided at first, had pronounced 
between the combatants, he had ceased to repre- 
sent France at Berlin. He was. obliged to 
relinquish his duties in consequence of a home 
-€risis, the effects of which ought not to have 
attainted him, inasmuch as no question of foreign 
policy was involved in it. He was, nevertheless, 
dragged into it, and under circumstances. which 
invested his retirement with a character of noble, 
dignified, and natural patriotism, fitly \crowning 
such a well-run course. 


268 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


It would be absolutely foreign to the subject 
of this narrative if I entered into the smallest 
detail with regard to the motives that induced 
Marshal MacMahon to appoint, on May 16, 1877, 
a Cabinet, the composition of which was at variance 
with the views of the majority of the Chamber 
of Deputies, an appointment which made the 
dissolution of that Assembly unavoidable. I will, 
therefore, abstain from all explanation in that 
respect, the rather that even the attempt to 
explain would seem premature to me. The act 
of May 16, 1877, will only be justly appreciated 
when a greater number of proofs shall have 
conclusively demonstrated the false, contradictory, 
and cruelly painful situation in which the Consti- 
tutional Law of 1875 seems to have made it its 
special business to place the Chief whom it gives to 
the Republic. Whena few more Presidents shall 
have found it impossible to maintain themselves 
to the end in the exercise of their dignity—and be 
it remembered that out of the six we have already 
had, four have been unable to complete the whole 
of their term of office '—it will, perhaps, begin to 





1 In reality there are only three ; namely, Thiers, MacMahon, and 
Casimir-Perier, for Grévy was compelled to resign in consequence 
of the alleged and not altogether unproven complicity of his son-in- 
law in the Caffarel scandals ; Carnot, of course, does not count—he 
was murdered. Nevertheless, M. de Broglie is practically right ; 
the divulging of the Caffarel scandals was not due to the virtuous 
indignation of the legislators of France at the corrupt practices of 
some of their fellow-legislators, under the auspices of M. Daniel 
Wilson, but to their wish to overthrow the more moderate Govern- 


THE ELECTIONS OF 1877—-THE RESIGNATION 269 


dawn upon people that a Chief of the State 
cannot be both elective and irresponsible without 
experiencing strong moral trouble now and then ; 
that is, that he will not care to see himself invested 
one day with power as the representative of a 
grand political cause in order to see himself on the 
morrow debarred from serving that cause, nay, 
ordered, as it were, to desert and betray that 
cause. The momentary brilliancy of his position 
is in too great and painful a contrast with the 
state of cipher to which he is condemned, and 
with the impossibility to which he is reduced to 
come to the aid of some interests which are dear, 
and must be sacred to him because of his having 
been chosen to serve them. The purely decorative 
part left to him, the homage to which he is 
entitled, and which the masses fond of spectacular 
show address not to his person but to the memories, 
and so to speak to the relics, of royalty, of which 
he represents but the pale reflex—all these con- 
stitute but puerile consolations, which are not likely 
to satisfy for any length of time a man with his 
heart in the right place, or even a man of taste. 
A resignation, even if it be brusquely tendered, 





ment, and thus to embarrass Jules Grévy, who, notwithstanding 
his culpable indifference to any and everything that did not 
concern the increase of his private hoard, would probably have 
been extremely reluctant to tolerate the composition of an advanced 
Cabinet like that of M. Bourgeois. The whole affair is too long to 
be worked out in a footnote ; one thing is certain, the position of 
President of the Republic is a curious one.—TRANS. 


270 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


like that we witnessed recently, is sufficiently 
explained by those painful conditions of the 
Presidential power. 

Before resorting to that extreme step to which, 
as we know, Marshal MacMahon was finally 
reduced, he fancied he had found a means of 
escape from the painful necessity of leaving the 
power in the hands of the adversaries of the very 
Conservatives who had elected him. The obli- 
gation to affix his name—the most brilliant 
ornament of which was its reputation for loyalty 
—to a programme altogether opposed to his 
well-known convictions and the promises implied 
by his advent to power, after a while became 
unbearable to him. He had the right, subject 
to the approval and with the co-operation of the 
Senate, to appeal to the country and to ask her 
to put an end to this. It was part of his consti- 
tutional prerogative, and I have never been able 
to understand what reproach he could incur for 
having made use of that right. 

But the legal consequence of that perfectly 
regular procedure was a General Election at very 
short notice. The struggle could not fail to be 
violent on the part of a political party threatened 
with the loss of power which it had enjoyed only 
for a short time. Those who desired to maintain 
the home policy of France on the lines which had 
been pursued by the dissolved majority might have 
adopted several platforms ; they decided to choose 


THE ELECTIONS OF 1877—THE RESIGNATION 271 


one in connection with France’s foreign policy. 
That which they did choose, we are bound to 
remark, was not conspicuous for its originality, 
and did not greatly tax their imaginative powers. 
It was simply, as in the days of the possible 
restoration of the Monarchy, the resurrection of 
the theme of Clericalism, and of the danger to the 
world at large from an aggressive revival of Papal 
pretensions supported in France by a-Conservative 
majority. The grievance was old-fashioned, and 
a current of new facts had dispelled the credulity 
which had ensured its acceptance for a little while. 
For the space of four years, the foreign policy of 
the Conservative party, represented during the 
whole of that time by M. Decazes, had sown no 
troublous seeds anywhere. No Conservative or 
even Clerical hand could be detected in agitations, 
one of the results of which, at that very hour, 
was a terrible conflict. On the contrary, peace 
and concord had been preached to all, and in 
every key andtone. Never had greater guarantees. 
been given for—nay, greater sacrifices been made 
in the supreme interest of—common peace. Hence, 
the event of May 16 might have caused some 
surprise across our borders, it could have caused 
no anxiety. 

M. Decazes was enabled to show proofs of all 
this during the debate that preceded the dissolution 
of the Chamber, and, moreover, proofs attested 
by the foreign Ministers themselves in terms of 


272 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


complete and well-meaning certainty. It was so 
much time and trouble wasted, the pretended 
dangers of Clericalism insured to those who 
galvanized the bogey into life, an advantage—or 
to be correct, an auxiliary—with which they would 
on no consideration have parted. The blows 
struck, on the one hand, at religion and at the 
Church enabled them to hold out the other to 
Herr von Bismarck with a just confidence in the 
eagerness with which he would seize it. 

This time, in fact, the union, which during the 
previous ordeals had only been cautiously shown, 
was proclaimed without disguise, nay, noisily bla- 
zoned forth. Until then, whenever there had 
been an attempt to drag into our home discussion 
the fear of or sympathy with the alien, Italy alone 
was mentioned; we were accused of provoking 
the hostility of Italy, the fears and uneasiness of 
which our adversaries pretended to share in virtue 
of a common origin and memories. Germany 
appeared only in the background as the protector 
of the threatened Italian unity, and her battalions 
were only faintly outlined in that background in 
order to inspire a mute fear. But in the present 
case the need for striking well and quickly no 
longer admitted of such compromise ; hence, the 
main sensation-trick of the electoral polemics— 
which, as will be remembered, was the announce- 
ment disseminated throughout the land of a treaty 
already signed between Rome and Berlin—and in 


THE ELECTIONS OF 1877—THE RESIGNATION 273 


virtue of which an armed intervention, in which 
Germany would play the principal part, was being 
prepared, or better still, was ready to chastise 
France, in the event of the names issuing from 
the electoral being of such a nature as to predict a 
Clerical majority. The whole of the German 
Press repeated the story without denying it. If 
there was no absolute treaty, said the Mord- 
Deutsche Zeitung (the inspired journal par exced- 
lence, too wary and too well-informed to utter a 
direct lie), there was, at any rate, a settled 
agreement with regard to it, which would be 
followed without delay by an interchange of 
signatures the moment the apprehended event 
should be realized. It is scarcely necessary to 
say that the allegation in its milder form was as 
devoid of foundation as in any other. There 
was no more an agreement than there was a 
treaty ; one might boldly defy people to produce 
from no matter what Foreign Office in Europe 
the slightest trace, at that moment, of as much 
as a preliminary conversation on the subject. The 
only agreement seems to have been between the 
journalists of the two countries interchanging 
correspondences, the dates as well as the found- 
ations of which were settled beforehand, and, 
as a rule, in Paris itself. Are we to believe 
that there was also an agreement between the 
Republican committees of the Eastern depart- 


ments and the German functionaries of the 
r 


274 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


annexed provinces, such as customs officers and 
rangers, who in their daily intercourse with the 
border populations so openly patronized the lists 
of the opposition as to induce the belief that they 
themselves, the German functionaries, had dis- 
tributed them? In spite of the warnings that had 
been given to us, I am still reluctant to believe 
that Frenchmen could have accepted. such co- 
operation, and my belief was only shaken once, 
namely, when the most celebrated representative 
of that region, M. Jules Ferry, came, after success 
had been obtained, to justify the Republicans for 
having made the threat of a foreign invasion their 
battle-cry, and thus tacitly admitted the benefit 
they had derived from it. The only theory on 
which to account for so damning a declaration, 
which drew forth murmurs even from the orator’s 
friends, was that of gratitude. [I remember per- 
fectly well my turning to the box reserved to the 
corps diplomatigue, where the German ambassador 
sat listening in an affable way, and it was that 
sight which suggested the idea to me to tell M. 
Ferry in reply that it was only in the Diets of 
Poland, on the eve of her dismemberment, that 
members before voting glanced to the envoys 
of the Queen! or of Frederick to try and see 
what they thought. M. Gambetta, who spoke 
after me, more cautious than his colleague, 


1 Empress is what the author meant.—TRANS. 


THE ELECTIONS OF 1877—THE RESIGNATION 275 


carefully avoided the faintest allusion to the 
subject.’ . 

Anyhow, the electoral victory having been won 
by such means, it was not surprising that a 
Cabinet should have been constituted which this 
time did not include M. Decazes, and that the 
first resolution of the Cabinet Council was the 
recall of M. de Gontaut. It would have been 
very ungracious, in return for such services 
rendered, to refuse to gratify Herr von Bismarck’s 
oft-expressed desire. 

The decision was taken without a moment’s 
loss; the only particle of ceremony with regard 
to it was that M. de Gontaut’s recall was not 
notified to him in a direct way. He was asked 
to send in his resignation by intermediaries who 
did not hide from him that his request was 
eagerly expected. He had so often offered it to 
M. Decazes, and had so freely talked with him 
about it from the point of view of general interest, 
that the answer claimed from him could cause 
him neither surprise nor embarrassment as far as 
he was personally concerned. Nevertheless for a 
little while he was tempted to refuse it to those 
who were at such little pains to hide the motive 
of their eagerness. He considered it very hard 
to appear to be his own judge, and to. yield 
practically to the attacks which the German Press, 


1 Journal Offictel, Report of the Chamber of Deputies, Nov 
15, 1877. 


276 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


in the elation of its triumph, showered upon him 
anew and with increased insolence. To defy 
the new Ministry to revoke him would have been 
to prove that his conscience was at rest, and that 
he had not ceased to deserve well of his country 
for a single day. But it would, at the same time, 
have been laying too much stress on an act of 
condescension, the nature of which was easily 
understood by everybody; and he owed it to 
himself to be careful of the dignity of France, 
even when he was relieved of the duty of watch- 
ing over it. His resignation was conveyed to 
the new Ministry by his sons, and accepted by 
means of the telegraph, in the brief and dry 
fashion peculiar to that kind of communication. 
Not another word was said, not a recollection 
bestowed on six years of patriotic service accepted 
under the most painful circumstances, and gone 
through amidst trials amid which neither the 
national honour nor the national interest had been 
allowed to suffer for a single day. So true was 
this, that those friends of M. de Gontaut who 
asked what grievances were alleged against him, 
were frankly told that there were no grievances. 
‘‘ But,” it was added, “ Herr von Bismarck could 
no longer endure him, and we wish to stand well 
with him.” 

To a Frenchman the most painful feature of 
an indifference, so closely akin to ingratitude, 
was the utterly different impression produced by 


THE ELECTIONS OF 1877—THE RESIGNATION 277 


the same incident on alien and but recently 
inimical territory, z¢. at Berlin. At Herr von 
Bismarck’s there was triumphant joy, loudly 
expressed by the pamphleteers in his pay ; every- 
where else there was sincere sorrow, shown in an 
equally undisguised manner. No sooner had the 
news of M. de Gontaut’s retirement spread, and 
before it had been officially declared, than the 
French Embassy was peacefully invaded by a 
kind of procession, consisting of all M. de 
Gontaut’s diplomatic colleagues, expressing their 
heartfelt sorrow at losing, in addition to his ever 
friendly counsels, the daily charming intercourse 
with a host of the best society, whose home had 
always been open to them on the most affectionate 
footing. The first to call was verily the Italian 
ambassador, anxious to grasp the hand of the 
man who at that same hour was pointed_at by all 
the papers as the incarnation of Clericalism. 
Invited by the Empress to come and see her 
that same evening at a most private gathering, 
M. de Gontaut wished to observe to the last the 
somewhat restrictive correctness of the laws of 
etiquette, and did not consider himself justified in 
going thither without having previously and 
personally informed the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of what the latter assuredly knew already. 
“ Monsieur l’Ambassadeur,” said Herr von 
Biilow to him in a grave tone, and weighing, as it 
were, every word; “you came here under very 


278 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


delicate circumstances; it was an act of great 
devotion on your part. The Emperor has already 
expressed to me, and will repeat to you officially, 
his indebtedness to you for your constant efforts 
to maintain good relations with Germany.” 

The cautious Minister had evidently in his 
mind both the sentiments of the Emperor and 
those of the Chancellor, which differed absolutely 
in every respect. He was anxious, on the one 
hand, to omit nothing of what the Emperor had 
commanded him to say; on the other, to add 
nothing that might displease the Chancellor. 

At the Emperor's gathering in the evening, 
the reception was less formal and more cordial. 
The moment the Emperor was informed of M. de 
Gontaut’s arrival, he came to the drawing-room. 
‘This is news indeed,” he said ; “ you are going 
toleave us. This is a great grief to me (c'est une 
grande affiiction pour mot). It is to you we owe 
the good relations with France ; yes,” he added, 
taking M. de Gontaut’s hands in his, “yes, it is 
really to you.” And the eyes of the old man 
grew moist with tears. ‘‘I have asked Prince 
Hohenlohe why you are going? The answer 
was that the Ministry made it a point with the 
Marshal.” Then he suddenly stopped, wishing 
to say no more, perhaps, or not knowing the 
motive of that demand. 

The Empress was even more sympathetic. ‘I 
remember,” she said, delicately alluding to a con- 


THE ELECTIONS OF 1877—THE RESIGNATION 279 


versation in the past; “‘I remember your telling 
me that on your arrival in Germany, the first 
place you went to was the cathedral at Cologne, 
and I also know the substance of your prayer.” 

She could not have told him in a more charm- 
ing and subtle manner that he might console him- 
self with the thought that his prayer had been 
heard. 

A similar recollection forced itself even more 
strongly upon M. de Gontaut’s mind, when a few 
days later he was obliged to ascend the palace 
stair-case in official dress—as he. had done six 
years previously—to hand the Emperor his letters 
of recall in solemn audience. ‘I prayed to God 
then,” he writes in a note, written the same day, 
‘“‘to support me in the cruel task I had under- 
taken. I was ia wai to thank Him for having 
helped me to fulfil it.” 

He had every reason to think that, when men- 
tally reviewing the work done during those years 
of labour, he should find nothing for which he could 
not account openly either to his country or to his 
conscience. His mission had been divided into 
two periods of unequal duration, but of equal 
importance. During the first and shorter period, 
he had responded to the confidence placed in him 
by M. Thiers, by giving the latter the most use- 
ful support in the task that imposed itself before 
any other, of acquitting the enormous war indem- 
nity due to the alien, and to free the soil from his 


280 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


presence. M. Thiers, having retired, there yet 
remained another task, almost equally beset with 
difficulties, and more ungrateful, perhaps, the 
principal burden of which weighed above all on 
the ambassador of France at Berlin; for, as the 
reader may have gathered from these pages, 
material deliverance meant by no means com- 
plete emancipation. As long as the ranks of our 
army were not re-organized, as long as we had not 
repaired the breaches of our line of defence, as 
long as our frontier was unprovided with walls 
and soldiers, our freedom, but recently recovered, 
was ever dependent on a chance or on a whim. 
That weakness of ours was a secret to nobody, 
and least of all to our enemies of yesterday; they 
felt sorely tempted to benefit by it by taking once 
more the road they knew so well, while it was 
yet open to them, and to consummate, by striking 
at the foundations this time, a ruin which they 
felt sorry for not having completed. That was 
the avowed design—not even disguised in M. de 
Gontaut’s presence—of the greater part of an 
eager and battlesome staff surrounding the aged 
Emperor. If Herr von Bismarck seemed less 
eager to associate himself with that danger, it was 
not because he did not share their regret at having 
left a breath of life in us, but because he con- 
sidered himself in a position to keep a tight hand 
over us by means of intimidation and by isolation 
which would effectually prevent our resuming our 


THE ELECTIONS OF 1877—THE RESIGNATION 281 


rank among the independent nations. But how 
eagerly would he have clutched at the simplest 
pretext or at the slightest imprudence on our part 
to strike at us again. And, in fact, his constantly- 
recurring and unjustified provocations, his affected 
alarms, can only be accounted for on the theory 
of his wish to create such a pretext. 

To M. de Gontaut belongs the credit of having 
afforded da noble blessée (‘the wounded noble- 
woman ”)—as M. Thiers called F rance—the neces- 
sary time to heal her wounds, by having maintained 
himself on that slippery and defenceless ground 
in an attitude both firm and calm-; consequently, 
when returning to France, after his recall, he had 
the satisfaction of being able to say to himself 
that the days of trial were over, and that he had 
helped his country to pass through the most 
difficult of these with safety. For after that crisis 
of 1875, the trap of which he had so effectually 
put out of gear, there was an end of all pretension, 
up to then so openly advanced, to keep us in 
leading-strings by exercising a jealous watch over 
the progress of our military re-organization, and 
by haggling with us in that way for our very 
conditions of existence. Those threats, at which 
M. Thiers himself was moved, are reduced to 
silence, and of its organization, as of its develop- 
ment, the French army owes no account except 
to France herself. 

Moreover, material force is not everything ; 


282 AN AMBASSADOR OF THE VANQUISHED 


a vanquished nation also feels the need to re- 
establish the prestige of her shaken moral weight 
in the sight of those who saw her fail. Nothing 
is more apt to make her recover that lost prestige 
than the dignity of character of those who represent 
her. Nothing was wanting in that respect in M. de 
Gontaut, neither elevation of sentiment, nor digni- 
fied demeanour in all the relations of life; and he 
had also the advantage which had by no means been 
overlooked by M. Thiers, when he appealed to him 
as being able to bring to the service of govern- 
ment, the principle of which was foreign to him, a 
patrimony of hereditary honour, recalling the 
traditions of our most glorious days. It will, 
therefore, be simple justice to inscribe the name 
of Elie de Gontaut-Biron in the annals of our 
deliverance side by side with that of the Statesman 
who selected him, and the enlightened Minister 
of whom he was the auxiliary and friend. 





OF THE 
UNIVERSITY 
OF 


we CALIFORNIS 


THE END. 





Richard Clay & Sons, Limited, London & Bungay. 


In One Volume, 8vo, with a Portrait, price 10/6. 





STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
By COUNT BENEDETTI 


The Times—“ Count Benedetti’s volume constitutes an important 
and authentic contribution to the history of a great crisis in the 
affairs of Europe, and if it does not finally determine the share, 
responsibility, purposes, and motives of the principal actors in 
that crisis, it at any rate shows good reason for revising the 


hasty, and in many cases unjust, judgments which prevailed at 
the time.” : 


The Daily News—“ There is a good deal of spicy personal interest 
in the passages which give Benedetti’s version of Bismarck’s 
‘ goings on.’” 


The Daily Telegraph—“ Its peeps behind the scenes, which lead 
up to the most momentous struggle of the century, are of per- 
manent interest.” 


The Daily Chronicle—“ A fascinating book.” 


The National Observer—“ Read in the light of recent events, this 
book gains interest, and it throws light on the origin of much 
that is now agitating men’s minds.” 


The Literary World—“ The book is interesting because it deals 
with the inner aspect of continental politics during a critical and 
momentous episode.” 


The Manchester Guardian—* The book is well worth reading.” 


The Liverpool Mercury—* As a personal vindication these studies 
are convincing, and much interesting matter is incidentally intro- 
duced. We recommend the volume to those who wish to study 
the history of an important and exciting period.” 


The Manchester Courier—“ As a contribution to history the volume 

is striking and valuable, and the brilliant style and thoughtful 
generalizations of its essays give it a high place in the diplomatic 
records of the country.” 


- 


The Leeds Mercury—“ The book will be of service to the historian 
of the future as the testimony of an actor in one of the most 
critical and momentous episodes of the century.” 


LONDON: WILLIAM HEINEMANN 
21, BEDFORD STREET, W.C. 














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